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The thesis is a constructivist theorization of India Pakistan relations to offer a clearer 
understanding of the nature of violence between these two states. In so doing the thesis 
aims to end historical reiteration in accounts of Indo-Pakistan relations - by historical 
reiteration the thesis means the counter productive use of history by both states to 
justify their respective positions. The thesis asks, what is the nature of violence between 
India and Pakistan? To answer this question it theorises the culture of anarchy between 
India and Pakistan and shows how the ideational antagonism between them accounts as 
the causal mechanism for conflict. 
The thesis argues that structural accounts of India Pakistan relations cannot account for 
transience in anarchy and that a normative approach is essential to get to grips with this 
ideationally driven relationship, a relationship that has seen conflicts of both limited 
violence such as the Kashmir war in 1965 and unlimited violence in East Pakistan in 
1971, moreover the thesis empirically demonstrates that different levels of violence 
(limited and unlimited) have been apparent since independence. 
Having demonstrated limited and unlimited levels of violence, the last section examines 
the nuclear tests in May 1998 and looks at the difficulties and dangers inherent in 
establishing a rationalist based deterrence between two states whose normative and 
ideational compulsions have led to military conflict. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the independence and partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 the relationship 
between these two states has been the most intractable and the most danucrou 
political stand off in South Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, it is perhaps the most 
dangerous and unpredictable region in international politics. In a meeting between 
President Clinton and the incoming President Bush, Clinton advised Bush that the, 
"continuing tension between India and Pakistan, " should he high on the incoming 
administrations list of priorities, "because they both have nuclear weapons. "' T'Ihere 
are several explanations for this continuing tension of which three are key. First, the 
hostility between the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League prior to 
independence, hostility that carried over into the post 1947 period. Second. the 
bloodletting that occurred at partition, served even further to entrench hostilit\ 
between them, leading both to question the philosophical justification and legitimacy 
of the other. Thirdly, within weeks of independence Kashmir became and remains a 
continued source of political, ideological and military friction between them. 
The theoretical framework adopted for the thesis (outlined on page 1 1) is grounded in 
Alexander Wendt's materialist/ideationalist constructivist approach and uses W'endt's 
characterization of the three cultures of anarchy. 2 These are a Kantian culture of 
anarchy given meaning through the logic of friendship; a Lockean culture of anarchy 
given meaning through the logic of rivalry; lastly, a 1-lobbesian culture of anarchy 
given meaning through the logic of enmity. 
\V%ithin a South Asian security context, the thesis will apply these three cultures of 
anarchy to India Pakistan relations to account for changes in their relationship and to 
offer a theoretically informed, non-prescriptive assessment of the direction the 
Clinton. Bill, http:. '/edition. cnn. com2004'ALLPOLITICS 07.09 amanpour. clinton. 
truiscrpit index. htmi 
` See Wendt, Alexander, 1999. Social Theori of International Politics. p. 246 
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relationship is heading. Theoretically the thesis %%ill demonstrate that looking at ideals 
and intersubjectivity at the micro le%e1 gives us new insight into the dynamics of' 
India Pakistan relations that a purely structural approach is not able to do. 
The argument of the thesis is that there is a transitory nature to anarchy betwvccn India 
and Pakistan and through analysis using the three cultures of anarchy we can see 
these transformations that hitherto structural attempts to theorise Indii Pakistan 
relations have been unable to accommodate or account for. 
It will be shown that this transient relationship has moved away from a Kantian 
culture of anarchy prior to colonialism, to a post 1947, Lockean culture that 
fluctuated towards a Hobbesian culture of anarchy in 1971. Given that both states are 
now nuclear weapon states, fluctuation between these cultures could hav c 
catastrophic results for South Asia and international politics. 
Constitutionally Pakistan is a Muslim state` created as a home for the Muslims of 
South Asia. India by contrast is a federated secular state brought into being by the 
union of what was the British Raj and the Princely states. This background has lelt 
Indo-Pakistan relations replete with political, secular, religious and constitutional 
antagonisms. Barry Buzan suggests, "their historical, geographic and cultural ties do 
not allow them to ignore each other.. but their organisation principles pose a 
permanent threat to each other. "4 
3 The founding father of Pakistan Mohammed Ali Jinnah died in 1948. The first constitution of 
Pakistan was published six years after his death and has been subject to numerous changes ever 
since, particularly in 1962 and 1972. The dilemma has been caused by the Islamisation debýitc. In 
other words, how Islamic, or not, should Pakistan be? During the late 1960's and early 1970's the 
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) founded in 1967 by Zulfiqar Ah Bhutto moved away from Islam as a 
constitutional cornerstone. Following Bhutto's removal in a coup in 1977, General Zia-ul Haq took 
over, introduced martial law and moved Pakistan back towards Islam. Following Zia's assassination 





Jalal, A\esha 1990. The Sale of. Ilan"tial Rule: the Origins of 
Pakistan 's Political Economy of Defeiic'e. 
4 Buzan, Barry 1983. People, States and Fear. p. 78 
This thesis will look at how these historical. geographic and cultural ties ha\ c 
contributed to the transitory character of anarchy between India and Pakistan and 
examine just how 'permanent' a threat India and Pakistan are to each other and how 
this threat can be theorised and understood more clearly . 
Chapter One will look at the pre-1947 period, and use the \lorlc\ -NI Into reforms to 
argue that a Kantian culture of anarchy existed bet\\een the \arious autonomous Lind 
semi-autonomous regions and Princely states, prior to the establishment of' the 
Morley-Minto system of elections. The chapter will argue that these reforms o\ er- 
emphasized religious differences between Hindu and Muslim at the expense of the 
more inter-religious political settlement of the Kantian anarchy between the regions 
and the Princely states. 
The argument will be made that Morley Minto marked the change from a Kantian 
anarchy of friendship to a Lockean anarchy of rivalry that became apparent in 
relations between the Muslim League and the INC prior to 1947 and became manifest 
after 1947 in relations between India and Pakistan. The chapter is an attempt to 
transcend the pre-1947 period. As John Zavos notes, trying to situate and theorise 
these disparate political, religious and cultural ideologies is a, *'veritable minefield in 
terms of the integration of apparently conflicting positions. "3 Moreover, these old 
arguments about nationalism, caste and religion do little to move the debate on India 
Pakistan relations forward, rather, they have a regressive dynamic which at best 
causes debate to stagnate, or worse, moves debate backwards. 6 
In a speech at the Brookings Institute in 2004 the newly appointed Pakistani 
Ambassador to Washington, Jehangir Karamat. commented (and lamented) that since 
his appointment he is constantly asked questions about the histor\ of the last fi1t'- 
sev en1 years. "Now maybe this is because everybody's crystal clear on «hat is 
5 Za\ os, John. 1997. PhD thesis submitted to the University of Bristol, p. 
6 See for e\ample Nlankekar, 1972. Pakistan Cut to . si=c and Ahmed. Gulzar, 1967. Pakistan . t! e. gs 
happening in Pakistan today and ý\ here it is headed. Or mad he the idea is never to let 
Pakistan off the hook by constantly dredging up its past. But \\ hatev er the reason I 
am going to bore you by not rehearsing histor\ and by focusing only on the present 
and the future. "7 This thesis is an account of the past, ho\vc\er it also applies 
theoretical analysis in a manner that contributes to debate on the present and the 
future of India Pakistan relations. 
The constant recourse to historical reiteration is not merely confined to Pakistan. The 
former Indian Admiral Verghese Koithara argues, "the circumstances en\elopin`g the 
conflict have changed a great deal and that many perceptions derived from historicil 
grievances have little contemporary relevance. " Koithara goes on to suggest that 
without a new consensus between India and Pakistan the "periodic thaws that take 
place are unlikely to lead to durable peace. ' 8 
Characterising the pre-colonial period within a Kantian frarnevork will alto\\ the 
thesis to move on to a coherent processing of post-1947 Indo-Pakistan relations 
through the two prisms of Lockean and Hobbesian anarchic cultures. Ho\\cv'er the 
Kantian culture also allows us to see that what led to partition did not come 
organically from socio-religious or socio-cultural relations on the subcontinent, it 
came from colonialism. Zavos suggests that during the pre-colonial period rulers had 
participated in religious ceremonies and incorporated religious identity into state 
politics, but for the British, the objective of the colonial state was to present itself as 
a neutral arbiter withdrawing from this active role and attempting to draw a line 
between politics as the concern of the state, and religion as the concern of a 
depoliticised population. "9 Emanating from the attempts of the British to dra\\ a 
secular line between politics in the public and religion in the private spranu tile 
multitude of Indian nationalisms and communalisms, none of which proved capable 
Indian Challenge 
7 Karamat, Jahangir. Speech at The Brookinus Institution, \\ ashington, 15'' December 2004 
8 Koithara, \'er<ghese, 2004. Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through a Realist Lens. p. 25 
9 op Cit. Zavos. p. 4 
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of succeeding at an All-India level. 
Chapter Two will analyse the 1965 conflict over Kashmir. because throuLdiout tile 
post 1947 period, ideological rivalry has become manifest in the formes- Dogra 
kingdom with both states, questioning the legitimac\ of the other. An important part 
of this analysis is the implications that a questioning of the legitimacy of the other has 
on the development of conceptions of the Self and Other. 10 This process remains 
deformed and uncertain in India Pakistan relations and is a dynamic that feeds into 
the Hobbesian culture whereby the legitimate right of the other to live is not 
recognised. 
These ideological conflicts are seminal to the transient nature of anarchy and the 
three cultures framework allows us to see how these antagonisms push against the 
static and structural accounts of international anarchy. Thus it ýv iII be argued that the 
ideational and inter-subjective nature of Indo-Pakistan relations contributes to the 
construction and reconstruction of anarchy and as such must play a significant role in 
causal explanation. 
India and Pakistan were founded on two very different ideological and theological 
foundations. India, a secular state where religion would play no part in the body 
politic (secularism became constituted under the 1976 42nd Amendment Act). 
Pakistan founded as a Muslim state, a home for the Muslims of South Asia who 
\vould have been subordinated by Hindu majoritarianism without the creation of 
Pakistan. The crux of these antagonisms has manifested itself in a conflict of Self'and 
Other with both states questioning the legitimacy of the other. 
10 Edward Said uses the term Self and Other to theorise the way the \\'est (or Occident) perceives 
itself by reference to the Other (the Orient). In other \ýords western perceptions ýý1 the Self are 
constructed by the way in which it views the Other. `Orientalism is a st\ le of thought based upon 
an ontological and epistemological distinction made between `the orient' and (most of the time) the 
occident'. For Said the self becomes what the other is not. See Orientali, vn: U c,, ternn ConcL'frions 
u/'the Orient. Introduction 
In 1965. Kashmir became the focal point of these antagonisms. but thhc1c same 
antagonisms were apparent prior to 1965 and e% en prior to 1947. This undermines the 
immutability of anarchy as set out by neo-realism and points towards a transitory 
dynamic in anarchy between India and Pakistan. The theoretical 'section helo'\ \\ ill 
set out how self-identity, ideas and culture have been constitutive to this change and 
how it challenges the immutability of anarchy. 
Part one of Chapter Three will evaluate the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict, part two will 
argue that, given the added materialism of nuclear power status. India and Pakistan 
will struggle to establish a robust nuclear deterrence given the ontological bagýgaaýge or 
meaning both states attach to nuclear power and to each other. 
The 1971 conflict offers the following theoretical question: Was 1971 driven by a 
culture of Lockean rivalry, or was it a Hobbesian battle for survival? In other words 
what meaning is attached to this conflict and what are the inter-subjective 
implications for relations between India and Pakistan'? Implications, that the thesis 
will argue continue to play a constitutive role in the construction and reconstruction 
of anarchy. The first nuclear tests at Pokharan are also vital because they offer a stark 
contrast between the placatory behaviour of Indira Gandhi's government in 1974 
compared to the provocative behaviour of the BJP led government in 1998 - again. 
this changing behaviour allows us to see the transient nature of anarchy bet\\ een 
India and Pakistan. 
Chapter Three will explain and analyse the May 1998 nuclear tests in India and 
Pakistan and argue that this was an important threshold. bringing about a departure 
away from a Lockean culture towards a Hobbesian culture and, given the inter- 
subjectivity between the two states India and Pakistan \\ ill attach a 4ýerý difý(ýcº ent 
ineaning to these developments than other states in the region. This has 'vorrvinn(gy 
implications for the security of South Asia and demonstrates that technolog\ on the 
subcontinent has overtaken the static and structural accounts of India P. ºkistnn 
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relations. It is imperative that a theoretical analysis is applied \\hich is ahlc to deal 
with the transient nature of the anarchy between the t« o states 
Contribution 
This thesis seeks a greater theoretically informed understanding of India Pakistan 
relations. By examining the relationship through a constructivist theoretical lens it 
will make a contribution to understanding how the cultural and ideological constructs 
of India and Pakistan have created transitory anarchic constructs between them. It 
empirically demonstrates how cultural norms on the subcontinent became hardened 
and entrenched by British colonial rule and shows how a predominant culture that 
was not based on religious difference was transformed into as culture of communalism 
based solely on religious difference. The explanatory variable here is European 
colonial policy based on a perception of theological difference that did not take into 
account the cultural interface that had been established on the subcontinent prior to 
colonial rule. 
The lumping together of religious groups or categories is not confined to the 
perceptions and policies of the British Raj, it can be found in contemporary American 
foreign policy and in contemporary scholarship with the burgeoning literature on 
`Islamic terrorism' which takes religion as opposed to politics or culture as its point 
of departure. This thesis will show that religion is too broad a category to be used as a 
basis for causal inference and that religion should perhaps not be used as a category 
at all given its broad and often contradictory meaning to different individuals. An 
example of this is given in Chapter One, which demonstrates that the meaning of 
Islam to Muslims living in central India is very different from Muslims living in 
northern India. 
The thesis will examine how historical and cultural ties have contributed to the 
transitory character of anarchy bet\\ een India and Pakistan and show how cultur-A 
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change is brought about. In the case of the subcontinent, change from one culture to 
another was brought about by policies pursued by a colonial power. 
The theoretical framework will give a clearer and more organised understanding of 
the transitory nature of relations and examine just how 'permanent' a threat lndKl and 
Pakistan are to each other. In this regard the thesis will build on : \vesha . lalal's" 
pointed suggestion of the supreme irony between the multiple lavers of sovereignty 
that constituted political settlements in the pre 1947 period, compared to the post 
1947 environment when the issue of sovereignty is deemed non-negotiable. This is. 
perhaps, the greatest example of the changing nature of anarchy between India and 
Pakistan. 
The establishment of a theory of transience will facilitate three important mOVCs 
forward. Firstly, a clearer format from which to draw causal inferences \1 ill be 
established. Secondly, the important school of thought, collectively known as 
constructivism, will become a rarity in international relations theory in that it can 
offer new and important insights into the dynamics of India Pakistan relations. Third, 
those interested in the security of South Asia will have a new theoretical I'ramework 
from which to debate India Pakistan relations that begins in the pre-1947 period, then 
inovcs on to discuss in greater detail the post 1947 period. 
For example, if it is established that the pre 1947 period - the 1965 Kashmir conflict - 
the 1971 conflict and May 1998 all fit into a Lockean culture of anarchy then the 
argument posited by George Perkovich below that the nuclearisation of India has a 
modernist agenda that is based in the main on Indian ambitions for great po\\er 
status, must be given credence. If however the argument of this thesis is correct and 
India Pakistan relations is moving from a Kantian anarchy through a Lockean 
anarchy, en route to a Hobbesian anarchy, then this has \eorrving implications for the 
Jalal's, Democracy and. -futhoritarianism in South, Isia' is assessed in the literature reg iCýý 
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future security of South Asia. In addition to the various approaches and arguments 
which have been used to understand and explain India Pakistan relations, the thesis 
will offer a framework within which a theoretically informed debate can take place. 
Despite the numerous books and articles written on India and Pakistan and 
specifically on Indo-Pakistan relations, there has been little or no attempt at framing 
the pre-1947 and post 1947 periods through a theoretical lens that allows us to see 
any transitory dynamic. The approach here through the three cultures of anarchy will 
allow new insight into changes in the past, and likely future direction. 
From a theoretical point of view, this thesis will show that culturally constructed 
ideas of identity are reflected in state perceptions of themselves and others and as 
such play a constitutive role in state identity and policy formulation. It will also show 
that these identities are learnt and socially constructed through social process and 
inter subjectivity, thus it can be shown that a socially constructed learned process can 
be unlearned and change. The challenge here is to show that a constructivist approach 
can illuminate a social process whereby change has or could come about in India 
Pakistan relations specifically, and international relations generally. 
For example, Alastair Johnston writes, "France has reacted very differently to the 
unification of Germany in the 1990's than it did to the same process in the 1860's. "'2 
If interests and ideas can change, then so can anarchy(s). In the case of India and 
Pakistan, the important question remains, in which direction is the culture of anarchy 
heading and how will the added materialism of nuclear power inform one states 
perception of the other? 
Despite India and Pakistan becoming independent sovereign states in 1947, many of 
the classic international relations (IR) theories have struggled to account for Indo- 
12 Johnston, Alastair 1996. Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China, pp. 216-268 in Peter 
Katzenstein. The Culture of National Security. 
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Pakistan relations. Given that these two states were born out of %\ hat was the British 
Indian empire, systemic accounts as to why states act the way they do have struggled 
to explain relations between them. This thesis will attempt to show the blend of 
reductionist and systemic variables acting on Indo-Pakistan relations. On one hand. 
foreign policy pursued, particularly by India has a realist characterisation given New 
Delhi's desire to maximize power throughout South Asia and its ambition to 
maximise power beyond the South Asian region. 
When Delhi looks south, it sees a region in which it is the hegernonic power over 
states such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. However, when it looks north 
it becomes enmeshed in an ideologically constructed political (and sometimes 
military) battle with Islamabad. It can be argued therefore that there is an 
unaccounted for blend of realist and constructivist led foreign policy objectives, what 
Stephen Cohen calls the "realism-idealism conundrum, " that this thesis \%ill 
examine. `) 
Cohen's description above gives a good insight into the methodological difficulties 
India Pakistan relations poses for international relations theorists due to its awkward 
juxtaposition between the shared ideas of a once singular terrain and the imposition 
of sovereign structure in 1947. This thesis suggests that the failure of IR to seriously 
address this methodological problem and move forward with a new approach that 
allows for both structure and ideation remains a serious and apparently intractable 
problem. 
Until these methodological and theoretical problems are addressed India-Pakistan 
relations will continue to stagnate in historical reiteration and moreover, if the 
epicentre of international politics is moving away from America towards Asia, IR 
scholarship will continue to lag behind this vitally important change in international 
Cohen, Stephen, 2001. India: Emerging Power. p. 308 
10 
politics. 
The theoretical outline below will begin with a broad account of the classical realist 
approach as argued by E. H Carr and later by Hans Niorgenthau and then mo\ e on to 
look at the structural or neo-realist theory of Kenneth Waltz. Having set out the 
theoretical background to structural realism the chapter \\ III then discuss \\ endtian 
constructivism that seeks to join the macro structure of neo-realism to a micro inter 
subjectivity between nation states. This is important because the empirical s\\cep of 
the thesis crosses over from the pre-1947 period of the British Raj. to the post 1947 
period. Thus a Wendtian constructivism vv1hich, through inter-subjectivity, seeks to 
understand what nature or socially constructed type of anarchy fills the structure as a 
causal explanation is a far better approach than structural theories which rely on 
structure to explain cause, or post-structuralist approaches that challenge the very 
existence of structure. 
Theoretical Framework 
`Neo-realism' or `structural-realism' emerged in the 1970's as a direct response to 
classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and E. H Carr. Realism is %\ idely regarded 
as the most influential theory of international relations and Burchill and Linklater 
suggest that. no other theory has given so much form and structure to the stud\ of 
international politics. "" Writing in his seminal work, The Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr 
argued against a normative approach to the study of international politics, 'hure 
aspiration. ' he wrote, was not a satisfactory point of departure for the stud` of 
international politics. When studying international politics. argued Carr. one must 
alvvavs look at the world the way it is, not the way one vvould like it to be. Carr hcuan 
modern realisms debate about the importance of the balance of power. 
" Burchhi11, Scott & Linklater, A, 1995. Theories of In(eriici Iona! Relziriorns. p. 67 
In order to prevent future conflict he argued, a balance of power in the international 
system is essential to prevent one state obtaining a preponderance of power. 1-01- 
realism. maintaining a balance of power, far from being a cause of \\ar as 
international liberalism had argued, it was actually the best mechanism a\aiLible to 
nation states to prevent war. 
Philosophically realism comes out of the Hobbesian view of the state of nature and a 
balance of power resembles the state or laws of nature. Attempting to de clop 
normative theories of international relations such as collective security had not only 
proved to be very unsuccessful in the inter war period, it was also very dangerous and 
for Carr, culminated in the outbreak of the second world vvar. The timing of Carr's 
work was also important coming as it did on the evc of the second world \w ar and 
proving Carr's assertion that the architects of the Versailles treaty ignored the 
importance of power in favour of a normative approach to international relations and 
as such had put Europe and the world on course for further conflict. We can discard 
as purely utopian and muddle-headed plans for a procedure of peaceful change 
dictated by a world legislature or a world court. We can describe as utopian in the 
right sense the desire to eliminate the element of power and base the bargaining 
process of peaceful change on a common feeling of what is just and reasonable. ' 
Carr was referring to the League of Nations, which he argued was a failed system of 
collective security which had been unable to usurp or overcome the influence of 
national interest and power. 
''ritten just after the Second World War, Hans Morgenthau's Politics .l niorig 
A'ations is perhaps the classic realist text. Like Carr before him. Moruenthau is 
interested in using a positivist methodology derived From the natural sciences to 
create facts, lavvs and principles of international politics. By writing, a set of 
principles or a guide for policy makers, Morgenthau sought to bring the positivist 
" Carr. E. H. The Twenty }'ear's Crisis. p. 283 
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notion of predictability to theorising about international politics. 
In order to develop theories to help guide and inform policy makers a theory must 
adhere to a strict criteria of logical and empirical tests. Theories must not be jud`gcd 
on preconceived or abstract principles or on untestable concepts or h\ pothesis but h\ 
its purpose which for Morgenthau is to bring. "order and meaning to a mass of 
phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible. "' 
Like Carr, Morgenthau argues that human nature is fixed and cannot be changed but 
theories of international politics can be based on knowable facts that work \\ ith 
human nature rather than against it as a utopian approach had tried to do. This is .1 
key departure from Wilsonian liberalism or utopianism as Carr dubbed it, whereas 
liberalism sought to work against the state of nature, realism argues that it works with 
a fixed state of nature. 
Basing his theorising within a positivist methodology, Morganthau developed his six 
principles of political realism in which he argued that politics, "is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is 
first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these 
laws being impervious to our preferences. "" Furthermore Morgenthau makes a virtue 
out of theoretical longevity, he suggests that human nature is fixed and thus can be 
found in the classical Indian, Greek and Chinese philosophies, a pointed reference to 
Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian war-. The point is that theories that 
have stood the test of time have by definition a greater depth and are subsequently' 
closer to the truth than newer theoretical understandings wwhiich Morgenthau dismikse 
as a `fashion' or `fad'. Political realism is not so much interested in enterinu a debate 
, about international politics and international relations theory, its ohjectiv e is to end 
the debate because it argues. normative approaches such as international liberalism 
16 lorg nthau, Hans. 1948. Politics .I mong . 
Walions. p. 3 
ibid. p. 4 
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work against human nature and are consequently dangerous and a,, the Sccond World 
War demonstrated, lead inevitably to conflict. 
Morgenthau suggests that international politics should be set aside as as separate 
sphere or a separate unit to be examined and understood. The concept of intere`t 
defined in terms of power provides this conceptual mechanism. Whatever moral or 
philosophical reason a decision maker might offer for a foreign policy decision, \\ hat 
they are actually doing is maximizing power because as an a priori there is al\\ ýl\ s 
the distinction between what might be desirable to do and \v hat can actually be done. 
These constraints are put on decision makers due to the relative power of'the state. 
By maximizing power at all times a policy maker is maximizing the relative power of 
the state within the international system. By using the concept of interest defined in 
terms of power, observers can actually distinguish between the rhetorical reasons 
given for a policy decision and the real reason for a policy decision. This conceptual 
approach, "imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order 
into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of' 
politics possible. X18 Morgenthau is offering a conceptual aid to allow for the 
observation of international politics and the foreign policy decision-making process. 
Realism has been a dominant theoretical approach to the study of international 
politics since the time of Carr's critique of liberal internationalism and placed po\ver 
politics, the balance of power and the role of nation states as the key levels and units 
of analysis in the study of international politics. These empirical and normative 
concerns of realism became synonymous with the discipline of international relations 
up until the development of neo-realism or structural realism in the 1970, s. 
Neo-realism moved the key unit of analysis -may from the endogenous decision 
18 Moruenthau, 1948. Polilics Among .\ uiioizs. p. 
5 
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maker to the anarchic nature of the international system. That is to say that \\ hereas 
realists argue that policy makers, no matter what they say they are doing, are actually 
maximizing power, neo realism places a far greater emphasis on the role of 
international anarchy in the system and its effect on the decision making process. In 
moving the unit of analysis to international anarchy Waltz argues that there is a 
distinction to be made between a reductionist level of analysis, that is. the 
endogenous, domestic level and the systemic international level. For neo realists like 
Waltz it is the systemic or structural level of anarchy in the international system that 
dictates state behaviour and he rejects as reductionist, realist, liberal and Marxist 
accounts of international relations because they fail to take into account the 
international system which, "comes between the intentions of states and the results of 
their interactions. "14 
For structural realists like Waltz, war and inter-state conflict occur because of the 
anarchic nature of the international system. Thus, structural realism moved the debate 
away from human nature and focused on the international system. For Waltz "\var 
occurs because there is nothing to prevent it. "20 The systemic structure of the 
international system forces states to act the way they do. The absence of any 
overarching international government to arbitrate between them, forces states into the 
self help system. Thus all states, no matter what their endogenous political 
complexion share a homogenised foreign policy pattern. 
Neo-realism contends that, at the reductionist levels the endogenous Muslim state of 
Pakistan and the endogenous secular state of India are irrelevant. India and Pakistan 
have been forced into power politics on account of the anarchic nature of the 
international system. "The anarchic structure of the international system breeds 
suspicion and distrust. The lack of a single sovereign or authority makes it a self help 
system, and it is not necessarily irrational or a sign of paranoia to be preoccupied 
19 Burchil1, Scott & Linklater, A. 1996. Theories of International Relations. p. 86 
20 ibid. p. 87 
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with real, potential, or imagined threats. " 
Although different in approach \Valtz, like Morgenthau shares the same objecti\ c of 
creating a clear systemic theoretical approach or objective la\\s to the study of 
international politics and both make a claim to have found a theoretical approach that 
allows for the inclusion of the relevant and rejection of the irrele\ ddnt. For Walt/ this 
requires a systemic approach that will demonstrate. "ho\\ the systems Ic\ cl or 
structure, is distinct from the level of interacting units. '', ' To do this Waltz elaborates 
on his distinction between systemic and reductionist levels and develops three levels 
or images. The first image is human nature, the second image is the state and the third 
and most important image is the anarchic nature of the international system \\hich, as 
mentioned above, Waltz argues is the systemic cause of war. 
Waltz suggests that according to the third image, "there is a constant possibility of 
war in a world in which there are two or more states each seeking to promote a set of 
interests and having no agency above them upon which they can rely for 
protection. "22 In other words the first and second image play a part in international 
politics but the permissive cause of war has always been the third image - the 
anarchic international system. Waltz cites the example of European powers becoming 
more inclined to peace in the inter war period just as Hitler was becoming more 
belligerent. "The increased propensity to peace of some participants in international 
politics may increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of war. This illustrates the 
role of the permissive cause, the international environment. ", ' It also demonstrates a 
clear departure from realism which would argue that war occurred because the 
European states failed to balance power between themselves and Nazi Germany an. 
Individuals such as the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain instead of 
defining interest in terms of engaging in normati\ e appeals to the German regime 
21 Waltz, Ken. 1979. Theory' of International Politics. p. 44 
22 \\ . Iltz, 1959.. Ifan the State and IU ar": A Theoretical. Inalisis. p. 227 
23 
ibid. p. 233 
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should have defined interest in terms of po%\ er-. 
The question this thesis must address therefore is ho\v big a role does anarchy play in 
India-Pakistan relations and what type of anarchy(s) are there? 'geo-realism suggests 
that anarchy is a permissive cause of war in the third image, and the first and second 
images are efficient causes of war. First and second images being, variables such als 
type of government, past history, location and interest. The first and second images in 
India-Pakistan relations are unique given that the t\\o states \\cre borne out oi' the 
same geopolitical territory of the former British Raj and the Princely states and als 
such have a unique cultural history that became separated at partition by the creation 
of the two new independent states. 
For neo-realism it is the quantitative structure of the third image - the internlation,, 11 
system and the self-help system that constitutes and explains state behaviour. 
Competing with the third image for explanatory power are the qualitative first and 
second images that allow for inter-subjectivity impacting on state behaviour. 
In the Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens framework, (outlined belo\\) a 
qualitative approach allows for an interpretation of `soft facts' as opposed to the 
quantitative reliance on the 'hard facts' speaking for themselves and thus doing all 
the constitutive and causal explanatory work. - ` This thesis accepts a quantitativ c 
notion of structure in so far as states do exist in the Westphalian state system. 
crucially however the thesis does not accept that the quantitative third image wholl\ 
explains Indo-Pakistan relations. Thus the thesis «ill supplement third image 
structure with the inter-subjective and qualitative first and second images and do so 
\\ ithin the theoretical framework of the three cultures of anarchy. The thesis then is 
loundationalist in the sense that it is anchored in the structure of the international 
system, but ideational in terms of inter-subjectivity being, a social process that 
See Ruesehemeyer, Dietrich, Stephens, E& Stephens. J. 199'. Capilcllist Development & 
Democ racl' 
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determines the nature of anarchy(s) between states. 
The remainder of this section will look at some of the criticisms of neo-realism and 
then go on to set out the constructivist account of international relations and explore 
the theoretical argument posited by Alexander Wendt that there are different sorts of 
anarchies in the international system and whether those anarchies are good or bad. 
positive or negative depends on the reductionist and inter-subjective behaviour of 
states. 
Neo realism has had a dominant role in international relations theory, but it does have 
its critics. Steve Smith writes, "[t]he state, made by war in many cases, is the product 
of the interaction between internal forces and an external setting. This undermines 
realist and especially neo-realist, claims of the external setting in determining state 
behaviour. , 25 Smith's criticism is pertinent to this study precisely because India and 
Pakistan are carved out of the same territory and had shared the same internal and 
external setting prior to 1947. 
Again we see the unique contours of India Pakistan relations posing a serious 
problem for neo-realism whose systemic makeup has difficulty grappling with the 
conflation of the internal politics of each state with national security issues. 
Neo-realism has difficulty accounting for systemic change because of its insistence 
on the immutability of international anarchy as the causal mechanism, leaving it no 
room to account for change at the unit level. Moreover, liberal internationalists argue 
that the `trading state' has replaced the `military state' because the rise of 
transnationalism and trade, have replaced territorial conquest by empires. 26 This 
25 Smith, Steve. 1995. The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations 
Theory. pp. 1-37, in Booth, K& Smith, S (eds). International Relations Theory Today. This 
criticism of neo-realism is also made by historical sociologists such as Charles Tilly, Michael 
Mann & Barrington Moore who argue that neo-realism cannot account for the relationship between 
internal forces (reductionist) and an external setting. 
`o Rosencrance, R. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State. p. 15 
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clearly challenges neo-realisms argument that the units in the system cannot 
due to the exogenous pressure of the anarchic sy stem acting, on them 
Despite the many theoretical challenges to neo-realism from disparate approaclics 
such as Marxism, neo-liberalism and feminism(s) it remains one of' the most 
influential theories of international relations. Constructivikm, whilst aacccptin-, 
structure, also challenges the systemic nature of neo-realism. 
Alexander Wendt argues that individuals and states act towards objects, including-; 
other actors, on the basis of the meaning they attach to them. That is to say that actors 
react differently to objects or other actors in a manner that is preordained b\ mean ýý`^. 
not materialism. Wendt writes, 
US military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their 
similar `structural' positions, just as British missiles have a different significance for 
the United States than do Soviet missiles. The distribution of power may al\\ aays 
affect states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjecti\ c 
understandings and expectations, on the distribution of knowledge, that constitute 
their conceptions of Self and Other. 27 
Wendt's argument challenges the immutability of anarchy. By way of a positive or 
negative inter-subjective knowledge, states challenge the power of anarchy Is a 
causal mechanism in international relations. In other words states can and do 
challenge anarchy, the units in the system are not wholly at the mercy of anarchy . 
but 
play an important inter-subjective role in the formation and constitution of anarchies 
dependent on the interests and identity that different states have. States are at the apex 
of the subjective process they are not at the mercy of an unchanging, all embracin-, 
anarchical structure. If Wendt is right and power politics is socially constructed by a 
process of inter-subjective modes of behaviour, then the India-Pakistan relationship is 
replete Nv ith examples, not least the sectarianism borne out of partition. India and 
27 \Vendt, Alexander 1992 Anarchy is \\hat states make of it: The social construction o{' po\w-er 
politics. " Inlerncitional Organisation, 41. pp391-425 
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Pakistan both claim to be nuclear powers and both statt,, ha%c prosecuted \\ar- against 
one another since 1947. 
Indian missiles do not threaten Sri Lanka per se and Pakistani missiles do not 
threaten the security of Nepal. Therefore it can be argued that there are other 
reductionist dynamics at work. Wendt poses these pertinent questions. "Does the 
absence of centralised political authority force states to pla\ po\%cr politics'? Can 
international regimes overcome this logic, and under «hat conditions? What in 
anarchy is given and immutable. and what is amenable to chan-cT For Wendt. 
anarchy is not a given, as neo-realists argue. constructivism suggests that po\\cr 
politics may be, "produced causally by processes of interaction between states in 
which anarchy plays only a permissive role . 
'12' Within this theoretical remit the po\%er 
of Waltz's suggestion that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent it becomes 
less persuasive and is demoted as a causal mechanism to a, statement of, war occurs 
because war occurs, or perhaps, war occurs because states let it occur. The systemic 
explanation as to the cause of war moves away from a systemic anarchy, towards a 
more state-centric or reductionist explanation which allo\\s states to interact \\ ith 
each other as opposed to being given a purely reactionary role against the sell-help 
system. 
Thus Wendt suggests that there are other inter-state and inter-subjective dynamics 
which effect one state's perception of another. He writes 
States act differently towards enemies than they do toward friends because enemies 
are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are 
insufficient to tell us which. US military power has a different significance for 
Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar `structural' positions" 
Again we can see the constructivist challenge to the immutabilit` or logic of anarchy 
2S ! h! [i. pp. 191-421 - `' ibid. pp. 391-425 
'`' ibid. pp. 391-425 
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that challenges the materialism of neo-realism. This 'rump materialism' is 
insufficient to offer a fully s` stemic account because it leaves no room for ideation 
and the subjective and epistemological use of know ledge such as identity -formation 
and interests. Wendt conceptualises the role of anarchy in its rump material for1mm as 
an empty vessel that has no intrinsic logic or specific form. "anarchies only acquire 
logics as a function of the structure of what \\c put inside them. " 3' So the problem 
constructivism has with neo-realism is not structure, but materialism \\ hick is given 
too much explanatory power. So in parlance with Wendt's empty vessel metaphor, 
the international structure is the empty vessel and interests and identity need to be 
given greater theoretical power in accounting for the nature of anarchies. 
Constructivism accepts structure (although not materialism) but adopts a different 
approach as to its formation, suggesting that structure does not exist apart from 
process. For neo-realism the structure of international anarchy dictates or programs 
state behaviour. Constructivism suggests that there are two different levels to 
structure, a macro level structure and a micro level structure. Neo-realism uses the 
broader macro level of structure as its causal mechanism, constructivism uses the 
micro level of structure because of the interaction between states and interaction is 
regarded as structure, a structure where ideas and interests play a role in its 
formation. 
The key difference is that the macro structural approach looks to the system to 
explain state behaviour and the micro level looks to individual agents and the 
interaction between them to explain state behaviour. The macro structural approich 
looks from the system to the units and micro structural looks at the interaction 
between the units within the system. As Wendt puts it. No particular words are 
essential to English. World War II would still have been that if German` had not 
attacked Greece. In each case, certain unit or interaction-level states of affairs are 
\\'endt, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. p. 249 
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sufficient for the existence of a macro-state. but not necessur . "3, 
The point is that at the sufficient macro level, variables can drop out of the broader 
macro causal explanation, therefore its net is cast too %% ide allowing it to become ovLer 
burdened with sufficient causes that do not add anything specific to the thcorctiLIl 
explanation. 
This chapter will now outline the contribution that has been made b) a micro Ie\ el 
examination of international relations and use the constructiv ist emphasis on i& is, 
culture and identity to show how states use ideas and culture to take each other into 
account. States are not approaching each other Prom a position of materialist 
ignorance. States do know each other and do take each other into account and interact 
based on these assumptions. The Bosnian civil war can be used to highlight how 
culture and collective memory are used. 
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1992 few Serbs believed that Croats and Muslims 
were fanatics out to deprive them of their rights. They explain the \\ ar and `ethnic 
cleansing' instead in terms of the opportunistic policies of a Serbian leadership bent 
on resisting economic reform" 
However, constructivism argues that the resource or dynamic that made this possible 
was the collective memory that throughout their history, Serbs had been victimised 
by a series of others, ranging from the Ottoman Turks, to Croatian and German 
fascists and that this collective memory prepared the ground for a population to be 
receptive to ideas of being conquered and dominated by an outsider or other. It is this 
cognitive resource which helps explain how the Serbian leadership \\ , -Is able to 
mobilise its population against its Muslim and Croatian neighbours with such relati\ e 
ease. 
32 ibid. p. 1 _> 
2 
°' ibid. p. 163 
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On the use of culture and collective memory as a force for political mobilisation 
Heather Rae argues that this culture of collective memory and identit\ stretched 
beyond the use of mobilisation, to the destruction of cultural and historical sites 
deemed not worthy of, or a threat to, the history as some might wish to re\\ rite it. 
"Thus, after all the Mosques in the formerly Muslim-majorit\ cit\ of Zvornik \\ crc 
systematically destroyed, the warlord Branko Grujic declared, 'There never \\ere an\ 
mosques in Zvornik. "'34 
The use of a normative appeal to collective memory coupled with a threat to ý111 
ancient way of life can and has had an influence in terms of' both mobilisation of'the 
Self against the Other and in terms of rewriting history. In historical parlkin1ce, the role 
of ideas and self-identity play a powerful role in deciding %%hat gets in the (history) 
books. In the case of Zvornik, how history can be rewritten to marry with a 
predetermined idea of what it should say. 
Rae is concerned primarily with domestic agendas, but the formation and role of 
ideas and interests at the endogenous level has implications for international relations 
because it is these ideas and interests states use to interact with one another. For 
constructivists, this is what states use to fill the empty vessel of anarchies and it is 
this knowledge, good or bad, positive or negative, which plays a determining role in 
how states relate to each other. 
For constructivism, anarchy does not predetermine or programme state behag lour, 
anarchy is not a given, it is an 'empty vessel' and states pla\ a social role in 
determining what gets into the vessel which in turn depends on the formation of idols 
and interests. In other words, actors have an agency role in determining the nature of 
anarchy through social process and how these ideas of culture and interests get i lajv cd 
out, is international politics. 
34 Rae, Heather. 2002. Homogenisation c! I Peoples. p. 166 
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The Three Cultures of Anarchy 
Wendt's three cultures of anarchy are adapted from three different philosophical and 
theoretical approaches that reflect different understandings as to the state of natur-c 
and the subsequent role of the state and the structural debates about what the role of 
the state is and to what extent the behaviour of states is determined, or not, by 
anarchies. In "Hobbesian cultures it is 'enemy' in Lockean 'rival' and Kantian 
'friend. ' Each involves a distinct posture or orientation of the Self toward the Othcr 
with respect to the use of violence. "'' The posture of a Hobbesian enemy is one of 
survival where the use of violence has no limitation. In a Lockean rival culture the 
use of violence is considered for the purpose of advancing an interest or to secure a 
specific objective. A Kantian anarchy is one of friendship or security community 
where the use of violence is not an option and states \\ork collectively against a 
security threat. 
The three approaches will be outlined below and it \\ ill be suggested that the three 
levels are needed to take into account the unique structure of the relationship \\ hick. 
prior to and after 1947 has shown signs of all three of the Hobbesian, Lockean and 
Kantian cultures of anarchy. The thesis will argue that the structure of anarch\ 
between India and Pakistan is one where ideas and identity prevail over structure and 
that inter-subjective anarchy in India Pakistan relations dominates over structure and 
that Kashmir has, more often than not, been caught in the middle. When it has not 
been Kashmir, it has been Bangladesh, Punjab or Baluchistan, knowledge is partial 
and amorphous and has always prevailed over structure. The three cultures of anmtrchv 
will allow the thesis to increase our understanding of \\hich direction indo-Pakistan 
relations is heading by looking at which variant of anarchy no\\ dominates relations. 
In the 1-lobbesian culture of anarchy survival is the key and the amount of' violence 
one is prepared to inflict on the other reflects a kill or be killed attitude. are 
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constituted by representations of the other as an actor who (l) does not recognise the 
right of the self as an actor to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not 
ý, tiillingly limit its violence toward the self. "36 It is the emphasis on sur\ ikal that 
the Hobbesian approach its hard edge and wh,, it is the most extreme and dangerous 
of the three anarchies. This limitless recourse to violence is explained hý the 
fundamental of survival, it moves beyond conflict whereby- violence might he gauged 
to meet an objective (Lockean) and into a sphere where an enemy does not recognise 
the right of the other to exist. This is the Hobbesian vie\\ of the state of nature 
without a Leviathan, or where the limits of the use of violence becomes limited due 
to material exhaustion. 
Wendt suggests that treating the other in terms of a Hobbesian enemy has several 
implications for a state's foreign policy posture and the history of India Pakistan 
relations is replete with such posturing. First, a state being treated as the other in the 
Hobbesian sense will try to respond in kind or by pre-emption and in doing so, move 
away from what might have been a status quo position to being forced into a till or 
be kill mode. Second, the decision making process moves to a worst case scenario 
where possibilities rather then probabilities \\ ill dominate the process, thus negating 
any chance of rapprochement and relegating the chances of a third party successfully 
intervening to prevent further escalation. 
Third, and crucially in the case of India and Pakistan, relative military capabilities 
become crucial and become the benchmark used to predict the behaviour of an 
enemy. In others words under a Hobbesian anarchy, military capability becomes the 
mechanism used to predict the behaviour of an adversary because the Other has 
already been established and is known as the enemy. Thus any political process has 
been usurped by military capability and the relativ c military power of the enemy is 
used to predict the behaviour of that enemy. 
endt, 1999. Social Theory Yt International Politics. p. --ý8 
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Constructivism argues that causal explanation resides at a social Ic' el of interaction 
between states and, "explains power politics ultimately by reference to perceptions of 
the self and other, and as such sees it as fundamentall\ social in the \Vcherian 
sense. " 7 Once a Hobbesian anarchy is socially constructed states x\111 behave in a 
manner that makes them an existential threat to the Other. 
This is the self-sustaining logic of a Hobbesian anarchy. The theoretical argument lies 
in where this logic comes from and what sustains it. Wendt suggests that change ma\ 
come about, not by anti-foundationalists emphasising the plasticity of the system, but 
by emphasising the resilience of shared ideas and interests, "no structure is easy to 
change, but a Hobbesian culture that constructs states as enemies will be a lot more 
resilient than one in which shared ideas matter as little as realists say. "'' That is to szl' 
that it is the social construction between states that is resistant to change. far more 
than the system itself and that states that construct others as the enemy through 
shared ideas will be far more resistant to change. 
The Lockean culture moves away from the kill or be killed, I-lobbesian emphasis of 
survival, to one of protection. The concept of rival has a very different meaning to 
both Self and Other and suggests the element of competition where violence is used 
in limited measure to secure an objective. That objective being premised on a 
tangible asset as opposed to unlimited violence to secure survival. 
Under a Lockean anarchy, states live within a status quo remit of live and let Ike 
\vhilst recognising the intrinsic right of other states to do the same. Sovereignty 
becomes a property, but becomes a right, only when other states recognise it as such 
and here is a key difference between the Hobbesian culture \\Ith its emphasis on 
survival and a Lockean culture which resides in the social recognition of soN erei`gnty 
'' \1 estdt, 1999. titýc"ru/ Theori' of inter national Politics. p. 263 
ibid, p. 278 
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of one state to another. The units do not live in an international system of self-help 
and the units against the system, but share a greater amount of unit construction. the 
recognition of sovereignty being an important normative construct of states relations 
with each other. "A powerful state may have the material capability to defend its 
sovereignty against all comers, but even without that ability a \\eak state can enjoy its 
sovereignty if other states recognise it as a right. "According to Wendt. this is 
because a constitutive outcome of having a right is self- limitation by the other, that 
the sovereign right of one state allows it to bestow sovereign recognition on the other. 
Thus, sovereignty of the self allows for the recognition of the sovereign right of the 
other and this sustains the status quo position. 
Despite the absence of a centralised authority or Leviathan most states adhere to this 
Lockean anarchy most of the time despite the major inequalities of material power 
and inequalities of economic and military capability. The Lockean system negates the 
realist imperative on the maximisation of power because the `rump materialism' of 
anarchy is controlled by the Self, recognising the sovereign right and legitimacy of 
the Other. States, by viewing each other as rivals, as opposed to enemies, "expect 
others to use violence sometimes to settle disputes, but to do so within 'live and let 
live' limits. "40 
There are several implications coming out of the Lockean anarchy for Indo-Pakistan 
relations. The first is that this anarchy changes the meaning of military force held by 
the other. Whereas in a Hobbesian anarchy the rump materialism effect abounds, 
forcing states into a kill or be killed mode, under a Lockean anarchy there is more 
room for manoeuvre because the meaning of military power changes. In other words 
it is the type of anarchy states live under that gives meaning to military capability, not 
military capability per se, thus the risk-aversion that states face with regard to their 
security, the threshold of risk is greatly reduced because states have more options 
39 Wendt, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics, p. 275 
ao ibid p. 281 
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given that they are not preoccupied ý\ ith survival as under a Hobbesian culture. 
When states accept and internalise the Lockean system. recounition of so\ erei-gnt\ of 
the other reduces the explanatory power of international anarchy and the self-help 
system because the system itself becomes less important than the recognition of the 
other's sovereignty. Thus survival via recognition as opposed to the sur% i' al of' the 
fittest becomes the norm in state relations and therefore it becomes in the interest of 
the self to recognise the other. 
The last culture to be discussed here is the Kantian culture %v hich moves a%v Llv f'ronm 
the Hobbesian emphasis on enemy and the Lockean emphasis of rival to emphasi/c 
friend. The Westphalian system has been dominated by the Lockean system %\ ith its 
liberal assumptions of the importance of individuality and the egoism of' states has, 
for the most part, dismissed as idealism or utopianism the role of friendship in 
international politics concentrating instead on the role of enemies, rivals and the 
causes of war. 
Under a Kantian anarchy a security community is formed whereby the use of military 
force is not an option and moreover is not even considered as an option. A Kantian 
anarchy can be seen in relations between America and Canada and bet\\cen the 
members of the European Union where political and economic - and even territorial 
disputes in the case of Britain and Spain - do occur but arc settled by \u-iv of other 
kinds of power such as discussion via institutional arrangement. 
What the shared knowledge that constitutes a security community does is change the 
meaning of military power from its meaning in rivalry. In disputes among rivals 
relative military capabilities matter to outcomes because the parties kno« the\ might 
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be used. In disputes among friends, this is not the case. " So the meaning of military 
power moves away from a neo-realist balance of power because under a Kantian 
anarchy the knowledge of what constitutes military power has a different meaning 
because it is derived subjectively from shared cultural ideas constructed between 
states. 
The stark contrast between these anarchies can be seen by looking at the anarchies 
between the USA, Canada and Cuba mentioned above. The Kantian anarchy between 
the USA and Canada rules out the use of military force and in doing so negates the 
balance of military power between them. In the case of Cuba the Lockean (or even 
Hobbesian) anarchy between Cuba and America constitutes a very different meaning 
of American military power, or rump materialism, in Cuba than it does in Canada. 
Again it is the rump materialism that is given meaning by shared ideas and interests. 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian anarchies are the sure of inter-subjective 
knowledge, interests and ideas that each state has of the other and each plays a 
powerful constitutive role in any outcome. 
Because so much international relations literature concentrates on war and the causes 
of war, much of it concentrates on enemies and very little of it concentrates on 
friends, "[r]elative to enemy, the concept of friend is under theorised in social theory, 
and especially in IR literature where substantial literature exists on enemy images but 
little on friend images. "42 Geoffrey Blainey makes a similar point, "For every 
thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on 
the causes of peace. , 43 Under a Kantian culture the need for a Leviathan would drop 
out because of shared knowledge and trust of states knowing each other's intentions 
and being more inclined to believe those that they like than those they don't like. For 
example a western liberal government will be more inclined to believe another 
41 Wendt, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. p. 300 
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western liberal government than a non-liberal government. because of sture, idc, iý, 
and interests of liberal democratic states. 
Wendt uses the term friend as a role structure 'ti hereby each state obsc r\ c, the 
following norms. "(1) disputes will be settled without \\ar or the threat of war and (2) 
they will fight as a team if the security of one is threatened by a third party . 
"44 i lhcý, e 
terms cut across two of the major theories of international security, a security regime 
and a security community. Security communities have been discussed above and two 
examples given, the USA-Canada relationship and the members of the European 
Union, where a resort to military force is no longer regarded as an option. The second 
theory, security regimes, effects the extent of internalisation of friendship given that 
states enter into such arrangements for the benefit of security (such as the North 
Atlantic states) creating allies as opposed to friends. "[f]riendship is temporally open- 
ended in which respect it is qualitatively different from being allies. Allies enoauý2 in 
the same basic behaviour as friends, but they do not expect their relationship to 
continue indefinitely. "'S Thus, a friendly relationship continues for so long as there is 
a security threat against them, when that security threat wanes the relationship reverts 
to a Lockean or even Hobbesian culture. 
Before discussing some of the criticisms of constructivism there is an important point 
to be made about the level or degrees of internalisation of the three anarchies 
discussed above. There are three levels of internalisation, that is, how far and ho\\ 
deep have the norms of the three anarchies been internalised into the body politic and 
how the structure of these norms affects cognitive processes. The three levels or three 
dcorees of internalisation are coercion, self-interest and legitimacy and each illustrate 
the disparity between Self and Other. in the Lockean and Hobbesian case. Or 
illustrate the fusion or sameness between self and other in the Kantian case \\ here 
interest is defined in terms of collective identity. 
4' Wendt, 1999. Social Theor_' of International Politic pp. 299-299 
4' ibid. p. 299 
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The first of these degrees is coercion when an actor or agent is forced into a policy or 
action they would otherwise not undertake. The agent is neither moti\ated to comply 
nor does s/he regard their actions as being in their oww n self interest, so the stimulus to 
act in this fashion is external and without this external stimulus an a(-, ent would not 
proceed. So the first degree of internalisation constitutes a conflict of material po\\ er 
and private meaning versus culture. This is the position of realism, which arUucs that 
in the end it is the restraints placed on states by the s\ stem that compels states to act 
the way they do. 
The second degree of internalisation contains considerable overlap with the first 
because it clashes with the amount of materialism against which we might judge our 
own self interest. Perhaps the disparity is most clear in the sense that in the first 
degree an agent has no autonomy at the decision level, whereas in the second dc, rce 
the decision is left to the actor. The second degree exists vvhen, "actors in this space 
obey cultural norms, not because they think the norms are legitimate (the third 
degree) but because they think it is in their self-interest. "46 Therefore there is a 
greater element of cooperation as opposed to coercion. There emerges in the second 
degree a lesser role for material forces and a greater role for shared knowledge and 
cultural norms and a dynamic of, if we didn't do it, somebody else would', \\hich is 
very often the argument for the sale of armaments from one state to another. 
The third degree of internalisation is when Self and Other reach a cognitive unlt\ to 
the point where Self and Other merge to become the self, "to say that an actor full` 
accepts its claims on himself, which means appropriating as a subjectivel\ held 
identity the role in which they have been positioned by the generalised other. " In 
other words the identity of the agent becomes constituti\e of the norm and tlhci-elore 
compliance vv ill be high because N\ hat might otherwise be regarded as an exterºial 
46 Wendt, 1999. Social Theory of lnternalional Politics. p. 
47 i(iLf ph. -'7-'-273 
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material force in the first degree, becomes a constituted norm in the First degree. The 
reason levels of internalisation are important ý\ ithin a constructi\ ist account is 
because they show the various levels at which a conflation of' ideas and interests (or 
lack of them) dictate state behaviour. cognitive processes and perception. 
In the third degree where ideas and interests bet\\een the Self and Other reach a 
cognitive unity the role played by a materialist. coerci\ e account. drops out. 
Therefore the greater the level of cultural conflation the closer one gets to a 
legitimate Kantian account between the Self and Other. So the t\ pc of anarchics 
between states range from the materialism of the Hobbesian account %% here the threat 
of death forces states to act in survival and coercive mode. A Lockean culture here 
states operate in a self-interest mode between the Self and Other and a Kantian 
culture of friendship where there is a high degree of legitimac' and cognitive 
recognition between the Self and Other, to the extent that the identity of the agent 
becomes constitutive of the norm. 
Criticisms of constructivism pertain both to its confused and some have ar`guecl, 
contradictory relationship yvith social theory and to how a theory borrowed iar . cl v 
from symbolic interactionism relates to the normative claims of constructivism in IR. 
Rohen Palan suggests that constructivism is, empirically and methodologically \\ rong 
and that in the last analysis ideas, culture and norms are not the principle force of 
order and change in the international system and that in the end it is material Iý>rýes 
and material interest that override normatively constructed action and policy. This is 
the classic realist retort that ultimately, material and structural forces acting on states, 
dictate state behaviour. 
Palan argues that at a theoretical level. "the confused manner b\ \\ hick 
constructi\'ism relates to social theory is not accidental but a necessary component of 
a theory \\ hose goal is to advance such a strong normati\ e and indeed idcolo. gicai 
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perspective. "" Palan's criticism is aimed at \Vendtian constructivism's inability to 
clearly delineate where material interests end and \vhere subjecti\ e normati\ c 
interests take over and until this theoretical demarcation is defined it cannot be 
argued that ideas constitute or override material conditions. To problernatize concepts 
such as power and interest and argue that culture should be treated. not as a\ ariable. 
but as constitutive of material forces, constructivism must set out the demarcation 
between ideation and materialism, a task Palan suggests it has failed to do. I-lo\\ c\ er 
Emanuel Adler offers this definition: constructivism, is the view that the manner in 
which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction 
depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world., "' 
The problem still pertains however as to how and when intersubjective aspects of 
structures part company with the material aspects of structures. 
Maya Zehfuss criticises what she argues is an over reliance on physical behaviour 
between actors when they take each other into account. This for Zeh fuss is 
undertaken at the expense of a discursive exchange between agents which confuses 
the distinction between identity and behaviour and forces analysis to focus onl\ on 
behaviour, that can be grasped without a linguistic content. "'° This centrality and 
reliance on physical gestures, "renders it impossible to analyse identity formation as a 
discursive process. "51 
Zehfuss, goes on to look at the role of Germany as a member of the European Union 
and examine how effective Wendtian constructivism is in explaining the chanuing 
roles of Germany from a Nazi state to the modern Federated Republic and how 
pertinent this is to Wendt's argument about the social construction of anarchies. She 
notes that German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel instructed Ambassadors to NA'l O 
a$ Palan, Ronen, A World of Their Own Making: An evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in 
International Relations, in Revir}ww of International Studies Vol 26, No 4,2000 pp. 575-598 
Alder, I'manuel, 'Seizing the middle Ground: Constructivism in World politics', European 
Journal of International Relations. Vol 3,1997. pp') 19-363 
50 Zehfuss, \laýa, 2002. Consti-ucthvis, n in International Relations. The Politics of Reality. p. 49 
'4 ibid. p. 60 
and the EU to alwa\ s endorse and vote \\ ith the opinion of the majority. For Zell fLI"S 
this shows a willingness to rely on others to make decisions beneficial to the seif. ' 
A process whereby Germany sa4\ its o\\ n interest as being similar to, or e\ en the 
same as other members which shows a willingness to give to the Other responsibilit\ 
for the care of the Self. 
In summary there are two clear problems and criticisms of constructivism. Firstl\ the 
problem of how to differentiate between identity and behaviour in order to identify 
change from one anarchy to another. Secondly, how to settle the issue of phi sical 
gestures not being transferable to a discursive Ic\cl of communication bet\\een 
agents. These are not serious problems for this thesis however because the dependent 
variables being used here do amount to structural change in relations between India 
and Pakistan, most notably the Morley Minto reforms, independence and partition 
that make it that much easier to demonstrate when material aspects of structure part 
company from inter-subjective aspects of structure. Furthermore these changes 
brought about a shift in the culture of anarchy between India and Pakistan. 
In a study that spells out the two differing methodological approaches in research in 
developing countries on the relationship between democracy and capitalism 
Ruescherneyer, Stephens & Stephens suggest that both methodologies have their 
problems. The first method, quantitative cross-national comparisons, which collects 
statistical data from a wide variety of countries, has found consistent correlations 
between development and democracy. Whereas comparative historical studies \\ hick 
seek to emphasize qualitative examination of complex sequences tend to trace the rise 
of democracy back to a specific place and time (i. e developed western states). The 
criticism being, that these specific variables were unlikely' to re-emerge in the context 
of developing countries. 
S, ibid. P. 60 
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These two approaches constitute the classic dilemma bet\\ een quantitati\ c and 
qualitative research, a dilemma that the authors seek to transcend with ýi ne"" 
approach that incorporates the so-called three clusters of po\\ei-, or [lie. 
comparative political economy. " 3 The clusters are. the meaning of democracy as it 
relates to social and economic inequality. Social class di\ isions and their relationship 
to the formation of civic organisations such as political parties. The structure of the 
state and how its formation influences the chances of democracy. Finall\ . trans- 
national power structures and its effect on democratisation. Moreover, the authors 
argue that by giving emphasis to the subordinate classes allows us to see a variation 
in how political elites react to subordinate classes gaining access to the state through 
the evolution of a state-society relationship that will emerge if the state is able to 
respond successfully over time in giving access to subordinate classes. 
The above framework seeks to theorise and understand ho\\ a post colonial state 
might be successful or unsuccessful in consolidating development with democracy 
within a capitalist structure and how by allowing all classes access to the state 
developing nations will develop a civic structure that allows for political and 
economic development. In the case of India and Pakistan the case is illuminating 
because of the starkness in differences and similarities. More will be said on this 
below in the literature review, however the three clusters allow us to see t\\o new 
states both riven with ethnic, class and clan differences, all vying for access to the 
state and trying to consolidate their political positions after 1947. The meaning, of' 
democracy, social class divisions and their effect on the formation of political parties 
and the radically different transnational positioning of the two states after 1947 can 
clearly be seen through this theoretical framework. 
On the \\ ider point of the problems of methodolog\, it also highlights the problcnm of 
marrying quantitative data Ny ith qualitative methods of examining sequential trends 
5i Rueschemeý er, Dietrich. Stephens, ER Stephens, J. 1992. ('(ipitnli. ýt Development cl 
Democracy. p. 40 
and anomalies. Constructivism seeks to draw these two methodologies together. 
accepting both a quantitative structure and a qualitative inter-subjectivity. King. 
Keohane and Verba argue that the differences between the two methods come do\\ n 
to style and technique, because the same underlying logic provides the framework for 
each approach and that, "this logic tends to be explicated and formalised clearly in 
discussions of quantitative research methods. But the same logic of inference 
underlies the best qualitative research. "54 Wendt also suggests that this methodology 
would allow post-positivism to accept the plasticity of structure ýv ithin a qualitative 
remit of inter-subjectivity that would end the debate as to whether structure exists and 
allow for a methodology that took account of structure, but did not draw on structure 
as being solely constitutive of causal explanation. 
Within the Rueschemeyer et al framework, a qualitative approach allows for an 
interpretation of `soft facts' as opposed to the quantitative reliance on the facts 
speaking for themselves and thus doing all the constitutive and causal explanatory 
work. The quantitative empirical grounding of this thesis resides in data thrown up by 
the pre and post 1947 periods and the qualitative theoretical work begins at the level 
of the three cultures of anarchy. 
Methods and Sources 
The epistemology of the thesis sits between the quantitative structure of the 
international system and the qualification of inter-subjectivity and triangulates 
between Wendtian constructivist theory, interviews with diplomats and journalists, 
and secondary sources. Triangulation will be used to corroborate the positions held 
and views expressed by interviewees with the theoretical perspective and secondary 
sources. The theoretical approach using the three cultures of anarchy is a deductive 
sA King, Gary, Keohane R& Verba, S. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. p. 3 
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approach that will guide research findings and inform the knowledge collected from 
interviews and data collected from secondary sources. 
Using the approach of Michael Mann's `as if positivism the difficulties of a wholly 
positivist approach can be seen in that verifiable facts and objective truths must be 
seen in the context of political or institutional bias. Mann argues that this 
methodological problem lies not, "between ideas in general versus material practice 
but between ideas and practice combined. "55 For post-positivists, a purely 
quantitative approach runs the risk of allowing subjective truth (or bias) to be 
mistaken for objectivity. Triangulation between constructivism, primary sources and 
secondary sources allows for a more complete analysis of the data. 
The thesis seeks causal inferences as to the transitory nature of India Pakistan 
relations to reach a clearer and more theoretically informed understanding of the 
variables that drive Indo-Pakistan relations and to offer further questioning and 
hypothesizing on this important and dangerous relationship. 
The argument being posited here are that Indo-Pakistan relations is moving frorn a 
Kantian anarchy towards a Hobbesian anarchy. However, the most important 
contribution will be to offer a new epistemological approach and framework for 
analysis of Indo-Pakistan relations. As Martin Wight argued, the main concern is not 
to prove one approach right or wrong because truth is not the sole preserve of one 
approach. For Wight, the debate itself, between the three traditions was more helpful 
and significant than a debate of ascendancy benefiting one of the three traditions. 56 
Moreover, in defense of Wight's approach Tim Dunne argues that the three traditions 
are meant to be seen through a historical process of the rising and falling of one of the 
ss Mann Michael, 1979. Idealism and Materialism in Sociological Theory, in Freiberg. J eds. 
Critical Sociology. pp. 97-119 
56 Wight, Martin. 1992. International Theory: The Three Traditions. Wight argued that the three 
traditions in IR could be divided into three categories or traditions: realist, rationalists and 
revolutionists. These categories served as the basis for Wendt's three cultures of anarchy. 
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traditions or cultures. The rising and falling of these various approaches (or cultures) 
is precisely the task of this thesis. Furthermore, Dunne sums up another of Wight's 
contentions that, "the greatest political writers in international theory almost all 
straddle the frontiers dividing two of the traditions. '7 
The majority of this thesis is located in the post independence and partition period 
and will straddle two of these theoretical positions, namely the Lockean and 
Hobbesian traditions. If theories inform the facts, then theories too must be 
scrutinised and inferences drawn and what those theories do not say are just as 
important as what they do say. This thesis is an attempt to strike an epistemological 
balance in theorising Indo-Pakistan relations in order to tighten up the method by 
which causal inferences are drawn. 
Debates about quantitative versus qualitative and epistemology before ontology have 
polarized the disparate schools of thought as to theoretical and methodological 
approaches to social research. Judith Squires sums up the theoretical dilemma, "how 
to balance a theoretical rejection of essentialism, objectivism and universalism with a 
moral and political commitment to non-oppressive, democratic and pluralistic 
values. , 58 In this thesis the answer to these problematic theoretical and policy issues 
is found in Wendtian constructivism because although it has elements of 
foundational ism, it also contains a degree of relativism within its inter-subjective 
constructs which are created through social process enabling it to put value(s) into 
ontology and thus sending this theoretical approach back in the direction of the 
poststructuralist project. Moreover, Wendt occasionally refers to his theoretical 
approach as `structural idealism, ' which again shows the attempt at establishing a 'via 
media' between positivist structure and post-positivist ideation. If we are to get to 
grips with the methodological and theoretical problems that India Pakistan relations 
57 Dunne, Tim. 1993. Mythology or Methodology? Traditions in international relations. Review Qf 
International Studies, 19.3. pp. 305-318 
58 Squires, Judith. 1993. Introduction, in Squires, J eds. Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the 
Rediscovery of ! -'aloe. pp. 1-13 
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presents, then a method whereb\ a structural idealism approach can be JLý\ eloped and 
deployed is vital. 
Data Collection 
This thesis is an exegetical study and unstructured interviews have been undertaken 
in Delhi during February and March 2005 with various journalists, and diplomats 
such as Mr Praful Bidwai (freelance journalist) and Mr V. Sangbei: (editor, [he 
Hindustan Times) and Dr Singhvi, former Indian High Commissioner to London. 
In the UK the author has interviewed former members of the Pakistani civil service 
on an anonymous basis, in particular, former members of the Pakistani Ministry of 
Information. The author has also interviewed Mr \Vajid Shamsul Hasan, journalist 
and former Pakistani High Commissioner to London. 
Archival material and documents were collected from the Nehru Memorial library, 
Delhi; The Indian Institute, Oxford; Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi; The British 
Library, London, and The Asiatic Society, Calcutta. 
9 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Culture of Friendship & the Politicization of Culture 
The chapter looks at the pre-colonial and colonial period and shows flow the 
presence of Europeans impacted on and began to unpick the prevailing soei, ll 
order - social order that I shall characterize here as having a Katntian logic of 
friendship. The chapter will begin by first establishing the concept of a Kantialn 
logic of friendship which this chapter defines as a deep internalization of cultural 
knowledge between the different religious communities on the subcontinent to the 
extent that religious denominations and symbols did not constitute the total sum of 
politics in the region. 
So internalized were many of the symbolic and ritual ceremonies of religious 
practice that many of these practices became religiously neutral in the sense that 
they took on meaning at a cultural level, thus allowing a conflation of different 
denominations to take part in religious ceremony that did not nmari' with their 
own particular religious persuasion. So despite the very clear theological 
differences between Hinduism and Islam on the subcontinent, culturally there was 
a blending of the two in terms of cultural meaning attached to than. For example. 
writing the introduction to Jaswant Singh's book, Defending India, K. 
Subrahmanyam cites the. "glorious instances of synthesis between two 
civilizations exemplified by the Taj Mahal, Hindustani dance. music and painting. 
architecture and even cuisine. "I Religion on the subcontinent whilst having 
theological difference, shares cultural meaning. 
This chapter argues that the constant references to historical accounts of South 
Asia do nothing to promote a theoretical understanding and a consequential ability 
to facilitate the stablization of relations between India and Pakistan. On the 
contrary, given their highly politicised nature, these arguments have pros cci, at 
Singh, Jasvvant, 1999. Defending I ndin. p. yiv. Singh výas Minister for forei, n affairs in the ßJ1' 
coalition government, 1998-20t)4 
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best unhelpful and at worst, counter productive and inflammatory. This thesis 
offers a new theoretical lens that transcends history and instead, moves towards a 
method whereby those interested in security issues in South Asia can examine the 
anarchic constructs of Indo-Pakistan relations without resorting to their own 
historical persuasions. It is now abundantly clear that nuclear know-how on the 
subcontinent and the related missile technologies have overtaken our theoretical 
understanding of the dynamics that drive Indo-Pak relations. This dangerous 
imbalance must be addressed - we must move beyond, both history and strategic 
thinking if we are to get to grips with the transient nature of India Pakistan 
relations and replace these approaches with a new and more instructive theoretical 
framework. 
The empirical case made here has been made many times in the past by leftist 
historians such as Mujeeb2 and is still made today by historians such as 
Schimmel, 3 and most recently, Jackie Assayag. 4 This chapter will make a 
theoretical contribution to this debate by demonstrating that Wight's three 
traditions or more recently Wendt's three cultures of anarchy can pass from one 
culture of anarchy to another. The major criticism of Wight is that the three 
traditions he set out (see introduction) were not able to show transience from one 
culture to another, Wight attempted to off set this criticism by arguing that it was 
the debate between the traditions that was important as opposed to the promotion 
or demotion of one particular tradition or culture, at the expense of another. 
This chapter will show that, in the context of India Pakistan relations, the Kantian 
culture was dismantled by political competition for the power of the state. It will 
show how the developmental process of putting a centralizing polity on top of an 
established and internalized culture forces a splintering and fracturing of that 
culture because of the identity demands put on it from the centre. A Kantian 
culture such as existed on the subcontinent remaining transient and in flux begins 
2 Mujeeb, M, 1966. The Indian Muslims 
Schimmel, Annemarie, 1980. Islam in the Indian Subcontinent 
4 Assayag, Jackie, 2004. At the Confluence of Two Rivers: Muslims and Hindus in South Asia 
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to fragment when a central polity requires a collecti\ e brand of cultural and 
identity politics from its regions or hinterlands. 
We thus have a difference in internalization between cultural influence and 
political power. Political power cannot be as deeply internalized because it seeks 
to impose its political will. not its influence. Thus the politics of national identity 
has been the problem with Indo-Pakistan relations because it seeks to ý xert power 
onto two societies that were born out of cultural influence within aK intiall 
culture of anarchy. Looking at the three cultural anarchies and their 
internalizations, the thesis will draw out some theoretical implications about the 
nature of cultural influence and the nature of political power. 
The chapter will argue that the European presence changed the sociological and 
political landscape of the subcontinent in a profound %\ ay and in a fashion that 
was not conducive to relations on the subcontinent as they had previously existed. 
Moreover, the changes wrought forced religion into politics where it had not 
previously been and this was a false composition that reflected the political needs 
of the Raj and subsequently framed the political environment in which the INC` 
and the Muslim League would operate in and in operating in this new culture of 
rivalry brought about a Lockean culture of rivalry. that since 1947 has fluctuated 
between a culture of rivalry and increasingly shown signs of slipping into a 
Nobbesian culture of enemy. 
This chapter will concentrate on the pre independence period and also look it the 
Gandhian attempt to create an all-inclusive Indian identity through the All India 
Spinning Association (RISA) that did not require the fragmentary politics 
practiced by the INC and the League. This section of the chapter will also 
examine the differing ideological positions of the INC and the Muslim League 
and look at how these two major players in the independence struggle sought to 
invent new identities for the peoples of the subcontinent and how these new 
ideological positions clashed with each other and how appropriate these positions 
were in relation to the 'masses' on the subcontinent. 
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The AISA approach was to construct a big tent under which the multiple identities 
and cultural manifestations could all feel at home. The approach of the INC and 
the League however, required the manufacturing of, and maintenance of 
difference. It has been the manufacturing and maintenance of difference that 
established and has sustained the politics of rivalry. Since 1947 this Lockean 
culture of rivalry has been sustained out of a necessity to maintain difference 
because the justification of both states requires ideological difference between 
secular India and Muslim Pakistan. The danger for relations lies in the 
interchangeable nature of a Lockean rivalry and a Hobbesian enmity. 
The use of the theoretical lens of a Kantian culture of anarchy is not meant to 
convey the notion of a rural idyll in pre historic, medieval or pre-colonial India. 
There are many (internalized) cultures that were inherently violent, but whose 
meaning has changed. For example the changing meaning of culture can be seen 
across (Northern) Ireland, in particular Belfast and (London)Derry. The paintings, 
murals and political declarations such as `You are now entering free Derry. ' 
painted on the sides of buildings. The meaning of these political statements have 
changed from a clear display of sectarianism to tourist attractions. As the politics 
changed, so too have the meanings attached to materialism. 
For illustrative purposes, Morris-Jones's `tale of the three idioms'5 offers a 
valuable vantage point into the multiple and transient layers of politics and culture 
on the subcontinent and how the formation of a modern polity has changed the 
language of politics. The three idioms refer to three interrelated levels of 
language. The modern, the traditional and the saintly. The modern is the most 
commonly used in mainstream politics in India and used by parliament and the 
press. This idiom would be recognizable to any non-Indian ear in discussions on 
parliamentary procedures, the functioning of committees, or land reform etc. The 
second and third levels, traditional and saintly however, take on a very different 
style and meaning by referring to caste, religious or cultural differences within 
5 Morris-Jones. W. H. 1987. The Government and Politics of India. p. 61 
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Indian society. Morris-Jones is not claiming that this is unique to Indian politics. 
but at a basic explanatory level, this is the difference between the way things are 
presented as being done, and the way they are actually done. In the context of 
India however, it is complex due to the multiple levels on which Indian society 
operates and the different idioms used in national. regional and local 
circumstances. "The behaviour which the traditional language holds to be 
irresponsible, is for the modern idiom responsible and that which the modern 
regards as improper is for the other the very opposite. "6 
The second traditional idiom is the language of region and caste or kin loyalty and 
the meaning attached to those caste or kin loyalties which differ from village to 
village and region to region, so what has a certain meaning nationally, has a very 
different meaning regionally. "varna has All-India meaning, but in the little 
worlds of jati, varna is only a reference scale relevant to a limited range of 
relations. "7 It is a host of microscopic regional worlds where the cultural meaning 
attached to varna has an All-India meaning and a regional meaning and as such 
structure will always give way to ideation - the structure may stay the same, but 
the meaning(s) attached to it changes. 
The third idiom can be found at the margin of Indian politics, and in a quantitative 
sense is relatively unimportant. However, saintly politics is important as the 
language of comment and judgment. This language looks back to the struggle for 
independence and the saintly characteristics of Gandhi. (although Morris-Jones 
makes clear that saintly politics predates Gandhi). The saintly idiom picks up on 
this collective memory of the bygone age and provides a normative reference 
point from which to judge the difference between the way things are and the way 
they could or should be. 
A good example of how the modern idiom clashed with the saintly idiom and the 
powerful affect this can have on politics on the subcontinent can be seem in the 
6 ibid. p. 62 
7 ibid. p. 57 
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1970's when the Gandhian political campaigner J. P Narayan (JP) used the saintly 
idiom to great effect against the government of Indira Gandhi. Gandhi herself 
made this task relatively easy during the Emergency by imprisoning her political 
adversaries one of whom was JP. Also imprisoned were many members of the 
Serva Seva Sangha, the Gandhian organization committed to the concept of Total 
Revolution, an organization committed to regenerate cottage industries in rural 
areas to prevent the flow of migration from villages to urban areas. This 
quintessential Gandhian objective stood in stark contrast to the modernist idiom of 
Mrs. Gandhi whose acute political antenna would have been aware of this 
disparity that opened up between JP's saintly idiom. "social, political, economic, 
moral, educational, cultural and spiritual reforms should be brought about 
simultaneously. Nationwide people's committees are to be formed. These 
committees will help the villager with all these reforms and organize each village 
to govern itself as far as possible. "8 In comparison Indira Gandhi's modern idiom 
was couched in terms of the centrist state, party politics and parliamentary 
democracy, however in her broadcast of 26`ß' June 1975 announcing the 
Emergency she displays her understanding of how to mix the two idioms together, 
beginning with, `The president has proclaimed an Emergency, " but going on to 
announce that a conspiracy against the government had been brewing ever since, 
"I began to introduce certain measures of benefit to the common man and woman 
of India. "9 
Collectively the three idioms offer a cross-cutting effect, both within Indian 
society and between society and government and Indira Gandhi understood this 
very well and more often than not acted on it with aplomb. It must therefore have 
been a source of concern to her that she was being outflanked by JP in the saintly 
presentation of policy. This dynamic is pertinent to this chapter because it will be 
shown how cultural internalization at village and regional levels constituted 
meaning and understanding within a local setting and how the constitution of this 
meaning and understanding was disrupted by the formation of a central polity -a 
8 Dube, Rani, 1978. The Turbulent Years. p. 120 
9 Frank, Catherine, 2001. Indira. pp. 380-381 
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process begun by the Raj and continued over into independence. 
The Indian National Congress (INC) as the name suggests was an assembly of 
leaders such as Gandhi, Patel and Nehru constituting a huge range of different 
religious and political ideologies and convictions whose unity was only bound by 
a shared desire for independence from the British. The aim of the Muslim League 
founded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah was to secure a home for the Muslims of 
South Asia, although what Jinnah meant exactly by the two nation' theory has 
been hotly contested over recent years. 1° 
Prior to independence clear disparities and animosities between the INC and the 
Muslim League came to the fore as it became increasingly apparent that the 
departure of the British was a question of when not if. An examination of the pre- 
independence period will highlight the political, religious and ideological 
differences that existed prior to independence that began to manifest in the period 
leading up to partition. 
The chapter will demonstrate the religious and cultural synthesis that occurred on 
the sub continent and suggest that the notion that centuries old fusion could be 
simply picked up, split down the middle and put somewhere else does not reflect 
relations as they actually were, but rather reflects the interests of the political 
elites in the two newly independent states to place emphasis on difference and the 
expense of sameness. 
Since independence and partition the status of Jammu and Kashmir has come to 
exemplify the ideological clash between the two states. Pakistan argues that 
Kashmir as a Muslim majority state should join the Muslim state of Pakistan. 
India counters that it is a secularly constituted state whereby religion is irrelevant. 
It has been from this epistemological template that India and Pakistan have 
10 Jalal, Ajesha, 1985. The Sole Spokesman. Jalal argues that Jinnah was more concerned with 
securing an autonomous region or homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, who under a 
unitary and regional system of government in which the Muslim League and the Indian 
national Congress would share parity at the centre of a federated state system. 
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justified these diametrically opposite positions. This thesis is a study of how this 
epistemological template has constructed and reconstructed anarchy between 
India and Pakistan since 1947. By the late 1940's India and Pakistan had already 
been to war once over Kashmir in 1947/48, and the focus of their mutual distrust 
had changed slightly with India arguing that Kashmir had legally seceded to the 
Indian Union and Pakistan arguing that a United Nations resolution of August 13"' 
1948 had been passed to put the future of Kashmir to a referendum. These two 
differing positions have not changed. Ideologically the die was cast with both 
states set on a path of continued attempts to undermine the philosophical and 
constitutional legitimacy of the Other. 
This chapter begins by looking at how and when Muslims arrived on the 
subcontinent and how the different cultural traditions of the Turko-Persians in the 
north differed radically from the Arabic influence along the Malabar coast. 
Muslims who traveled and settled on the subcontinent at different times and 
places contributed to a cross fertilization of language, culture and religious 
practice that influenced and changed the character of Islam on the subcontinent. 
That Indian Muslims, together with their Hindu hosts created a socio-cultural 
phenomenon that is unique to the South Asian region. 
It than moves on to discuss how the British began to unpick these socio-cultural 
ties and manufacture a political environment that fundamentally altered the way 
Hindus and Muslims perceived each other, particularly after the 1858 Mutiny. 
This politicization of culture introduced rivalry, particularly between the INC and 






The arrival & integration of Islam on the subcontinent 
The arrival of Islam on the subcontinent came from the north and from the \\ est of 
the region. Percival Spear writes, "Muslims in the form of Arab traders linst 
appeared on the Malabar Coast during the seventh century AD not many years 
after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD. For centuries they had 
important trading interests and political influence in this region. "" There is also 
the pluralist nature of Islam, both theologically and geographically, theologically 
the differences between Sunni, Shia and Sufi. Geographically. Islam arrived on 
the subcontinent from different regions, each having a different sect or emphasis 
such as the Persians and the Turks. Sufism arrived in the north of India. its ecletic 
and non-monotheistic character making it more familiar to Hinduism than Islam. 
Mushirul Hasan comments, 
It needs to be emphasized that Islam did not come to the subcontinent in a single 
time-span, but over a succession of periods of unequal length; consequently, its 
diffusion took place in a variety of forms from class to class and from one area to 
another. The difference in the phases in which people experienced Islam brought 
with it variations in the nature of challenges facing Muslims in different regions. 
In its local and regional specificity, therefore, Islam cannot be portrayed as a 
social entity whose `essential' core is immune to change by historical influences'' 
Moreover in other regions of the subcontinent evidence of religious and cultural 
fusion are apparent. In "Punjab, a territory divided into two unequal halves in 
1947, it provided a repertoire of concepts and styles of authority which served to 
encompass potentially competing villages, including the values of tribal kinship, 
within a common Islamic idiom. "" In Bengal. Islam settled and became fused into 
the indigenous Hindu religion and culture, it was not the case that separate 
religious communities led a parallel existence. LH Queshi adds to this argument 
by, suggesting that a separate Muslim identity does exist but, "has not proved 
1' Spear, Percival, 1990.. 4 History 0> lndici. P. ?1 
12 Hasan, Mushirul, 2001. Lc'glrcav of'a Divided Nation. p. 9 Ahl-i Hadith and Jarnaat-i Islami are 
both on-mil isations linked to Islamic separatist \ iolcnce in Kashmir. 
13 l lasan. Nlushirul, 2001. Lc'gac. i cal a Divided. Voltion. p. 9 
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sufficiently strong to compel expression in the creation of institutions. "" 
In Bengal, an area far removed from the centre of [Mughal) imperial power. Islam 
took many forms and assimilated values and symbols which were not always in 
conformity with the Quranic ideals and precepts. The religio-cultural idioms 
underwent a rapid change, giving birth to a set of popular beliefs and practices 
which in essence represented the popular culture of rural Bengal rooted in the pre- 
Islamic past. The local syncretic beliefs and practices, predating the advent of 
Islam in the region thus formed the popular culture in Bengali Islam from the 
beginning. " 
In other words it was not the case of a parallel existence. neither was it the case 
that two religious doctrines and cultures tolerated each other, or for that matter 
that one entity lived a separate cantonment lifestyle as the British did in India, but 
that fusion and interchange between Hinduism and Islam, that of itself produced 
an interface. A crisscrossing which produced what might now be called a third 
way (or syncretism). But this syncretism actually produced a new cultural and 
religious synthesis. The result of which can clearly be seen in the presidential 
address of Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, 
I am proud of being an Indian. I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian 
nationality. I am indispensable to this noble edifice and without me this splendid 
structure of India is incomplete. I am an essential element which has gone to build 
India. I can never surrender this claim. 16 
On the eve of partition this question was asked. "Do you think you will get Delhi 
if Pakistan is established? My husband replied pointing to the domed and turreted 
skyline of Delhi: `Look at it - whom do you think it seems to belong to? ' and 
Dina could not deny that the essentially Muslim character of its architecture 
seemed to proclaim that Delhi belonged to the Muslims. "" The reference 
obviously refers to the Islamic character of what would become the capital city of 
secular India. In the so-called seven cities of Delhi, the architectural legacy of 
14 Qureshi, Ishtiaq. H (1962). The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent: 6/0- 
1927. p. 85 
s Hasan, 2001. Legacy of a Divided Nation.. p. 9 
16 Cited in Hasan, 2001. Legacy of a Divided Nation. p. 1l 
I' Cited in Hasan, 2001. p. 129 
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Islamic rulers from Muhammad bin Sam of Ghur to the Lodis and the Mughals is 
still apparent. Promodini Varma makes the point, "The early Muslim invaders 
were not a homogeneous lot they were Afghans, Turks and Persians. " Differences 
between Muslim and Hindu architecture were different as they reflected the very 
different philosophies underlying them. However the connection between the two 
would eventually create a, "glorious new style creating a wholly new vocabulary 
and an entirely new structure. "18 This new vocabulary and structure established 
primarily during the Mughal period became an indigenised style whose cultural 
and religious antecedents came out of the two different religious traditions, but the 
end product created a new style that was uniquely Indian. The finished 
architectural product would not have been accomplished without the synthesis of 
the two original styles. 
Tara Chand argues that the different architectural styles come down to the 
differences in geographic region and climate that the various communities came 
out of. It is the relationship between man and nature. The Indian environment was, 
"vast, flat unending plains watered by broad slow-moving rivers, the horizon 
limited in the far distance by lofty mountain chains covered with white eternal 
snows, or thick impenetrable forests. "19 The climate is cut into seasons of intense 
rain or intense heat, which changes the aspect of the landscape from barren earth 
to a rich fertile earth. From this vast and diverse landscape comes a perception of 
reality which is continuous and cyclical, or one of birth and rebirth. This 
perception is reflected in the columns and pillars of Hindu architecture, they 
might be square, pentagonal, hexagonal or circular with an interior adorned with 
animal and human carving. An opulent interior stands in stark contrast to the 
Islamic styles, where the emphasis is on congregation and austerity. 
The emphasis on congregation, or urbanization comes down to the small tracts of 
hospitable land, these territories are, `oases large or small, surrounded by howling 
wastes of sand. ' The contrast between the patch of land which is productive and 
18 Dube, D. N, 1987. Delhi & its Monuments. p. 11 
Chand, Tara, 1946. Influence of Islam on Indian Culture. p. 232 
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the barren stony desert which encloses it demands congregation for reasons of 
irrigation, agrarian success and survival. "The struggle to keep vegetation alive 
and to save the intricate system of irrigation canals and hard won pieces of garden 
and pleasance from destruction, the nomadic life fostered by the scanty pasturage 
and desert and the sedentary occupations intensely pursued in the City and the 
fertile spot, all leave deep marks on the minds of men living in these regions. "`" 
These two different ways or methods of life and theological disposition reflect the 
very different geographic positions that the two populations were borne out of. 
Chand argues that, "on the soil of India the clash of the two divergent mentalities 
and their cultures resulted in the creation of a new culture. "' 1 
The architectural fusion borne out of this new culture can also be seen in other 
aspects of Hindu-Muslim coalescence. The Bhakti saints and the later Bhakti 
movement is the most prominent example of a Hindu Muslim interface. VB 
Singh argues that, "Such movements have left a deep impression on the psyche of 
Indians, especially in rural areas where most Indians live. " KM Panikkar makes 
a similar though slightly less committed argument that the pluralist arrival of 
Islam led to convergence, 
Except for sporadic efforts at conversion, there was no attempt to change the 
religion, philosophy or social life of Hindus. Their laws were left untouched. The 
Islamic state did not enforce an educational system. In fact Hindus and Muslims 
lived as parallel societies. 23 
Panikkar does not go as far as to say that the two communities crisscrossed one 
another but that they lived a parallel existence. However, both these arguments 
point towards a movement of at least coexistence with each other and a retained 
sense of their own identities which does not fit well with the political claims that 
would later be made about division between the two. Panikkar does qualify his 
20 ibid. p. 241 
21 ibid. p. 243 
22 Malik, Yogendra & Singh. V, 1994. Hindu Nationalists in India. p. 9 
23 Panikkar, K M, 1963. The Foundations of New India. p. 13 
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comments slightly. He writes. "this does not mean that they didn't influence each 
other; but that the institutions. beliefs and social structure of Hinduism X\ as not 
interfered with . -2' 
The relationship can thus be described as being mutuali v 
inclusive as opposed to mutually exclusive. 
The differences in Islam however can be seen through its succession and arrival 
on the subcontinent and the different cultural traditions the Turko-Persians 
brought with them to the north compared with the older, Arabic version which 
arrived in the south. "The Turko Persian version of Islam prevalent in northern 
India as a result of the Ghorid conquests presented a contrast to the Arabic Version 
of the south, a product of maritime trade relations going back to ancient times. '* 'i 
The difference in their original geographic location and their geographic 
relocation on the subcontinent had a profound influence on the nature of their 
livelihoods and traditions. The Turko Persians becoming synonymous " ith the 
formation of the agrarian state and the Arab maritime tradition of the Malabar 
coast forging a sea-borne trading link between the Indian ocean and the 
Mediterranean. 
There is no doubt that the Turkish invasion of the north was a violent and bloody 
affair and led to the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate. However the Deccan 
Sultanates took root earlier and under very different circumstances. Assavag 
suggests that there has been an over emphasis on the invasions of the north at the 
expense of the different circumstances further south. A. R Saiyed agrees with this 
point, adding that the spread of Islam by the sword has been repeated so mane 
times it is not easy to dispel this myth and to establish the fact that. -Islam has 
primarily spread peacefully on the subcontinent due to the efforts of missionaries 
and Sufis. "26 Furthermore, a concentration on the Ghaznawid and Ghazni raids in 
the north tends to overlook the fact that Delhi became a 'second Baghdad' "once 
the native Muslim nobility, supported by Hindu allies, replaced their foreiLrn 
,' ibid. P. 12 
IS 
, A1ssav a, -,. 
Jackie, 2004.. 41 the C'onllucz'nrc' of Two River. s:. lfuslinix and Hindus in Sowfi Asia. 
p. 36 
I" Saji\ cd. A. R, 1995. Religion and Ethnicity . Among . 
1luslim. x. p. 84 
coreligionists. 
This new process of civilization formed the basis of a new reciprocal alliance 
between Hindus and Muslims, the ground for which had been prepared by the Sufi 
missionaries of the Chishti and Suhrawardi orders. "') 7 The basis of this Hindu- 
Muslim alliance was still greater entrenched by the support of local Hindu nobles 
in exchange for the payment of jiziya (poll tax). The most important point being 
that one Muslim Kingdom was usurped by another and was helped by Hindu 
nobility to do it. These were not proselytizing fundamentalists intent of spreading 
the word of God, these were merchants, chancers and gold diggers. (Wink 
describes this period as a goldrush. 28) These events however, occurred long after 
the establishment of the Arab and Persian Sunnis in the south and long after the 
establishment of Sufism in the north. 
The characterization of the Indian Muslim in the south became that of a town 
dwelling merchant, a characteristic that led to the transformation of the social and 
cultural and architectural landscape of the subcontinent. Mujeeb argues that the 
Muslims came from an urbanized society and as such brought urbanization to the 
subcontinent. Muslim civilization was urban and for Muslims the Mosque 
represents the epicenter of religious life with an emphasis on congregation. This 
in contrast to Hinduism whose fragmentary and even contradictory beliefs needed 
no sense of congregation, indeed such is the contradictory nature of Hinduism it 
makes congregation unnecessary or even implausible. The number of cities 
multiplied during the Muslim period and their size increased. "In none of the 
larger and more important cities was the number of Muslims greater than that of 
the Hindus, nor were they economically more prosperous. Urbanisation therefore 
may be regarded as a Muslim contribution to Indian life. "29 
27 Op Cit. Assayag. p. 37 
28 Wink, Robin. 1999. "The Future of Imperial History. " in Wink eds. The Oxford History of the 
British Empire. pp. 653-668 
29 Mujeeb. M, 1972. Islamic Influence on Indian Societe,. p. 10. For a good discussion on the 
changing nature of commerce in northern India during the time of The East India Company, see 
Bayiy, C. A Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Societe in the age of British Expansion 
/ 7'0- /870 
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Following Timur's sacking of Delhi in 1412 large numbers of Turko-Persian 
Muslims moved from the north to the south. Annemarie Schimmel notes that. 'it 
was not only the infidel Hindus who had to suffer: his coreligionists were treated 
with similar cruelty. ' Among the northern Muslims some were Sufi Shaikhs, 
warriors and reformers some of whom later became aristocratic landowners and 
respected local chieftains. This is how Arabic and Central Asian Islam met, in the 
middle of the Deccan plateau. This Indo-Islamic meeting was not entirely without 
friction as ethnic and sectarian divisions continued to exist. Although their 
synthesis was volatile it allowed for the establishment of a series of Islamic 
dynasties and Persian culture over a period of more than three hundred years. 
Muhammad Ibn Tughluq was the founder of the first independent Kingdom in the 
Deccan. 30 The eventual demise of this dynasty which is also the burial place of'the 
Chishti saint Hazrat Bandanamaz Gesuddaraz (whose tomb is still worshipped aas 
the Mecca of the Deccan) saw it break up into independent kingdoms across the 
Deccan which became the Sultanates of the Deccan all of whom vied with each 
other for supremacy across the Deccan. These Sultanates finally ended with the 
capture of Bijapur and Golkonda in 1686-7 by the great Mughal Aurangzcb who 
lived in the region for almost thirty years and is buried there. 3 
This is a key difference between the Mughals and their British successors. unlike 
the British Viceroys, the Mughals lived and died on the subcontinent. most 
famously Shah Jehan who is buried in that icon of India, the Taj Mahal. It Heist 
also be noted that the demise of the Deccan Sultanates undermined themselves 
due to constant internecine conflict between Sunni Muslims who were the first 
Dekhni colonizers and the so-called 'foreign' Muslims. Afaqi Sh'iahs who 
originated from Iran. The rise of the Mughals in the Deccan at the expense of the 
Sultanates is another example of one set of Islamic based fiefdoms beim( usurped 
by another. 
;` \ssav a z. Op cit. p. 38 
Schimmel, Annemarie, 1980. Islam in the Indian Subconntinent. p. 36 
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Assayag argues that although the Muslims conquered the Deccan they in turn 
were conquered by it and influenced by it. While la% ing too much emphasis on the 
assimilative nature of Hinduism. we tend to overlook the absorption of I Iindus 
and their customs in Muslim society. While the : Muslim religion adopted attitudes 
peculiar to Hinduism and its architecture borro`\cd ? rom Hindu motif'-, "' and 
techniques, Hindu kingdoms - even prominent ones like the Rastrakutas and 
Vijayanagar - employed several Muslims in their sere ice because they were 
aware of their economic value, especially as horse traders. ' 2 
Islam in the subcontinent should be characterized more as insinuation than 
introduction or invasion. Further this insinuation occurred over a very long period 
of time and into a society already segmented by multiple castes and sects all of 
whom differed regionally according to their own regional peculiarities. By 
absorbing elements that were no longer Muslim or Hindu but the product of 
assimilation these cultural forms, or norms, were able to change over time and 
generations and from region to region. It is a form of religious pluralism that 
became a cultural form, this form might be described as syncretic, but even this 
seems to relegate the cultural constitution of meaning. The meaning of religion is 
relegated and replaced constitutionally by the meaning attached to culture, culture 
which itself is susceptible to change. 
This process is not simply an accumulation of layers, but a process whereby the 
meaning attached to materialism changed, religion supplied the materialism of 
symbols, but culture gave them meaning. An Indo-European example of this is the 
meaning the Nazis attached to the swastika, a symbol which carries a ve nn 
different meaning in India than in Nazi Germany. This example ho\\ c\'er has a 
static meaning attached to it, at least it does in Europe. On the subcontinent it is 
the transience and multiplicity of meaning that is important because it leaves open 
the possibility of change or even a reversal of cultural norms. These chan,, Cs in 
traditions could occur in the absence of a centralized state and instead re\ olv e 
'2 ibid. P. i9 
ý; 
around a village, region, family or caste. It was the introduction of a central state 
that began the erosion of this system because a new state-centric approach negated 
and constricted the transient and changing meaning of culture. 
Given the complexity and turmoil on the subcontinent during this period a search 
for a theory that seeks to locate and codify relations between Islam(s) and 
Hinduism(s) and the multitude of differing cultural meanings that have grown up 
beside them, meanings that also change from village to village or region to region 
must be regarded as an impossible task. Yet this is precisely what some seek to do 
in a quest for the cultural artifacts of `nation-ness'. Assayag accurately describes 
the difficulties inherent in this task. "It is quite true that Islam established itself 
over a long period of time in a varied manner in a segmented Hindu society. But it 
is also true that Hinduism with its innate pluralism, is nothing but a semantic and 
syndical creation of the nineteenth century. , 33 The history of Islam on the 
subcontinent and its complex and often contradictory relationship with Hinduism, 
which more often than not can be argued to be nothing more than a tale of 
unintended consequences is not a phenomenon that can be remitted within a 
systematic formula. 
Recent attempts to categorize or perhaps re-categorize Muslim Hindu relations 
can best be illustrated through Benedict Anderson's qualitative theory of imagined 
communities and invented traditions. For Anderson the nation is, "an imagined 
political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. "34 
The nation is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know each other, meet them or even hear of them and yet in their minds 
lives the notion of communion. The nation is limited because it encompasses a 
population of human beings within a boundary beyond which other nations live 
and no nation regards itself as being coterminous with mankind. Although there 
are some in Pakistan who argue that India looks upon Pakistan as being 
coterminous with India, which can be put down to the (Indian) nation, not so 
33 ibid. p. 42 
34 Anderson, Benedict, 1991. Imagined Communities. p. 6 
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much remembering itself, but rather, inventing itself and that invention bears little 
or no resemblance to relations as they actually were across the subcontinent. 
Again this comes back to the anomaly of these two states being borne out of the 
same geographic territory, which had been a multitude of different political and 
cultural formations which criss-crossed the subcontinent long before the 
colonialisation of the region. It is the criss-crossing of cultural norms that went on 
for centuries prior to 1947 and prior to the colonial period that requires the 
contemporary identities of India and Pakistan to be kept apart. Without these 
opposite identities of a secular India and a Muslim Pakistan, the two become what 
they once both were -a huge geographic area replete with religious and cultural 
transience that changes from region to region. The political elites in both India 
and Pakistan are by no means alone in their attempts to imagine and invent the 
past in order to bring unity and meaning to the future, most if not all nations are 
able to do this. However, India and Pakistan have proved able to imagine and 
invent their histories more than most. 
Sudhir Kaker notes that the events surrounding partition were not only unique to 
South Asia, but also required, "profound changes in behaviour and beliefs of those 
affected by them. , 35 This is the crux of the structural versus intersubjective 
dilemma of state formation and interstate relations on the subcontinent. Partha 
Chatterjee notes that the idea of the nation preceding the state is a distinctly 
European conception having little or no relevance to the newly formed post 
colonial states, "where the state preceded the nation and conditioned its whole 
existence. "36 Given this formulation of state first, nation second in the 
development of post colonial states it is perhaps not surprising that they have 
given rise to some particularly virulent strains of nationalisms and invented 
traditions. Yet despite the potency of postcolonial ideologies, many have 
struggled to sustain parity and legitimacy between the centre and the regional 
35 Kakar, Sudhir, 1996. The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Violence. p. 40 
36 Chatterjee, Partha, 1999. Nationalism as a Problem in the History of Political Ideas. in The 
Partha Chatterjee Omnibus. p. 12 
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parts of newly formed states. The problem is even more acute in South Asia 
where the state preceded what would become the two nation states of India and 
Pakistan. 
Ashis Nandy argues that Indians have what he describes as a plural self in \v hick 
the multiple religious and cultural influences of the subcontinent can be seen. 
Many communities see themselves as simultaneously Hindu and Buddhist. Hindis 
and Muslim and Hindu and Christian. This is neither a case of multiculturalism. or 
as the properly educated Indians like to call it, syncretism. It seems to be the case 
of a society where identities are cross-cutting and the others are telescoped into 
one's own self, where none of the identities can be adequately depicted or defined 
without taking into account some other. 37 
This status is the Kantian anarchy where the self and other have merged and 
where the self cannot define itself without the other. In other words the self 
becomes dependent on the other for its own identity and the other becomes part of 
the multiplicity of the 'not-self. ' Furthermore Burman points out that as late as 
1911 more than two hundred thousand people declared their religious affiliation in 
a census as `Hindu-Muslaman. ' In similar vein the Patuas or scroll painters of' 
West Bengal have dual identities, with both Hindu and Muslim names. Even more 
extraordinarily the Islamic sect, the Khojas who today religiously observe the 
Hindu festivals of Ekadasi, Diwali and Holi were not sure which sect they 
belonged to and it was left to the English court to declare them to be Shias of the 
Ismaili branch. The Khojas draw many parallels between the great Islamic 
personalities and the vast Hindu pantheon of Gods in their numerous incarnations. 
The word `Om' wriiten in Sankrit was equated with `Ali', written in Arabic, and 
the similarity between the two was stressed to convey the similarities and 
resemblance of the two religions. Muhammad was at times placed parallel to 
Mahadev, and `Ali seen as Vishnu. '38 
37 Nandy, Ashis , 
2002. Coping with the Politics of Faiths and Cultures: Between Secular State 
and Ecumenical Traditions in India. pp. 135-166. In Nandv Ashis. Ethnic Futures: The Siate 
and Identiti' Politics in Asia 
38 Burnham, Roy, 2002. Hindu-Muslim: Syncretic Shrines and Conrnninities. p. 22 
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This cross fertilization of language. religious practice and the mixing and blendinýý 
of religious symbols is a socio-cultural phenomenon. Both Indian NILuSIlms and 
Hindus in a rural setting, far removed from the puritanical Brahminist conception 
of the `worshippers of Rama' or the top end of the Llema hierarchy begin to 
assimilate one another's religious symbols but add meaning to those symbols by 
way of cultural influence or cross fertilization, ``so they pray to Allah in the name 
of Vishnu and vice versa. 09 
There is then embedded in the religions and culture of the subcontinent. \v a\ s and 
means of undertaking ceremonies and rituals, some of which have lost their initial 
religious significance and taken on a cultural guise that cuts across religious 
meaning and in many circumstances used religion as its anchoring. but has since 
moved on to different cultural meanings that themselves change over time and 
generations. Below is one case study of how cultural unity or fusion has 
manifested itself in one dargah (shrine) in Maharashtra. The follo«ing lengthy 
text is quoted because it shows how the cultural meanings of dargah's change and 
evolve over time. 
The Dargah of Kolgaonewale Baba 
Location: At Kolgaon in Shrigonda Taluka of Ahrnadnagar there is a famous 
dargah belonging to Syed Ahmed Shah or popularly known as Kolgaonwale Baba. 
Kolgaon is about 45 kms away from Ahmadnagar city. 
Nature of the shrine: The Kolgaonwale Baba's shrine is quite old, but the present 
complex with a big courtyard and Mussafirkhana etc is a recent creation. As per 
the legends Syed Ahmed Shah or Kolgaonwala Baba came in search of the graves 
of his murshids or gurus who had come along 4 vith the 1400 Palkis about 1500) 
vears back from Baghdad. The names of his murshids are Sved Cha«ýgesh Ali 
Shah and Syed Muhabbat Ali Shah. Kolgaonwala Baba reached Kolýgaon in 1934- 
5 and stayed there until his death. He died on 19: 7: 1981. Kolgaon is a small 3 
village with about 1500 population. Earlier it used to have a significant Muslim 
population. But most of them left at the time of partition as Sindhi refugees 
chased them away. At present there are only 25 'Muslim households left behind. 
The dargah is located at one end of the village -a little bit in the outskirts. A 
graveyard was located at the place earlier. The dargah complex without the 
coiupund vv all was completed only in 1967. 
Oip Cit. p. 1 
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There are many stories about Kolgaonwale Baba's supernatural qualities. The 
mujawars stated that the Baba stayed in one room for thirty years constantly. Fie 
answered to natures call only twice a week. Baba used to cure the sick. He cut the 
papers in which sweets used to be offered to him into small pieces. He tied small 
strings to them and gave them to the devotees as a part of his treatment. He also 
helped the issue less couples to procreate children by his blessings. It is reported 
that one man called Maqbul Bangriwala who was issue less for 16 years was 
blessed with a child after meeting Baba. 
Kolgaonwale Baba was initially well received by the local villagers - both by 
Hindus and Muslims. But as he gradually became famous many people from 
outside the village and far off places like Mumbai, Pune , 
Karnataka started 
coming to him, his link with the local village gradually became tenuous. In fact 
the entire financing and management went into the hands of the outsiders - people 
belonging to all faiths. Gradually the dargah complex became a kind of center of a 
cult. A Parsi architect from Mumbai named Nari Gandhi got attached to the center 
very closely and through his contribution a museum, a mussafirkhana and a 
modern dargah was constructed. The boundary wall was constructed in 1983 by 
contributions of devotees - Punjabia, Sindhis, Marathis and all. The 
mussafirkhana or the saraikhana was completed only 7-8 years back. The dargah 
complex has the graves of Kolgaonwale Baba and his gurus in separate 
compartments. Besides, there is a mazar of one faqir named Maston Baba . ialal 
Shah. It is located near the entrance gate below the baithakkhana or sitting room 
of Baba. The entrance gate of the dargah itself presents a fine piece of modern 
architecture. A kabutarkhana for the pigeons also is an added attraction to the 
centre. After nari Gandhi dies six years back in a car accident new constructions 
within the complex have virtually come to a standstill. 
People of all faiths frequent the dargah. During marriages many couples, 
irrespective of their religion visit the shrine to pay obeisance to the Babas. Many 
of them come and stay at the mussafirkhana. Sometimes also foreigners come and 
stay at the shrine. Though the devotees come every day, there are more crowds on 
Sundays, Thursdays and Fridays. Apart from these large numbers of people 
assemble at the dargah during the two urs that are held annually. The first urs is 
held in the name of kolgaonwale Baba. It is held six days before the Bakri Id and 
continues for four days. The sandal is taken around the village and brought back 
to the dargah. The second urs is held in the names of Kolgaonwale Baba's two 
murshids - Hazrat Change Shah and Hazrat Muhabbat Shah. This urs is held for 
two days. During both the urs a small fair is held at the shrine. It is important to 
note that during the urs proper maan or respect is shown to a Deshmukh Maratha 
(Hindu) family of the village. During both the occasions saree and bangles are 
sent to their family on behalf of the dargah management. It is believed that their 
ancester Gulabhrao Deshmukh had done khidmat of Kolgaonwale Baba when he 
arrived at the village at the beginning. Gulabhrao had no children earlier, but with 
the Baba's blessing he got one. As a mark of gratitude he used to do Khidmat - 
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take care of Baba and provide him with food40 
This example of just one of the many dargahs or shrines in Maharashtra 
demonstrates how a religious shrine became bound up in the socio-cultural 
development of one village and how the meaning of that shrine took on different 
meanings. These different meaning in turn, changed and mutated, thus the initial 
meaning and justification for the shrine becomes lost and new cultural meanings 
become attached. 
In the introduction to his book, `The Indian Muslims' M. Mujeeb concedes that 
the remit of his book is not sufficient to explain the arrival and development of 
Islam on the subcontinent. "This book, " he writes, "is an attempt to portray the 
life of the Indian Muslims in all its aspects, beginning with the advent of the 
Muslims in India. Its account to be perfectly valid should, therefore have been 
based on a series of complete records covering about twelve centuries. "" In other 
words, such a claim cannot be justified because the presence of Muslims on the 
subcontinent predate by several centuries the available records. Mujeeb asks, who 
are the Indian Muslims? 
Whoever they may be and whatever they may be in India the Indian Muslims take 
themselves for granted. This is true of all Indian Muslim history, and it is true 
even now when a division of the country has taken place on a basis that does not 
appear to be justified by history. 42 
Mujeeb is suggesting that the religious and cultural status of Indian Muslims as it 
was prior to 1947 does not tally with the need for partition. Implicit within the 
suggestion that India was divided in a manner that was not conducive to the status 
of Muslims in India is the argument that partition came out of political 
expediency, not for reasons of religious, cultural or even political necessity, but 
merely to suit the political requirements of the INC and the Muslim League. 
'0 Burham Roy. Op Cit. pp. 46-47. Dargahs are found all over India and Pakistan. In Baluchistan 
the Dhikris and Dais built their dargah near Turbat and visit it at the same time as orthodox 
Muslims go on hajj. A. R Saiyed writes that a countless number of Muslims believe that several 
trips to the dargah of the Sufi saint Muinuddin Chishi was equivalent to one hajj 
41 Mujeeb, M. 1967. The Indian Muslims. p. 1 
42 ibid. p. 10 
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Qureshi comments, 
The Muslims of the subcontinent would not have been welded into a well- 
integrated community if they had not been drawn together by, various other forces 
in addition to their religious belief. 43 
For Qureshi Muslims integrated far more into the subcontinent in a way that the 
British never contemplated. The task of the European liberals, particularly after 
the Mutiny was to make India British, it was not to make the Britishers Indians or 
even Eurasians. The distinction which needs to be made therefore is that Islam did 
not attempt a whole-sale institutionalization of its religion and politics unlike the 
British whose project was two-fold. First, trade and later to import and 
institutionalize a liberal polity into India. The centuries of Islamic presence on the 
subcontinent could be characterized as, influence, as opposed to the politics of 
imposition, "the Muslims of the subcontinent were no longer Arabs, Turks. 
Afghans or Iranians; they had developed a distinct character. "" Islam arrived on 
the subcontinent and made subtle changes which assisted a process of integration 
over many centuries. Paul Brass argues that religious division was largely a 
British invention, which did not reflect relations between the two religious 
communities prior to the arrival of the British. Brass argues, 
Hindu-Muslim communalism was itself a British creation that, left to themselves, 
Hindus and Muslims would work together in a secular political order and would 
divide internally on economic and class rather than religious lines. The British, 
operating on a set of assumptions that treated Hindus and Muslims as distinct 
peoples, introduced mechanisms, notably separate electorates, which served to 
keep them apart45 
Brass argues that class, income, culture and the means of production has a far 
greater impact on Indian society than theology. The above point was also made by 
various Indian nationalists who argued that communalism was a British invention 
and a tactic of divide and rule. But questions about the nature and longevity of 
Qureshi, Ishtiaq, 1962. The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent: 610-19 1. 
p. 93 
Qureshi, 1962. The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent: 610-192 . p. 
95 
45 Brass, Paul, 1990, The Politics of India Since Independence. p. 5 
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Muslims in India were not taken into account, neither was there an attempt to 
analyse or even understand the inter-religious relations as they actually were. 
Clifford Geertz writes of the importance of symbols and symbolic systems within 
the structures for understanding an environment and for orientation. 
Man depends on symbols and symbolic systems with a dependence so great as to 
be decisive for his creatural viability and as a result, his sensitivity to even the 
remotest indication that they may prove unable to cope with one or another aspect 
of experience raises within him the gravest of anxiety" 
For A. R Saiyed there should be made a clear distinction between the quantitative 
and qualitative reasons for Hindus who converted to Islam during the pre-colonial 
period. Saiyed cautions that `conversions of faith' have been muddled with 
`conversions of convenience' and that this approach has muddied the waters 
between quantitative and qualitative conversions that have distorted and 
exaggerated the political impact of Islam on the subcontinent. 
On the quantitative side, the first All India census conducted by the British in 
1887 revealed that Muslims numbered only 19.7 per cent of the population, which 
after several centuries of Muslim kingdoms under different Muslim leaders and 
fiefdoms - many of whom had usurped other Islamic rulers on their way to 
succession - cannot be regarded as an enormous quantitative increase in the 
Muslim population. Furthermore, if the quantitative impact was not large, "until 
the advent of British supremacy, the qualitative impact (of Islam) was somewhat 
diluted. Large segments of converts were merely nominal Muslims"47 In other 
words it was the very presence of the British and the nature and style of the 
politics they brought to the subcontinent, coupled with their belief that there was a 
clear distinction between Hindu and Muslim aided and abetted the furtherance of 
the political and sociological divide between them. 
This begs the question, why did the British see such stark differences between 
'b Geertz, Clifford, 1973. "Religion as a Cultural System, " in Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation 
of Cultures. p. 99 
47 Saiyed. A. R 1995. Religion and Ethnicity Among Muslims. p. 75 
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theological difference and ignore all sociological evidence of mutual influence or 
synthesis? Perhaps the answer lies in Plantaganet accounts of the Crusades. Islam 
frightened Christiandom, the memory of the crusades had been etched into 
collective memory and fear and suspicion of Muslims was the reaction. If Islam 
frightened the British, then Hinduism perplexed them and it was the lack of 
reconciliation between these two very different theologies and the society from 
whence they came that troubled and persistently wrong-footed the British in terms 
of their understanding of it and subsequent government and subsequent 
government policy that was borne out of it. 
Conversions of Hindus to Islam were not regarded by the British as being nominal 
or conversions of convenience, but taken as evidence of an insidious religion 
intent on conquering the subcontinent. Europeans transferred their experience of 
Islam from its heartland in the Arabian peninsular to the context of South Asia 
and thus the spread of Islam in South Asia became, "the imperialism of the spirit. 
succeeding the imperialism of the sword. "48 
Converts came out of convenience and changed their beliefs nominally to fit in 
with the political requirements of the day, which is precisely what the League and 
the INC did in designing their political demands to fit in with the British discourse 
of liberalism. In this sense the presence of the British brought about a similar 
response from the League and the INC as had occurred over many centuries 
during the hegemony of the Islamic based kingdoms and Sultanates, with the 
indigenous population taking on the political colour of the day, and adapting and 
changing to meet different circumstances. These changing nuances in behaviour 
seemed obvious to the Indian mind, as Nehru himself puts it "there were obvious 
advantages in accepting the religion of the ruling power. "49 This obvious 
qualitative change in political stance and discourse proved less obvious to the 
quantitatively inclined British. 
48 ibid. p. 76 
49 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 1947. The Discovery of India. p. 220 
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A key difference between the British and their Islamic predecessors can be put 
down to the fact that Islam did adopt and take on new cultural forms through 
contact with the subcontinent. The British however retained a political and 
philosophical rigidity in their mission and their period of rule in South Asia was 
far shorter, British hegemony lasting only between 1818 and 1947. Satish Misra 
writes, 
In the course of time the descendants of the original missionaries, now pir: ada. s or 
spiritual preceptors, also lost the fervour of their predecessors and looked upon 
their followers more as a source of revenue than as a people to be guided into the 
Islamic way. Their own attainments in the meanwhile came down 50 
This process of political and cultural cross-fertilization and an internalization over 
time was largely lacking in the British approach. Islam arrived on the 
subcontinent at different times and for different reasons. The Sufis from the north, 
the traders and missionaries from the southern and western coasts, the Umajjcd 
conquests and finally from the north came the Turks and the Afghans. The Islamic 
experience, or `conquests-cum-immigration' has the greater plasticity and 
multidimensional forms. The British experience, a more rigid (and rigidifying) 
effect that was eventually ejected from the subcontinent. Whatever the cherished 
dreams of the early Islamic iconoclasts might have been, "Islam, in the interest of 
its own survival had to incorporate syncretic elements that were rooted in the local 
indigenous traditions of the area. An unwillingness or inability to show resilience 
would have probably meant Islam's eventual rejection. , 51 
The more subtle and less obvious unifying variables such as class and sect were 
not taken fully into account. Class did play a significant role in the sociological 
structure of the subcontinent and would often supercede religion as a primary 
force in its makeup. For example those Muslims of the elite landowning zamindar 
class had far more in common with other members of the Hindu political elite 
than they did with other Muslims from a lower income bracket. Robinson 
Misra, Satish, 1964. Muslim Communities in Gujarat: Studies in their History and Social 
Organisation. p. 161 
$1 Op Cit, Saiyad. p. 89 
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suggests that, "their connections (the Muslims) with Hindus who belonged to the 
elite were far stronger than their connections with Muslims who did not. "" British 
blindness to the issue of class can be seen as both an anomaly and an irony given 
the class-ridden nature of Victorian Britain. David Gilmartin argues that as an, 
"alien power that shared its religion with no significant portion of the population, 
the British found in religion little ideological foundation for the exercise of 
imperial power. "53 
Having failed to see elements of Hindu-Muslim unity at a political and cultural 
level, the British also failed to see intra communal rivalry, Hindu on Hindu and 
Muslim on Muslim which again brings us back to the variables of Islamic sects of 
predominantly Sunni, Shia and the Hindu system of caste. As Robinson puts it, 
"Muslims had little in common with each other apart from their religion, Hindus 
were fundamentally divided even by their faith. Many Muslims and Hindus had 
more in common with each other than with their co-religionists. "" 
Having already concluded, incorrectly, that Muslims of all sects and classes were 
able to organize as a homogenized society or sect, the British then took that 
incorrect analysis one step further and concluded that this homogenized group 
was able and willing to use its collective strength to oppose and even depose the 
rule of the East India company and the British Raj. This view became the 
benchmark of the way the British viewed Indian Muslims. It would become, 
"Britain's enduring insistence that India was divided into two religious 
communities - those of Hinduism and of Islam. "55 As the above has demonstrated 
intra-communal relations were replete with sectarian rivalries between Sunni and 
Shia and class differences between all sections of the Islamic community. 
There are various arguments about the origins of Muslim separatism and why it 
became such a contentious political issue. Indian nationalists argue that the British 
52 ibid. Separatism Among Indian Muslims. p. 32 
53 Gilmartin, David, 1988. Empire and Islam. p. 13 
sa Robinson, 1975. Separatism. 4mong Indian Muslims. p. 33 
'S Metcalf, Thomas, 1994. Ideologies of the Raj. p. 132 
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deliberately sought to play Hindu and Muslim off against one another in an 
elaborate game of divide and rule. Robinson writes, the British are usually seen 
as throwing their weight first behind one community and then behind the other to 
keep them divided. Indian nationalist historians found the argument particularly 
attractive and accuse their imperial rulers of having broken an evolving synthesis 
of Hindu-Muslim culture. "56 However, as the above has demonstrated. division 
was often seen where none actually existed. 
If the British were guilty of deploying a divide and rule tactic, the evidence 
suggests that it was a tactic of accidental divide and rule as opposed to a 
deliberate strategy to impose their will. Indeed, it is difficult to argue for a divide 
and rule strategy because it does beg the question, where are the divisions? An 
answer that affirms divide and rule is difficult because the Indian Muslims, aside 
from the fact that they were Muslims had little else in common, descended as they 
were from Arabs, Turks, Persians, Afghans and from many former Hindus who 
converted to Islam in an attempt to escape the caste system. Moreover they were 
split along sectional lines within Islam and linguistic and dialectical lines 
according to where they lived in the subcontinent. 
The second proposition first put by W. W Hunter in his 1876 `The Indian 
Musalmans' contends that Muslims had been consistently discriminated against 
by the British and as such their stock had fallen during the years of the British 
Raj, "the Muslims had been discriminated against by the British, had been slow in 
taking advantage of western education, and as a result had fallen behind in the 
competition for jobs and economic advancement. 957 This argument is a precursor 
to the reconfigured argument put by the Muslim League in the run up to 
independence. Its later manifestation being that a minority population such as the 
Muslims without partition would inevitably face discrimination in a newly 
independent India that would be dominated by Hindu majoritarianism. The third 
argument is a direct criticism of Indian nationalism and its failure to provide a 
56 Robinson. Op cit. p. 43 
57 Hunter, W. W, 1876. The Indian Musalmans'.. p. 231 
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fully inclusive secular framework whereby all minorities would be accounted !r 
and included. Robinson sums it up, 
Muslim communalism, it is argued, was due to the failure of nationalism to 
develop a truly non-communal ethos. Nationalism was associated with ai 
frequently aggressive Hindu revivalism, and its symbols, its idiom and its 
inspiration were all Hindu58 
By the early part of the twentieth century the divisions outlined above became the 
political framework that both the INC and the League used to j usti ik and 
consolidate their positions. But if the INC failed to present a persuasive case for 
Indian nationalism, then the Muslim League can be found guilty of failing to 
construct its own brand of Islamic collectivism. The Muslims of India were too 
diverse and too widely dispersed to ever be corralled under such a broad Islaillic 
heading. If the British perceived division where none existed then many in vv hat 
became the Muslim League saw unity where none existed. In the end neither the 
Indian nationalism of the INC, or the Islamic unity as espoused by the League 
were sufficiently potent and all-inclusive to create the desired effect of unity at an 
All India level after the departure of the British. In the event, they became 
political tools used by a political elite to bring about a desired political end. As the 
above has demonstrated those ends were political, not theological. 
The second part of this chapter will demonstrate that a Kantian culture became 
unpicked when the British established what Gyanendra Pandey describes as the 
`communal riot narrative' that labeled all violence as communal. An insidious 
legacy of this narrative was that it changed the way Hindus and Muslims viewed 
each other and established a political self and other between Hindu and Muslim 
vv here it had not previously existed, this dynamic became particularly apparent 
after the Mutiny. These political differences would become manifest in the 
political and ideological positions of the Lague and the INC'. Moreover, however 
valid, or not, these positions became they were nonetheless imperative for the 
consolidation of a political power base and as a result the INC and the Leaýluc 
Robinson. Franc is. 1975. Scp zi utism Among Indian Muslims. p. 2 
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became a threat to one another. Once the League and the I\C bean to tap into 
the British liberal discourse, they became rivals in pursuit of political power. 
The Politicization of Culture 
Gyanendra Pandey suggests that the colonialist reading of history put communal 
violence between people of different religious persuasions as one of, if not the 
most distinctive feature of Indian society. "In a colonialist reading of history' that 
had become dominant by the end of the nineteenth century, 'communalism' was 
seen as the special mark of the Indian section of the 'Orient" and that this reading 
of history put, "the political experience of the people, and the identification of 
religion, or the religious community, as the moving force of all Indian politics. " ." 
In other words Indians of all religious persuasions (read Muslims and I-Iindus) 
were unable to separate religion from politics, the two were inextricably linked 
and politics was merely the sum of religion. 
Pandey suggests that the driving force behind this belief comes down to the 
`communal riot narrative' and that this British-invented narrative would always 
link violence with communalism. Pandey shows how a riot in Binares in 1809 
prior to the British assuming power in the city became a template for a communal 
violence historical discourse throughout India. The District Gazetteer account of 
the riot compiled in 1907 writes specifically of violence in Benares and yet in a 
submission to the Indian statutory Commission of 1928 the description of the 
violence was recounted but without any reference to a specific place. Thus What. 
"applied to a particular city, now applies to the country as a whole. Benares 
becomes the essence of India, the history of Benares the history of India. "60 
This historical narrative became the epistemological motif of British assessments 
Panddcv, Gv anendra, 
sli/m/terii Stildii's I'/ 
sý ibid. p. 1 16 
The Colonial Construction of Communalism' in Guha, Ranajit eds. 
p. 140 
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as to the cause of violence, which negated the possibility of political or economic 
violence or other related issues such as land reform - all violence became 
communal violence. Within this analytical framework, religious festivals such as 
Holi or Muharram become the trigger for violence between Hindu and Muslim. 
By emptying violence of all other meaning and significance the British were able 
to establish the, "perverse nature of the population, and the fundamental 
antagonism between Hindus and Muslims. "61 It was through analysis like the 
above that not only allowed the British their `civilizing' mission on the 
subcontinent but in many cases, justified it. Colonial accounts gave acts of 
violence such as 1809 a name, communalism, fanaticism and even irrationality 
and these names or titles created the self and the other, which in turn provided 
legitimacy and justification for the British cause. 62 
At worst the British drew a false hypothesis on Hindu Muslim relations, at best, a 
misleading one. 63 Indian nationalists however argue that this false hypothesis was 
more to do with political convenience. As the next section seeks to demonstrate 
the semitic structure of Islam as opposed to the amorphous make up of Hinduism 
which do have very real theological differences was viewed by the British as both 
theological and political difference. 
After the 1857-1858 Mutiny, the Europeans were quick to differentiate between 
the guilty and the innocent and it was Islam and the Indian Muslims who became 
the guilty. It was this distrust and hatred generated by the 1857 Mutiny which, 
"reverberated throughout the half century that followed as a central although 
generally unstated factor guiding the formulation of British policy. V)64 
61 ibid. p. 147 
62 CA Bayly argues that communal violence is contingent on other political and economic 
variables. Religious differences were more likely to become communal conflicts when they 
coincided with shifts in political and economic power and during times of crisis such as the decline 
of Mughal power and early colonial rule provided pre-existing lines for social fracture. See Bav lv. 
The Pre-History of Colonialism? Religious Conflicts in India 1700-1860. Modern Asia Studies. 
Vol. ] 9, No. 2 1985. pp. 177-203 
63 For a full account of the nationalist argument. See Mahajan, Sucheta, 2000. Independence and 
Partition 
64 Wolpert, Stanley, 1967. Morley & India. p. 167 
62 Haynes, Douglas, 1991. Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India. p. 3 
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This has important implications for the future of the independence movement 
because Indian Muslims being singled out for the blame was not missed by many 
Hindus. As Douglas Haynes puts out, "Under the domination of European 
imperialism, the colonized altered their perceptions of the political world in 
fundamental ways, modifying their notions of authority, reformulating their 
conceptions of justice, and often forging new identities. ' 
The danger of Hindus beginning to form an identity separate from Indian Muslims 
was not lost on M. K Gandhi and on his return from South Africa in 1914 Gandhi 
attempted to build a brand of Indian nationalism that crossed theological divide in 
an attempt to pull together Hindu and Muslim and bridge the gap he could see had 
opened up between the two in the light of British policies. The All India Spinners 
Association (AISA) was established to create an Indian tradition of spinning and 
the creation of swadeshi (indigenous goods). The spinning and wearing of khadi 
became the uniform of the independence movement and is still worn today by 
members of the Congress party. 
The making and wearing of khadi created a tradition and identity for the 
independence movement and a uniform that separated Indians from their colonial 
masters and at the same time offered a collective secular identity for all Indians. 
Crucially through the use of visual slide shows and exhibitions the AISA used the 
promotion of swadeshi all over India to connect urban populations with rural ones 
and create connectivity between the two in the name of a new India, and thus 
created a new Indian narrative that united Indians and separated them from the 
British. Populations separated by huge geographical distances, language, religion 
and region, "the goods of the swadeshi movement defined the Indian nation by 
consciously bridging otherwise disparate regions with a consumer good whose 
production would legitimize the nation... and provided an opportunity for 
participants to take a small piece of their nation home with them. , )66 
66 Trivedi, Lisa, "Visually Mapping the `Nation': Swadeshi Politics in Nationalist India. 1920- 
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Projects such as the AISA were attempts to draw Indians into one political unit 
offering them an identity and culture that was set aside from, and different to. the 
politics being offered by the British. Whilst the wearing of Khadi became the 
uniform of many in the independence movement, the politics of providing a 
political and cultural identity became `overwhelmed' by what Ashis Nandy has 
termed the "colonization of minds, "67 through the process of an Anglo-Indian 
political dialogue. This dialogue offered Indian politicians a short cut to political 
influence, but in the process helped forge and constitute the future politics and 
international politics on the subcontinent. It is a contradiction of both the League 
and the INC that set themselves up as replacements for the British, but at the same 
time adopted a liberal epistemology from which to conduct their politics, taking 
on and absorbing western concepts of liberal democracy and justice. The 
manufacture and wearing of swadeshi was a way of indigenising the 
independence movement. 
Trivedi argues that by spreading Khadi, its exponents sought to change the map of 
India, which up until that point had been drawn by the British. A new map would 
offer a visual vocabulary of nationhood to build a national community and lay 
claim to a national land. 68 In other words it would offer the connectivity between 
an urban population and the thousands of villages across India, which up until that 
point had been joined or connected only by the presence and cartographic skills of 
the British Raj. 
The section below will look at the manifestation of policy formulation that 
became the Morley-Minto reforms. This section will conclude with a discussion 
of how caste, or the caste `system' affected Indian society and how it was 
1930, The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 62, No. 1.2003. pp. 11-42 
64 Nandy, Ashis. 1998. The Intimate Enemy. p. xi 
68 Matthew Edney argues that the British needed to produce a scientific map of the subcontinent 
as a single, coherent political entity before it could dominate India as a colonial space. 
Moreover, a cartographic understanding of India was a prerequisite for Britain's imagination of 
colonial authority. See Edney, Matthew. Mapping An Empire: The Geographic Construction 
of British India 
72 
interpreted and understood by Europeans. Susan Bayly argues that up until the 
colonial period the subcontinent was populated by people for whom. "formal 
distinctions of caste were of only limited importance as a source of corporate and 
individual lifestyles. " She goes on to suggest that, "the institutions and beliefs 
which are now often described as the elements of `traditional' caste were only 
taking shape as recently as the early eighteenth century. "b9 Two points come out 
of Bayly's analysis. First, that the so-called ancient traditions of the caste system 
were not as systemic and as entrenched as is sometimes portrayed and second, the 
evolution of the caste system itself, is a relatively recent phenomena which far 
from stretching back to antiquity, became apparent during the eighteenth century 
at the time of the demise of the Mughal empire and the rise of the western 
industrialized powers. 
This way of thinking or episteme on the part of the British formed the basis of an 
orientalist discourse and methodology that became known as Indology. That is, a 
way of accumulating and understanding knowledge and `facts' that fit in with a 
predetermined western and rationalist way of thinking. The short-comings of this 
methodology can be seen in Pandey's argument of a `historical narrative' 
constructed by the British and has a similar outcome. It holds that the essence of 
Indian civilization is the opposite of the west. The East is bestowed with the 
irrational institution of caste and the religion that accompanies it, namely 
Hinduism. 
Ronald Inden argues this has led to several distortions in the way the west looked 
on the east. First, it required the dismissal of Indian political institutions. 
especially kingship. It required the depiction of Indian thought as mythical, as 
69 Bayly, Susan, 1999. Caste, Society and Politics in India. p. 3. In a more recent article Bayly 
argues that the coercive policies of the British had two important elements. Which she refers to 
as the `invisible empire. ' First, the hardening of the caste system whereby more people than 
ever before were `drawn or coerced into the schemes of ritualized social hierarchy which are 
now regarded as key characteristics of caste society. ' Second, the closing and hardening of 
boundaries of differentiation between Hindus and Muslims, where prior to European rule, there 
had been `real but often ill-defined distinctions, ' See Bayly, `Colonial Cultures: Asia, ' in 
Porter, A. The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. 3 pp447-469 
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opposed to (western) rational and logical. Third, it required the characterization of 
Hinduism as being essentially idealistic and apolitical. Caste conceived of in this 
way has been the cause and effect of India's low level of political and economic 
`development' and its repeated failure to prevent conquests by outsiders. Or, as 
Inden puts it, "thought as dream has been a dominant metaphor in the study of that 
subcontinent. "70 The epistemology of Indology then was reliant on an insistence 
that the east lacked any indigenous access to the logic and rationality enjoyed by 
the post Enlightenment nations of the west. 
The impact of this epistemology not only forged the way the west looked at India 
but perhaps more insidiously, it formed the basis of academic remits that became 
known as Indology and Orientalism. Such was the influence of this approach it 
also changed the way in which Indians looked at themselves and each other, 
emphasizing differences where there had previously been none (or very little). 
The approach became the political template by which a cultural disparity could 
begin to open up, or as Bayly suggests, this approach led to a hardening of 
boundaries between sects where previously those sects had been in flux. 
Because the caste system overlaps so many other elements and aspects of politics, 
such as class, colour, language or occupation it plays an important role in the 
development of who belongs and does not belong to one of the thousands of caste 
categories. Who is and who is not a Jat, Rajput or Chamar plays an important role 
in the development of self and other. 7' For example, in independent India and in 
accordance with the constitution, the so-called `scheduled castes' receive a set 
amount of help from the state, in particular with access to education and civil 
service employment. 72 Bayly suggests however that despite the caste system as set 
'Ö Inden, Ronald, 1986. `Orientalist Constructions of India. ' Modern Asia Studies, Vol. 20. No 3 
1986. pp. 401-446 
71 Broadly speaking the caste system divides into four main headings according to varna. These 
varna categories also subdivide according to gender. The varna of Brahmans, the highest level 
and reserved for priests and spiritual leaders. The varna of Kshatriyas, associated with rulers 
and warriors. The varna of Vaishyas associated with commerce. The varna of Shudras or 
untouchables associated with dirty or Un-Godly tasks 
72 Article 46 of The Indian Constitution: The state shall promote with special care the educational 
and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular of the scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of 
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out in the Bhagavad Gita, caste is to a very considerable extent is, "what people 
think of it, and how they act on these perceptions. Far from being a static 
reflection of received codes and values, caste has been a dynamic force in Indian 
life and thought. "73 Caste then does have a high degree of internalization, but the 
nature and construct of caste is transient and has different meanings and 
interpretations, some taking a theological view, others adding political, class or 
economic meaning to caste. 
In similar vein to Bayly, Nicholas Dirks suggests that under the British, "caste 
became a single term capable of expressing, organizing and above all 
systematizing India's diverse forms of social identity. , 74 Attempts to empirically 
discover the origins of the caste system proved as fruitless as attempts to discover 
other nagging questions about the caste system such as the origins of the Raj puts. 
The meaning of caste must be contextualised within a specific time and region 
because, as the case of the Rajputs (below) demonstrates, being a Rajput during 
the Mughal period attached meaning of loyalty to the Mughal court and at the 
demise of the Mughals, the meaning of being a Rajput changed during the Raj, 
and changed again after 1947. 
There are similarities between the British approach to the governance of India and 
their Mughal predecessors. However, in terms of political and particularly cultural 
integration and internalization, a disparity begins to emerge. For example the role 
of the Rajputs ('son of a King') in both the Mughal court and the military shows a 
high level of internalisation between self and other. Stewart Gordon argues that 
one of the most fruitless academic searches of this period has been the search for 
the origins of the Rajputs. Gordon suggests that the question should be posed in a 
more organic form and the term Rajput placed in `attributional and relational 
terms. ' Again this term offers a high level of internalisation and an organic link 
between self and other whereby the interests of both share a Kantian level of 
internalization that did not manifest itself during the time of the Company or the 
exploitation 
Bayly, 1999. Caste, Society and Politics in India. p. 7 
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Raj. "Over the course of 150 years - from the early sixteenth century to the mid 
seventeenth century - the Mughals and certain armed indigenous groups figured 
out how to integrate... " By way of this integration, genealogy came a poor second 
after, "the correct clothes, a good carriage, the ability to dance. the right speech 
patterns and enough money to make the bank of faro were more important 
attributes. " 
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Rajputs became the Generals of the Mughal armies and were rewarded by way of 
revenue and land and as revenue and land passed through the generations. so did 
family loyalty to Mughal rule. Ceremonial and secular patronage also played a 
part in the connection between Mughal and Rajput with an elaborate array of, 
"non-Islamic symbols to reward and promote solidarity in the heterogeneous 
cavalry which served them. This they had quite thoroughly done by the end of the 
sixteenth century. Men were rewarded with the personal robes of the Emperor, 
turban jewels, swords, horses and decorated quivers, never with Korans. ' 
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Through military service, marriage and patronage, the Rajputs emerged as a caste 
whose loyalty was to the Mughal court. 
Akbar, one of the so-called `grand Mughals' married a Rajput princess making his 
son and eventual successor Jehangir half Rajput. In turn, Jehangir's son Shah 
Jehan was also the son of a Rajput mother. Nehru refers to this period as `Mughal- 
Rajput cooperation' and suggests that racially this "Turk-Mongol dynasty became 
far more Indian than Turk or Mongol... The Mughal nobility became 
progressively Indianized and the Rajputs and others were influenced by Persian 
culture. "77 
Asayag argues that. "South Asian Islam was for the majority of Muslims an 
Indian religion. We must not therefore look for the causes of the growing discord 
71 Dirks, Nicholas, 2001. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. p. 5 
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between Hindus and Muslims in their religious practices, but in the economic, 
ideological and political changes that took place 78 It is these changes, some of 
which occurred towards the end of the Mughal period, but continued throughout 
the Raj period, changed the way Hindus and Muslims viewed themselves and 
each other. It was during this period, discussed below. where a Kantian culture 
became politicized and two separate communities or entities began to emerge and 
perceive each other as the self and other. 
The Legacy of the Indian Mutiny 
This section will look at how the British developed their justification and ideology 
for staying on and will then look at how the assumptions made after the Mutiny 
became politicized were built upon by the political elite who would take India 
(and Pakistan) towards independence and partition. After the restoration of order 
in 1858, the British had a very serious problem as to the legitimacy of their 
position in India. The extent of the shock and severe discomfiture felt can be seen 
in the ruthless treatment of anyone even suspected of being involved in the 
Mutiny. As Metcalf identifies, 
The intensity of the punishment meted out reflected the vulnerability of the British 
in India, precariously set over a vast land they barely comprehended. Desperate 
and fearful, they sought to quell by a vengeful terror the harrowing vision of the 
loyal sepoy or faithful bearer as a treacherous murderer79 
Having imported land reform and the beginnings of modernity to the irrational 
minds of the natives, the British expected grace and favour. In the event, they 
received neither and again this allowed for a feeling of betrayal which negated 
any need to consider the complexities behind the revolt, Instead what little debate 
there was revolved around two distinct categories of either loyalty or betrayal and 
the inability of Indians to show gratitude, which served to increase Britains 
justification for staying on. This can be seen in the light of an amnesty that was 
78 Op Cit. Asayag. p. 45 
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called in May 1858 to which some responded by surrendering. However, the 
amnesty, "excluded those who had killed European citizens, and the authorities 
refused to pardon those who did not surrender. Death thus awaited many who 
participated in the revolt. "80 The amnesty then was not an amnesty at all, but an 
unconditional surrender. 
E. I Brodkin suggests, "after the re-establishment of British power, the victors 
were eager to sort out friend from foe, to reward one and punish the other, and 
descriptive adjectives such as loyal and rebel became permanently fixed to a 
variety of individuals. "81 As far as the white men were concerned, any attempt by 
Indians to cling to their old social and economic order (talookhar) at the expense 
of the liberalization project was to move away from the process of rationalization. 
Metcalf suggests that if Indians did not pursue what was in their own (liberal) best 
interest, "but obstinately clung to their traditional ways, then the liberal 
presumption that all men were inherently rational and educatable fell to the 
ground, and with it expectation that India could be transformed on an English 
model. "82 
The question remained however, was India capable of being molded and remade 
in the image of Britain? This was the central question that became the cornerstone 
of the debate between liberals and utilitarians. This debate is important for two 
reasons, first because the result would shape Indian politics and many Indians up 
to and beyond 1947 and, "only with the coming of British rule, from the late 
eighteenth century on did the notion that there existed distinct `Hindu' and 
`Muslim' communities in India take on a fixed shape. "83 
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Second, because in many cases, the way Britain viewed India after 1858, in time. 
became the way some Indians viewed themselves, in terms of a system of 
government, its constitutional and institutional makeup and crucially where its 
theological divisions were, "this insistence that India was divided into two 
opposed religious communities shaped the way not only the British, but 
increasing numbers of Indians, viewed their society. "84 
Moreover, after 1947 constitutional changes and government policies in both 
India and Pakistan were changed to take account of, or take advantage of 
theological division but the two new nations of India and Pakistan would inherit 
and have to wrestle with precisely the same ideological and theological 
differences that emerged as a result of British policy in the nineteenth century. 85 
Writing with regard to post 1947 Pakistan, David Gilmartin argues, "the 
reconciliation of mediatory `democracy' with the public assertion of Islamic 
`community' continues to preoccupy, many Pakistanis. " He goes on to suggest 
that, "the legacies of both empire and Islam continue to shape the history of 
Pakistani state and society. "86 
In other words there was, inherited from the British uncertainty and argument as 
to how to go about reconciling a society dominated by feudalism and the 
zamindar system, or the zail system introduced by the British, with a centrally run 
system of federal government. 
Land reform was the product of a "British society with an agricultural pattern 
quite different from India. " This, compounded by the philosophical disparity 
culminating with the introduction of, "British notions of property and contract, "87 
85 For an interesting suggestion that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct nationalisms fighting 
for different objectives in 1857, see Malik, Hafeez, 1963. Muslim Nationalism in India and 
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that were alien to the Indian system 
For Gilmartin the legacy of land reform and the philosophical approach of the 
British has still not been settled, not least because of the contradictions apparent in 
the political and legal system whereby the purpose of colonial rule itself was to 
open up India to the world economy and take advantage of its considerable 
primary wealth, but to do this depended on cooperation from an indigenous 
political base. For Gilmartin, the agrarian feudal system was not and has not been 
squared with the concepts of central governance. 
Whereas much of the post 1947 literature revolves around a perceived notion of a 
movement from `communalism' to Islamic 'separatism' which rejects Jinnah's 
two nation theory, Gilmartin posits that the future Pakistan inherited a legacy of 
both the contradictions of the unsettled issue of what role Islam should have, and 
the political and legal contradictions of the British legacy. These are precisely the 
contradictions David Washbrook refers to when he suggests, "The Anglo-Indian 
legal system was distinctly Janus-faced and rested on two contradictory principles 
with different social implications. "88 For the British in the 1850's the debate 
pivoted on Indian `difference' or Indian `sameness' to European modernity. That 
is to say, whether Indians were `capable' of `bettering' themselves through a crash 
course in liberalism and equality before the law and thus achieve `sameness', as 
many European liberals argued. Or were the inhabitants of the subcontinent so 
different or even ungodly as to make such a transformation impossible? Leaving 
open only the non-interventionist approach of the East India Company, Metcalf 
argues that this debate was never fully concluded and as a result the ideology of 
the British veered between the two, India becoming both `sameness' and 
`difference'. 
The British could not escape the enduring contradiction that between their self- 
imposed `civilizing mission' with its idea of an India remade in Britain's image 
and their insistence upon maintaining an imagined India of enduring *difference"' 
88 Washbrook, David, "Law State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India, " Modern Asian Studies 
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In order to discover and know India the British received help from Indians. 
"Indians themselves, especially the Brahmin informants and assistants who 
worked with the British, by the information they provided shaped much of the 
ethnographic project. "9° By this method the British sought to `know' India. "The 
period 1860 to 1877 saw a rapid expansion of what might be thought of as the 
definition and expropriation of Indian civilization by imperial rulers. `Knowledge' 
of India in all its aspects, its life, thought, sociology, and history preoccupied the 
British. "91 This is important because the British sought to amass, catalog and label 
with Victorian empirical vigour all that could be known about the world outside 
Europe in what became the Archeological Survey of India and yet, "India was 
`known' in ways that would sustain a system of colonial authority, and through 
categories that made it fundamentally different from Europe. "' Farzana Shaikh 
points to the, "propensity of British officials to classify and categorize Indian 
society in order to make it more accessible, " but that these social constructs bore 
little or no relation to the reality of the society officials were attempting to 
understand. 93 Thus Lord Morley wrote in a May 1907 dispatch that reaffirmed its 
commitment to, "the broad principle that Indian society lives thinks and acts 
according to castes, races and religions. "94 Thus the British created a new political 
entity (or Muslim communalism) where it had previously not existed. 
Francis Robinson also points to the importance of official perceptions as a major 
cause of Muslim separatism characterized along lines of religion, race, language 
and caste. Officials he argues, handed out patronage and accorded representation 
to Muslims as Muslims and in so doing constructed a Muslim communal identity 
90 ibid. Ideologies of the Raj. p. 113 
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which both the Muslim League and the INC became aware of and began to exploit 
to serve their increasingly separate political ambitions. 9 The British constructed 
both the political environment of separatism and a political idiom to 11o with it that 
became the mainstream political culture of the pre independence period. The two 
major political organizations, the INC and the League bought into this construct 
and exploited it for their own ends. 
Whilst this sustained theories of difference, it also offered Indian elites the 
opportunity to uphold or strengthen their positions and have a disproportionmc 
influence on the construction of what became a political genealogy for the 
foundations of, and justification for, British rule in India. British understanding of 
Hinduism was much vaguer than their understanding of Islam %\'lhich, like 
Christianity, had a fundamentalist, semitic structure which was easier to identify 
with. 
Hinduism by contrast has no singular canon, structured hierarchy or beginning, 
middle and end that would have been familiar to Europeans. Islam however, 1v ith 
a structure of rules on diet, gender roles and daily routine gave it a beginning 
middle and end that the British immediately understood. This did little to south 
their underlying fear of Islam given the perceived threat of the potential power of 
a collective Islam rising up against the Raj, however such a structure did give 
Islam a definable quality. It also offers credence to the argument that any attempt 
at divide and rule came, not from British political cunning to divide and rule, but 
out of a genuine belief in sectarian difference between Hindu and Muslim. 
There is also evidence to suggest that the British felt that an uprising amongst 
Muslims would be far more difficult to control than a non-Muslim LIprisin(, 
because of a belief that Muslims acted entirely in concert with one another. Sir 
Lancelot Hare who replaced Sir Bampflvde Fuller as Governor General of Bengal 
in 1906 noted that Muslims posed a greater threat because they tended to mobilize 
with the skills of the 'Moulavies' whereas the modern predominantly Hindu 
O' Robinson. Separatism. -1rong Indian . tluslinn.,. pp. 98-1 ßf" 81 
organizations consisted of mere `agitators. ' 96 
This is in stark contrast to the amorphous and even contradictory nature of 
Hinduism whose customs and rules on diet, gender roles and daily routine \\ ere 
apt to change from region to region and even village to village. Hinduism does not 
possess one specific sacred text and as such lacks a historical lineage and 
theological inheritance that are considered vital to the monotheistic religions. 
Bereft of this structure, "Hinduism is not endowed with a structure conducive to 
mass mobilization, religious or political. "97 
The British saw the disparate theological differences, but misunderstood or failed 
to see the cultural and political connections between the two, a phenomena due in 
no small part to the longevity of an Islamic presence on the subcontinent 
discussed above. The Indian Muslims became, 
at once opponents and allies, a romanticized Self and a threatening Other, the 
Muslims were, during the later decades of the nineteenth century, shaped into a 
community strikingly different from India's Hindus. This vision was never free of 
ambivalence, nor did it accord at all closely with the Muslims themselves" 
Moreover, the British obsession with their new scientific methodology of data 
collection and empiricism did little to expand their understanding of religion. As 
Clifford Geertz pointed out, "a theoretical frame\\ ork which would enable us to 
provide an analytical account of it, (religion) an account of the sort ww e can 
provide for lineage segmentation, political succession, labor exchange, or the 
socialization of the child does not exist. "" 
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The partition of Bengal and the agitation it aroused among Hindu politicians acted 
as a catalyst in transforming Muslim attitudes to the western styled system of 
governance via representation -a system which many Muslims had been opposed 
to given that they argued that Muslims could and should only be represented by 
their co-religionists. Anxious British officials let it be known that support for the 
partition of Bengal, "could confer considerable political benefits and when 
influential Muslims such as the Aga Khan and Newab Mohsin-ul-urulk. concluded 
that political loyalism could finally obtain the concessions on representation that 
had alluded them, " officials concluded that they had secured Muslim slupport for 
partition. 100 
The partition of Bengal in 1905 precipitated a political crisis to such an extent that 
the partition of the province by the British was reversed in 1911. British thinking 
behind partition was premised on the ground that it made the province easier to 
administer. For many Hindus it was seen as an attempt to weaken their political 
influence by dividing them. 1°1 Curzon was condemned for trying to cleave, "thy: 
Bengali nation in twain with his sword. " 102 Whilst partition did make 
administrative sense, politically, by splitting Bengal along religious lines puut the 
eastern districts of Bengal under Assamese control and split the Bengali speaking 
area in half, thus weakening the Bengali dominated Congress party. As previous 
plans to reduce Bengal had been suggested such as removing the Hindi speaking 
area of Bihar or the Oriya-speaking region of Orissa, the INC was not without 
reason to suspect a political motive. 
There was an apolitical argument for reducing Bengal, in 1900 it was by far the 
biggest and most populous administrative unit, covering 189.000 square miles 
and inhabited by more than seventy-eight million people. 
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Whether by accident or design the partition of Bengal was a parting of tile W, -Iv's 
for Hindus and Muslims. The former being extremely suspicious of British 
motivations and the latter seeking to use partition as a means to increase their 
political influence through cooperation with officials. Moreover Nluslims x\e c 
keenly aware of British fears of an 'Islamic uprising' and were not slow to play 
this card. For example, in 1908 Sayyid Ali Imam emphasized the governments 
good fortune in being able to rely on Indian Muslims, "for the defence of the 
Empire. " 104 The political outcome of partition was to create a clear disparity and 
different strategies between the political ambitions of the League who used the 
politics of cooperation with the British, compared to the hostility and resentment 
it instilled in the Bengali Congress party. 
Having missed the cultural similarities between Hindu and Muslim the two, intra 
communal antagonisms between Sunni, Shia and even Sufi were also missed. 
Whilst English writers like W. W Hunter, "saw in the Wahabi reformers men of 
`pure' faith, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, as a self-styled `cosmopolitan' Muslim, found 
nothing attractive in these `wild denizens of the hills. "° That many InRln 
Muslims like Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarth college, could feel threatened 
and intimidated by some of his co-religionists both inside and outside of a 
particular sect was a point rarely picked up on by the British % ho by enacting the 
Morley-Minto legislation gave Muslim communalism a constituency which they 
sought to capitalize on through the use of communal rhetoric. Islamic symbols 
and terminology fixed the concept of a community of equal and like-minded 
Indian Muslims that, "paved the way for the definition of an 'imagined' political 
community -a nation - whose presence justified the emergence of an independent 
state. "''06 The net result of these debates on sameness and difference was to make 
Indian society "more overtly religious and sectarian than prior to British rule, "... 
the British were. "preaching sermons on westernization and progress to a society 
'0' Speech by Sayyid Ali Imam at the All India Muslim League session. 31st December 1908. in 
Pirzada (ed) Foundations of Pakistan. p. 61 
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that was actually becoming more 'Oriental' and 'backward. "'107 
The implications of the 1857/58 period were profound in terms of the effect it had 
on British and Indian attitudes up to and beyond 1947. ramifications of which 
went far beyond the sporadic and confined fighting that vv as the Mutiny itself. At 
a sociological level the post Mutiny period brought an end to the majority of 
intermarriage between members of the East India Company and Bengali women. 
With the full transfer of power from the Company to the British crown came the 
emergence of the bungalow and the cantonment area. physically separating the 
illiberal Hindus and Muslims from their British masters. 
Having crossed the rubicon of Mutiny. Britain embarked on a process to fully 
integrate and legitimize their rule in India. They did so based on assumptions 
based on information gleaned from disparate parts of India. from Rajputs and 
Brahmins, but for all their empirical detail and analysis of data collected the 
British still had, "little conception of what drove indigenous politics . 
"108 
These orientalist constructs ranged from Muslims being collectively fired by their 
Islamic zealotry; because the Sikhs ate meat they were categorized as a martial 
race whose aggressive nature marked them out as military candidates whilst the 
vegetarian Hindu became feminine and duplicitous people who would standby 
and watch woman being burned alive on funeral pyres. 
All these roles justified Indians being looked after by the reassuring hand of the 
rational and masculine white man. However in a departure from Benedict 
Anderson. Bayly suggests that these orientalist stereotypes were not, "tools of 
epistemological conquest, so much as fig-leaves to conceal desperate 
ignorance. "109 Here we have two different theoretical explanations as to how 
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orientalism came about 
Anderson and Said argue that orientalism was determined by western conceptions 
of the East. Bayly however argues that the company had acquired plenty of 
information which more than enabled them to deal with Indians and as for the 
Indian merchants they might have been, "predisposed to spend their profits on 
temples, to the disdain of the Europeans. but there was no question about what 
profit and loss was in Indian commerce. " Here we can see the causal explanation 
residing in the construction of ideation as opposed to materialism. 
It is on a cultural level that the two parted company and at that point orientalist 
despotic acts like sati took over. However, "orientalist fantasy flooded into the 
gaps left by the decline of pragmatic information: it did not always predetcrminc 
that information. "'" 
The argument hinges on the explanatory power of orientalism that between the 
company servants and the Indians, shared information about profit and loss in a 
ledger account, negated orientalism at the commerce level, but not at the cultural 
level. Orientalism suggests that European conceptions of India and the Indians 
were preordained. However, Bayly's argument challenges this by suggesting that 
on an economic and commercial level Europeans and Indians shared a good 
understanding, an understanding that faltered at the cultural level and Metcalf 
asserts that the various strands of these contrary positions were never fiollk 
reconciled throughout the period of the Raj. 
Marshall however, supports Bayly's argument sug`. gesting that European trade 
often depended on credit extended by local merchants and thus obliging the 
Company to operate within the Asian commercial system. "Trade on the scale 
pursued by the East India Company could not be separated from politics. "" 
Nlarshull, P. 1998, "The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion, in Marshall, eds. The (). v/ nf 
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In the post 1858 era however when the Crown took over from the Company it is 
Said's orientalism that explains more thoroughly how the British saw themselves 
and their role on the subcontinent and it also explains the policy outcome of 
legislation such as Morley-Minto because the more holistic theory demonstrates 
that the British viewed themselves as having greater differences from Indians than 
Bayly's argument of similarities. In other words, after 1858, it is the differences 
between India and Britain that informed policy rather than the similarities and 
moreover, the differences the British saw between Indians themselves, in 
particular Hindus and Muslims. 
The Morley-Minto Reforms 
The 1909 Morley-Minto reforms introduced electoral politics to the Indian 
subcontinent and profoundly changed the nature of domestic Indian politics and 
relations between the INC and the Muslim League. It should be noted that there 
were other legislative measures taken after 1909, the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms in 1919 and the Round Table talks in London between 1930 and 1931 that 
led to the 1935 Government of India Act. "2 
The 1919 Act introduced dyarchy, a dual form of government whereby the so- 
called `transferred subjects' such as education and public health came under the 
control of elected ministers and `reserved subjects' such as finance and law and 
order was retained by the Governor. 
Under section 84 of the 1919 legislation a statutory commission was to be set up, 
the Simon Commission whose task was to report back to parliament on the 
progress of constitutional reform and make recommendations for future changes 
to the constitution. However the committee that reached India in February 1928 
was made up entirely of British members of parliament, a fact that caused great 
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offence and the work of the committee was hamstrung by the continuing 
disagreement about the widening of communal awards to minorities. 
The progress of legislation from the Acts of 1909 to 193 was by no mtýýýn a 
linier process leading inexorably on from Dominion status to full independcncc. 
indeed on his return from attending the Round Table talks in London. Gandhi as 
arrested in January 1932 and served a two year sentence in the Aga Khan palace. 
Moreover the INC boycotted the Round Table talks and condemned the 1935 Act, 
in particular the decision announced by British Prime Minister Ramsey 
Macdonald in August 1932 to extend the communal award to all minority 
communities, making them separate electorates. 
The INC was particularly dismissive of the decision to award minority status to 
untouchables, the Muslim League although angry that the new constitution fell 
short of their demands and reduced them to a minority in Bengal and Punjab 
accepted the 1935 Act. The concern of the League can be seen by a speech made 
by Mohamed Ali at the All India Muslim Conference on 24`x' April 1930. He said. 
"While the Muslims were opposed to British domination they were equally 
opposed to Hindu domination. "113 
The 1909 reforms, gave Muslims the status of having their own separate and 
weighted electorate which took into account the population of Muslims as one 
single entity, "Separate electorates, along with reservations and weightages, gave 
birth to a sense of Muslims being a religio-political entity in the colonial ima. ie - 
of being unified, cohesive and segregated from the Hindus. " 
The reforms had at their very heart the assumption of an Islamic collective and the 
British fear of what such a collective might do to challenge their hegemonic 
status. "These assumptions were self-sustaining... in the making of the N1orlc%- 
percent, ige of rAgious population 
ýý' Qureshi, tshtiaq. 1962. The Muslim Coinlinm r' of the lrt, l(ý-Pakr. v(w1 subcontinent. p. 289 
89 
Minto reforms., which translated the English view of Indian society into formal 
constitutional arrangements. " 15 
That such a co-religionist unity ever existed came down to the exaggerated British 
fear of Indian Muslims and their potential challen<fe to the Raj. This tear of 
Muslims led the British to accommodate them politicall\ and in so doin(-'. created 
a political opportunity where none had previously existed. in establishing the 
Muslims as a separate and special interest in the Indian constitution, the \lusli111 
League was important but government assumptions about Indian M luslims in 
general, and its policies towards them, were crucially important. -16 
This self-fulfilling prophesy led in no small part to the establishment of Muslim 
separatism as it sought to build on concessions already granted to it via 
government legislation. David Page argues that it was the Morley-Minto and later 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms that lead to the growth of nationalism on the 
subcontinent because they caused the politicization of the provinces. tic writes, 
"The assault on the Centre, the last stage in the emergence of nationalism, came 
not from the nation itself but from the provinces. "' 117 
Constructivism contends that states (and individuals) use an ontological set of 
ideas and assumptions to take each other into account. As Wendt suggests, the 
blank canvass of not knowing who the other is, is no longer viable. States, through 
a social process, do know each other and take each other into account on that 
basis. Not on the basis of a blank canvass, or empty vessel that structural theories 
suggest, but based on what gets into the vessel. 
Morley and Minto political animals of their dav. were responding to the political 
environment of the day developing policy on the basis of a socially learnt prooccsý, 
whereby. "representation of Moslems as Moslems became the foundation I-or any 
114 Hasen, Rl usliirul, 2001. Legaii of a Divided Nation. p. 35 
ibid. p. 173 
116 ibid. P. 171 
Pauc Dav id. 1982. Th1' Indian Muslims and tilL' Imperial .S.,, teen "l Color()/. p. 6 90 
constitutional scheme. "'" Furthermore a Government of India Reform Dispatch. 
in October 1908 states that Muslims constitute, "an absolutely separate 
community, distinct by marriage, food and custom, and claiming in many cases to 
belong to a different race from the Hindu's. "' 19 
In the wake of the Mutiny the British divided along the philosophical and 
administrative lines that dominated British thinking on India. There arose the 
philosophical question of liberal paternalism versus utilititarianism, the so-called 
ideologies of the Raj, an issue that was never fully resolved. Second. the 
administrative question arose of how India should be governed. From the banks of 
the Thames, or the banks of the Ganges? 
The tendency towards strong central governance from Delhi which reached it 
zenith during the viceroyalty of Curzon contended with a regionalist approach 
advocated by Morley. In the Morley-Minto reforms it can be seen that a more 
regionalist approach won out, but with Hindu-Muslim difference at its centre. 
This difference was borne out of British perceptions and fear of Islam, a fear that 
become apparent after the 1857 Mutiny, a process that damaged the prevailing 
social order on the subcontinent. 
In an approach similar to the transient approach here, Ashok Kapur argues that the 
development of an Indocentric power structure on the subcontinent can be seen in 
incremental historical stages that have waxed and waned since the early 1600's. 
The first of these stages or periods corresponds with the Kantian period here. The 
first developmental stage in Kapur's analysis is from feudalism to order/managed 
disorder (1600's - 1947). 
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It was the first period of European involvement in the subcontinent that was '`the 
118 Das, M. N, 1964. India under Morley and Minto. p. 230 
119 ibid. p. 259 
120 The second stage is, from anarchy to order (1947 - 1971), the third stage, from insecurity to 
security (1971 - 1987). See Ashok Kapur, The Indian Subcontinent: The Contemporary 
Structure of Power and the Development of Power Relations. pp. 6933 -71 1, Asian Su rveyy Vol. 
28, No. 7 July 1988 
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crucible in which modern subcontinental power relations were -, enerated. '' Prior 
to the emergence of the East India Company and the succession of the British 
crown. "there was no conception of centralized or decentralized systems of 
government or power politics-the notion of a continuous and recipt cal 
relationship between ruler and ruled did not exist. "' 21 In other words in the first of 
Kapur's three historically contextualised frameworks, the seismic shil't in the 
construction of relations came about by the political activity of the Company and 
the Crown as they sought territorial dominance, either directly or via relations 
with the Princely states. 
Up to the early 1600's there was no political entity called India and ' Indian' 
kingdoms and multiple fiefdoms reflected the limits of horse or elephant power 
and the `personality' of the rulers. However in 1857/58 an indigenous political 
union (or assembly) emerged to meet a threat posed by a third party - the British. 
It is important to note that the Mutiny was not a collective team in the sense of a 
unified political entity with what we might recognize now as a central command 
running from the political leadership down to the military. Indeed it was precisely 
the lack of a unified political and military strategy that contributed to the failure of 
the Mutiny. That notwithstanding, 1857 does demonstrate a political desirc to 
remove a third party and there was an attempt to remove the third party by way of 
collective action that cut across the theological division between Hindu and 
Muslim. 
Collective action by Hindu and Muslim is important because it demonstrates \\ hat 
could be termed as the last effort by Indians to collectively remove the British. 
Once the British view of Hindu-Muslim division entered political discourse. 
Indian elites no longer responded to Indian politics, but responded to what thc'' 
thought the British viewed as Indian politics. 
In this sense the colonized knew their colonizers far better than the colonircrs 
121 ibid pp. 69 3-71 1 
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knew the colonized. However, this process demanded a polarization of Indian 
politics from which it would never recover. Indian politicians played this 
colonially constructed game with great aplomb and. "dressed themselves in the 
guise of the organizational forms that their rulers would recognize for the purpose 
of advancing their own economic and political interests. " 122 
By blaming Muslims for the events of 1857-8 the British unwittingly began to 
construct what they assumed was already there - theological and political 
division. To find their niche in this alien form of political discourse indigenous 
politicians shaped their values, identity and approach to fit into an Anglo-Indian 
idiom that was recognizable to the British. "The hegemony of these idioms was so 
strong that all attempts to construct alternative political discourses of power were 
eventually overwhelmed , 99123 Through this process one of the highest goals, 
namely, to introduce political representation into India, became inextricably 
linked to communalism as political elites went along with a new political 
discourse, which allowed them to compete in the political processes of the Raj. 
The notion of Muslim weightage to reflect the presence of Muslims as the 
numerically biggest minority became of paramount importance once the British 
had accepted the League's majoritarian argument, but it is also a paradox given 
the deep divisions within the League as to how Islamic (or not) the League should 
be. On one hand a sense of Muslim mobilization was essential for the political 
unity and strength of the organization. On the other hand, it disguised the secular 
issues that many in the League felt were vital and these interests were more to do 
with protecting the interests and political power enjoyed by the high born land 
122 Haynes, 1991. Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India. p. 10. Haynes is drawing heavily on the 
work of the so-called `Cambridge School' who argue that the emergence of public and national 
politics during the Raj was the result of Indian elites calibrating their political approach to 
match the political environment of the day. Concentrating his ethnographic research on Surat, 
Haynes concludes that it was not so much that the British sought to impose their will in Surat, 
but that political elites soon discovered that couching their terms and goals in a non-liberal, 
non-communal dialogue left them marginalized. Furthermore, those who persisted with using a 
Gandhian agenda and dialogue found themselves being disregarded and out of touch with 
political realities on the ground. 
123 ibid. p. 12 
118 Shaikh, Farzana, 1989. Community and Consensus in Indian Punjab. p. 138 
93 
owning ashraf Muslims. 
Farzana Shaikh suggests, it made. "sound political sense for thcsc `Iuslinl" to opt 
for a system which by focusing attention on their ' Muslim-ness' promised to 
guarantee them a measure of authority among their traditional follow ers. "' ý4 The 
reasons for an Islamic communion are diverse. Under the umbrella of religious 
identity were other more political issues such as political and economic status. 
Protecting this status and influence meant taking on the guise of Islamic 
congregation. That is not to say that this was entirely fabricated, far from it, 
Francis Robinson has drawn attention to the degree to which Sayyid Ahrnad Khan 
and his associates such as Shibli Nomani and Altaf Husain Half, were -men of 
deep faith' whose political influence upon later generations of Muslims cannot he 
underestimated, were dedicated to reviving pride in the grandeur and superiority 
of Islam. "' 25 The dilemma of the League hoyvcv'er was that it professed Islamic 
communalism whilst maintaining secular ambitions of political and economic 
status. 
Summary 
This chapter has shown how an internalized Kantian culture became politicized 
and unpicked by the presence of a European power. This process, brought about 
by the way Europeans perceived Indians changed the way Indians themselves, in 
particular Muslims and Hindus, perceived each other. 
Prior to European power there existed an internalized Kantian culture with a 
concomitant construction of the self and other that criss crossed one another and 
became telescoped into ones own self where none of the identities can be defined 
or depicted without taking into account some other. This cultural internalization 
i ,' Robinson, Francis, 198?. Islam and , tluslim Se/ c1/a! ism. p. 139 
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was disrupted by the politicization of culture that manufactured a sell and other 
between Hindu and Muslim - between the INC and the League. 
One of the key elements in this politicization process occurred due tc an 
unwillingness, or inability to differentiate between the quantitative and qualitative 
influence of Islam. The quantitative influence taken as a measure of the impact 
Islam had had on the subcontinent was understood in terms of political power. 
whereas the qualitative influence of Islam, namely the conversion of Hindus to 
Islam, purely out of political convenience was ignored or missed. Indians used 
theology to give themselves influence in the changing political environment of the 
day, but as the political environment changed, so too did theological persuasion. 
Thus we have cultural transience, a mixture of changing theological persuasion, 
which left in its wake, a plethora of cultural meanings. For many Indians, 
including Nehru, it was an obvious course of action, to change or adjust political 
and theological beliefs to fit in with the predominant culture of the day. 
The key point is flux, a transient dynamic that became rigidified during the time 
of the British and rigidified still further by the INC and the League using 
manufactured claims of secularism and a home for the Muslims of South Asiýl to 
carve out their own political power bases. If these power bases, premised on a self 
and other existed in the minds of those who ran the League and the INC. they did 
not exist in the minds of people in the subcontinent. 
In Wight's three traditions the criticism has been that there is no distinguishing 
feature or dynamic that forces change from one culture to another. This chapter 
has shown that change did occur in the pre 1947 period by a process of the 
politicization of culture, a process whereby a Kantian logic of friendship was 
disrupted by a European power and compounded by the need of the INC and the 
L Lague to create their O\V11 
distinctive political identities and constituencies that 
brought about this politicization of culture and in order to do this required reli('ion 
and culture to become static and categorized. It needed Muslims to be Muslims. 
Sikhs to he Sikhs and Hindus to be Hindus. A Kantian culture of friendship 
9ý 
becoming usurped by the need of the League and the I NC to establish loyalty to a 
central polity. The establishment and maintenance of these loyalties forged a new 
Lockean culture of rivalry between them. the construction of which manufactured 
a self and other that became a material and structural difference \\hen India and 
Pakistan become sovereign states within the international system in 1947. 
Having looked at the manufacture of these ideologies the thesis will go on to look 
at the maintenance of these ideologies below and argue that the maintenance of 
these two opposing ideological positions, continue to push India and Pakistan 
towards a Hobbesian culture of enemy. It raises the question of what role the 
structure of the system and sovereignty play in perpetuating difference betvv cen 
India and Pakistan and whether the Westphalian system can only exist when states 
perceive themselves as having a clearly defined self and other. The contemporary 
experience of Western Europe however, seems to suggest that states can 
overcome structure and move towards a Kantian anarchy. Contrary to this, the 
contemporary experience in South Asia suggests that structure has played a major 
role in pushing India and Pakistan towards a Hobbesian culture of enemy. 
Structure is important because both states have manufactured ideology to justify 
sovereignty, a position that did not exist prior to partition, indeed sovereignty has 
become perhaps the major political issue since 1947 and defines the nature of 
power politics between India and Pakistan with the status of Jammu and Kashmir 
usually being central to the political and military conflicts fought between them in 
the name of sovereign legitimacy. The structure of the system has allowed India 
and Pakistan to prosecute their military and political differences in the name of 
ideological difference. 
Partition brought about two entrenched political problems for both states. The first 
is the structure of the international system serving as a legal and sovereign dig ide 
between them. The second is the ideational constitutions of the two states that 
Justified their membership of the international s\ stem. Without these ideological 
divisions the justification for the two states disappears. 
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The following chapters will show how these manufactured divisions translated 
into violence in the structured post 1947 environment. These differences are 
essential because they continue the manufacture of difference. This is the realist 
idealist conundrum, or the structural inter-subjective problem. Both states 
emphasize difference and down play similarities because differences enhance 
sovereignty and enforce the justification of each state. 
Each political or military clash between them adds to the quality of the differcncc 
between them. Their foreign policies reflect this inter-subjectivity and in the 
process add to the accumulation of evidence that justifies and enhances difference. 
Once the origins of these ideological differences have been critically' examined, 
the debate can move away from questions of how India and Pakistan threaten each 
other, towards questions of why India and Pakistan threaten each other. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Culture of Rivalry and Limited Conflict 
Chapter One argued that the Morley-Minto reforms introduced the politics o1' 
communalism between Hindu and Muslim and that this politically constructed division 
was used by the Indian political elites in both the INC and the Muslim League to further 
their own political ambitions. After 1947 this division had manifested into two 
dominant schools of thought -a secular India and a Muslim Pakistan. Such was the 
dominance of these two adversarial positions led by Jinnah for the League and Nehru 
for the INC that they eclipsed all other options and opinions, but not only were other 
options eclipsed but became regarded as being out of touch with the reality of the 
politics of the day. In other words a secular India and a Muslim (later Islamic) Pakistan 
became real. 
In his famous speech at Lahore in 1940 Jinnah gives a good account of Pakistani 
perceptions of being dominated by a Hindu India. "The only difference is this, that 
brother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one... a thousand years of close contact, 
nationalities which are as divergent today as ever cannot at any time be expected to 
transform themselves into one nation merely by means of subjecting them to a 
democratic constitution. "' Numerous other prirnordialist historians take a similar view, 
such as Khalid Sayeed who writes, "There has never taken place a confluence of the two 
civilizations in India - the Hindu and the Muslim. They have meandered towards each 
other here and there, but on the whole the two have flowed their separate courses. -2 
Jinnah's comment substantiates Benedict Anderson's argument that nations need both 
an immortal past and a heroic destiny. He writes that if nations are widely accepted to 
be new and historical, "the nations to which they give political expression always loom 
out of an immemorial past and still more important. glide into a limitless future. It is the 
Jinnah, Mohamed, 1940. Speech at the Muslim League conference at Lahore in which Jinnah caned 
for and got a resolution for an independent Pakistan. Cited in Cohen, Stephen. 2004. The /(/(! (I of 
Pakistan. p. 36 
Saav eed, Khalid, 1968. Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948. p. 12. For a discussion of the 
theological differences between Islam and Hinduism and a discussion on the attempts by the \luslim 





magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny. "' Thus, in order to pursue their 
respective destinies, India and Pakistan had to invent their past to pursue their destinies. 
the difficulty being that the two shared the past and as a consequence are forced to 
exaggerate difference at the expense of similarity. These two states do have different 
ideological justifications, however, these ideological differences belong firmly in the 
twentieth century, not in an immemorial past. 
Parity was a key argument for the League both prior to independence and during the 
transfer of power period and fear of Indian dominance remains seminal to Pakistani 
thought from its big southern neighbour. Moreover, Arvind Adityaraj argues that it was 
the INC's rejection of the two nation theory that "created a fear psychosis" with regard 
to India. 4 Thus, the structure of the international system is not sufficiently strong 
enough to supercede Pakistan's fear of Indian dominance. Sisur Gupta argues that 
Kashmir became symbolic of the conflict of the two new states and a result of the, 
"fears, jealousies and rivalries that marked the political processes at work in India 
before freedom.. 
. 
The two succeeding states began to function in relation to each other 
with a number of compulsions they inherited from the past. "5 
Varun Sahni also addresses how the structure of the system merely served to change the 
nature of suspicion. The India Pakistan relationship "is one of enduring rivalry, enemy 
imagining and zero-sum calculations. In that sense, disputed geography and divergent 
ideology have proved to be far more powerful than sociological kinship and economic 
similarity in shaping their divided history. "6 Sahni's analysis is pertinent because it 
sums up the structural and agency dynamic at the heart of this chapter, the sociological 
kinship of the pre-colonial period versus the disputed geography and divergent ideolog\ 
of the post 1947 period of sovereignty. 
The argument will be made in this chapter that under a Lockean anarchy India and 
Pakistan 's Foreign Policy; A Reappraisal. Chapter One 
3 riderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. pp. 1 1-12. Anderson cites the late Indonesian 
President Sukarno who talked of 350 years of colonialism his 'Indonesia' had endured althouyrh the 
eery concept of Indonesia was a twentieth century invention. 
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Pakistan entered a rivalry stage in relations whereby the justification for the foundation 
of each state became a focal point of antagonism and rivalry between them under a new 
belief system that was alien to the South Asian experience. namely the liberal 
Westphalian system. During the Lockean period discussed here. Kashmir became a 
focal point of those antagonisms, but these same antagonisms were apparent prior to 
Kashmir becoming central to Indo-Pakistan relations. Moreover, in 1971 the future 
status of East Pakistan became the focus of political and military antagonism: the events 
of 1971 will be discussed in the following chapter that will look at the Hobbesian nature 
of anarchy between these two states. 
The theoretical change from Kantian friend to Lockean rival discussed in Chapter One 
is clearer than the proceeding changes in anarchy, because a delineation from Locke to 
Hobbes is far less clear and interchangeable given the similarities between rival and 
enemy. However, theorizing the nature of role structures and the character of anarchy 
that exists between India and Pakistan - between self and other, will offer a framework 
from which to debate whether the 1965 conflict fits into a Lockean culture of rivalry or 
a Hobbesian culture of enemy. Indeed, throughout all the empirical data that will be 
examined in this chapter and the next, the theoretical question can be asked, what 
periods since 1947 can best be characterized as Lockean and what periods can best be 
characterized as Hobbesian? Or, are India and Pakistan rivals or enemies? This 
theoretical question is seminal to this thesis and will provide two distinct frameworks as 
to the current and future nature of anarchy between India and Pakistan. Any movement 
between the two theoretical characterizations will underpin the main argument being 
posited here that anarchy between India and Pakistan is transient. 
The theoretical and ideological challenge for both states is to overcome their modernist 
ideological differences of the post 1947 period and allow mutual identity back in within 
the modern context of the Westphalian system. The problem being, that allowing the 
cultural milieu of the pre-colonial period back in, undermines the modernist agenda and 
justification of both sovereign states. In this sense it is the structure of the system to 
which both states belong which stands in the way of a rapprochement because the 
structure of the system demands difference. 
the LOC in Kashmir. pp. 147-163 in Bajpai, Kanti eds, Kar Jrl am!. 4>>cr. 
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Sisur Gupta neatly sets out the structural and inter-subjective dilemma of Indo-Pakistan 
relations. it is possible that Kashmir has become for the t« o countries the symbol of 
their rivalry -a rivalry which has been traced to deeper factors than the dispute over 
Kashmir. In disentangling the knot it may well appear to be worthwhile to start with 
Kashmir. It is also possible however that loosening at other ends would be necessary 
before such a start could be made. "7 We thus have a problem of structural inter- 
subjectivity. A structural problem due to the limitation and ideological requirements of 
being a sovereign state, but inter-subjective given that India and Pakistan come out of 
the same religious and cultural milieu of the pre-colonial period. 
This chapter will argue that 1965 fits into a Lockean culture of rivalry between India 
and Pakistan because it was a conflict fought over a specific region or territory 
(Kashmir) and that the conflict was limited to that one specific objective - an objective 
that did not involve questioning the right of the other to exist. Moreover, the political 
justification of the conflict resides firmly in the normative constructs and clash of ideas 
between the self and other with both states questioning the legitimacy of each other's 
claims to Kashmir. Namely that Pakistan believes that as a Muslim majority state, 
Jammu and Kashmir should be part of the Muslim homeland - Pakistan. India by 
contrast argues that as a secular state religion resides in the private, not the political. 
This limited conflict came about due to rivalry and an attempt to bring Kashmir into a 
normative belief system and structure, but bringing Kashmir into this normative 
construct did not require the complete elimination of an enemy as would be required 
Linder a Hobbesian culture of enemy. 
The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war was the second conflict the two newly established states 
had fought over Jammu and Kashmir since independence and partition in 1947. The first 
conflict occurred a matter of weeks after independence and concluded \\Ith tile 
establishment of the ceasefire line (CFL). 
8 This dissection of Kashmir left a third of the 
state under Pakistani control - so-called Azad Kashmir and the remainder of the state 
under Indian control. This thesis is not an examination of the partition period of 1947, 
7 Gupta, Sisur. 1967. Kashmir: .4 Stitc/i in Indo-Pakistan Relations. p. 439 
In the \N ake of the 196 conflict and the Tashkent Treat \. the CFL \ý as formalized into the line of 
control (LOC) between the No countries. 
I00 
although a brief outline will be necessary because many of the arguments bem cell the 
Muslim League and the INC came to ahead at this juncture and would have profound 
implications for future relations between India and the two wings of East and \V'est 
Pakistan. 
In the case of Bangladesh and its relations with India, the two states embarked after 
1971 on a relationship whereby India was the hegemonic power and sought to maximize 
its influence and power in Dacca. Relations between Delhi and Islamabad however 
remained trapped in the transient dynamic of Lockean and Hobbesian cultures that at its 
zenith reached a new height of Hobbesian danger in May 1998. After the founding of 
Bangladesh, relations between Delhi and the newly established Bangladesh underwent a 
qualitative change from pre-1971 relations. 
In stark contrast however, relations with Pakistan remained tense and mutually 
antagonistic. Thus we can see the high level of ideas and inter-subjectivity that 
dominate and constitute the nature of anarchy between India and Pakistan. Such is the 
transience of this anarchy it could be referred to as a systemic inter-subjectivity, once 
the ideas changed (between India and Bangladesh), the socially constructed nature of 
anarchy changed. Blainey argues that wars reoccur between two particular states 
because neither state reconciles itself to peace. The text cited below refers to the 
reoccurrence of conflict between Russia and Turkey, the dynamics underpinning it 
however are holistic and applicable to Indo-Pakistan relations because India and 
Pakistan can accept the need for war to end, but remain unreconciled to peace. 
Russia and Turkey fought because each believed that she was stronger and could 
gain more by fighting than by negotiating. At the close of each "var they agreed on 
their strength, but the agreement was temporary. After one or two decades the 
loser recovered confidence, regained financial strength, perhaps rearranged its 
army and enlarged its fleet, forgot the dangers and aches of war and explained 
away its previous military defeat with one of those ubiquitous national myths that 
restored self-respect. The accession of new rulers and military leaders aided the 
fading memory of defeat. The terms of the previous peace treaty were chains 
which could now be thrown away. Revenge became attractive. for it now seemed 
attainable9 
9 Blaine, Geoffrc> . 
ThL' CLrusL's ()1 War. p. 182. 
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Kant has written on the dangers of a mere tacit nod in the direction of peace. only after 
it becomes apparent that war can no longer be sustained. o treaty of peace that tacit]% 
reserves issues for a future war shall be held valid. For if this were the case, it would be 
a mere truce, a suspension of hostilities, not peace. which means the end of all 
hostilities. "10 
There has been an inherent lack of an end to hostilities between India and Pakistan. 
Whilst material considerations such as finance and manpower contributed to the 
political expediency of ending conflict, the ideational dynamics that drive these two 
states into political and military conflict remain outstanding. Thus wars between India 
and Pakistan end because both states involved are no longer materially capable of' 
sustaining them, not out of a consideration for peace, or from the perspective of ending 
the ideational rivalry that drives relations. 
This has constituted the transient nature of anarchy between India and Pakistan since 
1947 and can be seen in the two citations above. In the case of Blainey a previous treaty 
is seen as chains that must be thrown off in a conflict to avenge the last defeat. In the 
case of Kant, no treaty that reserves the right to renew hostilities at a later date should 
be held valid. This has important implications for the Tashkent treaty signed between 
India and Pakistan at the end of the 1965 conflict which will be discussed below. 
The chapter will give a brief outline of some of the political events that unfolded in 
Jammu and Kashmir, during the partition period. It will then move on to discuss the 
1965 conflict. We will begin to see how a Lockean rivalry began to manifest in 
relations, but also that the origins of this conflict have their roots in the ideological clash 
and irreconcilable differences between India and Pakistan and how conflict itself has 
added to these irreconcilable differences leaving Kashmir. "a hostage to Indo-Pakistan 
relations. "" 
Partition & Military Conflict 1947-1948 
10 Humphrey , 
1-eJ, (Trans) 1983. Kant, Immanuel. P i-petunl Peace Emd OrhCr Esxcli. s . p. 
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Territories which had been governed directly under the British Raj between 1858 and 
1947 would be divided on the basis of religious predominance. Areas where there %N as a 
Muslim majority would cede to one of the two wings of Pakistan and areas of Hindu 
majority would accede to India. The Princely states which had existed under British 
paramountcy during the Raj, would accede to one of the two new sovereign states. 
Again these decisions were expected to be based on the geographic position of the 
region and their proximity to either India or Pakistan and the demographic make-up of 
their particular region or state. 
Throughout the Raj period relations between the British government and the Princely, 
states rested on paramountcy. The definition of what paramontcy actually meant 
changed throughout British rule, in particular on the matter of British 
interference/noninterference policies in the domestic affairs of the Princely states. 
During his tenure as Viceroy (1905-1910) Lord Curzon advocated full intervention, his 
successor Lord Minto argued that introducing a more noninterventionist approach 
would make Princely states more reliable alliance partners and at the beginning of 
discussions that eventually led to the Councils Act of 1909 Minto argued. "A Council of 
Princes might serve as a possible counterpoise to the Indian National Congress. " 12 The 
tactic was to use the bait of noninterference and the establishment of a Council of 
Princes to keep the Princes with the British government and away from the INC. 
Ambiguity surrounding paramountcy ran right up to the dissolution of British power in 
India, the last Viceroy Mountbatten, fearing the fragmentation of India, wanted to 
relinquish British rule as soon as possible with a simultaneous lapse of paramountc. . 
His chief political adviser Conrad Corfield argued for secession talks to take place 
between the Princely states and the new sovereign dominions of India and Pakistan after 
independence. Corfield suggested that Mountbatten's objective ran against the spirit of 
promises made in the Cabinet Mission memorandum. 
13 Corfield resigned in July 1947 
and with the liquidation of the Political Department. the fate of the Princes became the 
responsibility of the new States Department headed by Sardar Patel who had no 
sympathy for the Princes cause, how - tough the Indian government was prepared to be 
was demonstrated by Nehru. who just a few - months prior to the transfer of power said 
" Ashton. S. R 1982. British Policy Towards the Indian SIL/1L'c 1905-1939, p. 19-5 
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any state refusing to participate in a constitution assembly which had been summoned to 
devise a new constitution would be regarded as "hostile" and would have to "bear the 
consequences of being so regarded. "j 
4 
As head of the States Department Patel (and his deputy V. P Menon) devised a scheme 
whereby the Princes would be asked to accede to India for three subjects only, defence, 
external affairs and communications, all other matters of mutual concern were to be 
covered by standstill agreements. With the exception of Junagadh, Kathiawar, Kashmir 
and Hyderabad, all the states signed instruments of accession and true to his word, 
Nehru and the new Indian government settled the problem of non acceding states by 
force. 15 
Kashmir however was not quickly resolved by force, it had a Dogra Hindu leader or 
monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh in a state with a Muslim majority. Faced with these 
political difficulties the Maharaja faced a choice of India or Pakistan, but uncertainty 
about what to do led him to do nothing but procrastinate with the exception of signing a 
`standstill agreement' with Pakistan to allow commercial activities to continue, such as 
the transportation of fuel into the valley. 16 For Jinnah who actively campaigned for 
Kashmir to cede to Pakistan this threw up a particularly awkward political problem 
because the overwhelming majority of support for the Muslim League lay outside of, 
not just Kashmir, but also outside of what would become the new state of Pakistan. " 
Domestic politics in Kashmir were further complicated by the establishment in 1934 of 
°' Hodson, H. V 1969. The Great Divide: Britain - India - Pakistan. p. 360 
14 Nehru, Jawaharlal. Speech at the Gwalior session of the All India States' People's Conference 1947. 
Cited in Ashton, S. R. British Policy Towards the Indian States 1905-1939. p. 193 
is Following the transfer of power, the States Department began the process of integrating states, a 
process spread over many years and one which involved the surrendering of many more powers than 
the three relating to defence, communications and external affairs. Some of the states were eventually 
merged with neighbouring provinces such as Pudokkottai with Madras and Baroda with Bombay. For 
a full account of the former Princely states and their eventual merging into India and Pakistan, see 
Ramusack, Barbara, 1978. The Princes of India and the Twilight of Empire : Disolution of a Patron- 
Client System 1914-1939 
16 The signing of the 15`" August 1947 standstill agreement between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir 
formed a part of Pakistans argument as to the illegalality of the Accession of the valley to India. 
Pakistan argued that this agreement debarred the state from entering into negotiation or agreement 
with any other party. See Blinkenberg, Lars 1998. The History of Unsolved Conflicts. Volume 11. pp. 
46-56 
17 However, the League did have considerable support amongst the intelligentsia and the clergy, in the 
Kashmir valley such as Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, a prominent religious leader and Ghulam Abbas, the 
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the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, a political organization that was the 
only political opposition to the Maharaja. but whose own secular and theological 
differences would see it split in two and form two separate organizations. Alastair Lamb 
comments that, "from the moment of its birth the Muslim Conference faced the problem 
of internal discord. " 18 The secular side of the party being led by Sheikh Abdullah 
formed the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) and the theological side. 
led by Mirwaiz Mohammed Yusaf Shah reforming the Muslim Conference. The 
significance of this split in Kashmiri politics became self evident at the time of the 
transfer of power because the secular JKNC became allied to the INC operating in 
British India and the Muslim Conference was allied to Jinnah and the Muslim League in 
British India. 
As mentioned above, most Muslim League support was in the United Provinces (UP) a 
region which would become Uttar Pradesh in India, M. A Jinnah's initial claim for an 
undivided Punjab and an undivided Bengal to accede to Pakistan also amounted toi 
nothing. Jinnah's aspiration for the Punjab is perhaps the best example of the intractable 
religious and demographic difficulties faced in 1947, given that the Sikh population 
across central Punjab having resisted Mughal rule were not about to allow their region 
to join the Muslim state of Pakistan. Jalal argues that up until 1947, the political map of 
India did not reflect the religious denominations of the population, but following the 
demise of the Raj, "the frontiers of the new states were drawn mainly along the lines of 
religion. In the making of Pakistan, religion appears to have been the determinant of 
nationality. " 19 
Grave reservations about the future demographic make-up of the subcontinent «erc not 
confined merely to the Punjab - far from it. In the Kashmir valley, the disparate 
populations of Hindus. Buddhists and Sufi Muslims saw no future belongin to an 
Islamic state or even one loosely premised on Muslim rule. But more troubling for the 
Muslim League and the future Pakistan. the vast majority of 'Muslims were at best 
uneasy and worse outright hostile at the prospect of joining Pakistan. Furthermore. 
Jammu and Kashmir lacked any unifying principle or cultural identity, its geographic 
t'ýtuundicr of the Muslim Conference. 
Lamb, Alastair. 1991. Kasli, ni: ":. 4 Dispuk'd LL'uoc' 1S16-l990. p. 92 
19 Jalal. AN csha. 1994. The Sole S1'okc. xm n. p. 1 
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shape being drawn by the States founder. Dogra Gulab Singh since 1820. Lamb 
describes the state as a collection of territories and a --British geopolitical artifact. "' .A 
large part of the vale having been bought by the East India Company in 1846.1'011o«cd 
by the expansion of the Dogra dynasty during British rule and in 1935, the Gilgit area 
was leased by the Maharaja to the British to become a frontier Political Agency to 
protect against any Russian incursion from the north. 
The concern of the masses of peasant farmers centered on the prospect of land reform 
and the future of their agrarian way of life, not the political. religious and ideological 
arguments being put by the landed elite who made up a significant portion of support 
for the League, "given the social composition of the Muslim Leagues support base, the 
prospects for land reform in Pakistan were dim. On the other hand, such a prospect 
loomed large in India. "21 In his Inaugeral speech of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent 
assembly Sheikh Abdullah said, "Any unnatural cleavage between religious groups is a 
legacy of imperialism and no modern state can afford to encourage artificial 
division.. 
. we 
have been able to put through our `land to the tiller' legislation and make 
of it a success. Land and all it means is a inestimable blessing to our peasants who have 
dragged along in servitude to the landlord and his allies for centuries. "'"` Furthermore, 
the secular JKNC and ally of the INC was the only political organization indigenous to 
the Princely state that had a real interest in land reform. It is no surprise then that for 
many who scratch out a living from the land were preoccupied with their futures as 
subsistence farmers and not the political and ideological arguments of the elite in the 
Muslim League. 
The League again had the problem of being a political organization with an Islamic 
identity but also had a variety of secular issues to protect. These theological and secular 
problems are highlighted by Hewitt who suggests that Sheikh Abdullab was fond of 
pointing out that the, "difference between a Kahrniri Pandit and a Kashmiri Muslim was 
far less significant than the difference between a Kashmiri Pandit and a Hindu Brahmin 
20 Lamb, Alastair, I L)94. Birth of aT higc'J1v: Kashmir 1947. p. 11 
2) GanguI . 
Sum it. 2001. Conflict ('nL'ndiing: India Pakistan Tensions since 194,. p. 16 
Inaugeral speech made b\ Sher-I-Kashmir Sheikh Mohammad : \bdullah in the Jammu and Kashmir 
Constituent : \sscmbly on 51` No\ ember 1951. 
Cited from The Report of the Starte Autonom-1, 
('onnrrrrrttcc. Jammu. 2000. pp. 136-1 ,7 
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from the Indian plains. "23 Partition was an attempt to homogenize religion into two 
different camps, the difficulty being that in many cases the politico-cultural differeiiccs 
were not sufficient to underwrite and sustain that difference. 
The agricultural concerns of the peasants found a home in Sheikh Abdullah's newly 
established JKNC who, under the influence of Nehru expanded the ambit of the party to 
include all three major communities - Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist. The JKNC would 
prove to be a thorn in the side of the League as it clashed with the League's communal 
basis and more dangerously for the league the overriding policy commitment of the 
JKNC was a commitment to land reform, a policy which threatened to undermine the 
power and influence of the Muslim Conference and the Muslim League. 
Having operated for so long in the pre-1947 political environment created by the British 
which exaggerated the role of religion, the successors of British India also carried this 
policy forward and given Jinnah's two nation argument for the foundation o1' Pakistan, 
this continuation of British policy by other means can hardly be regarded as surprising. 
Moreover, Lamb argues that India had never accepted Jinnah's two nation argument and 
only went "along with such absurdity in order to keep the British happy and expedite 
their departure. , 24 This is important because going along with partition to hasten the 
departure of the British does not equate to an acceptance on the part of Delhi to 
recognize the legitimacy of Pakistan. 
In October 1947 the Maharaja Hari Singh was the head of Jammu and Kashmir, a state 
replete with political volatility in a region already riven with the violence of partition. 
The debate about exactly who these individuals were that crossed the Jhelum River in 
the early hours of 22nd October remains a hotly contested issue. Pakistan largely 
maintains that this was a spontaneous uprising. India however questions the spontaneity 
of this event and also questions the validity of many of the individuals taking part. In 
other ww-ords, those involved were in fact members of the Pakistani military. Lamb 
argues that the origins of the military/tribal incursion towards Srinagar is linked directly 
ýý ith a longstanding political battle between t« o Dogra rulers, the Raja of Pooch and the 
le itt, Vernon. 1995. Reclaiming the Past?: The Search lot- Polüiccr/ 1n(/ Cultural [,,,, it, in 
C Ollh'rrrporar 1' Jammu and Kashmir p. 192 
24 LýII»h. , ýI, ýstir, 
1991. his/11nir.. 4 Disputed L', iZLlca IS-I -1990. P. 149 
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Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. 
These political rivalries would led to the Poonch revolt, the revolt was a reaction to the 
increased political involvement of Hari Singh in the affairs of Poonch including an edict 
Dusiur-i-Amal stipulating that the Raja must appoint a Chief Minister (%Vazir) selected 
for him by Srinagar and all decisions taken in Poonch must be drafted by the \\'azir. 
There were higher taxes imposed and a stipulation that all Jammu and Kashmir state 
laws would apply in Poonch. It was an attempt to end any and all political, economic 
and judicial power or autonomy exercised by the Raja and one that was resisted by 
many including soldiers returning from the Second World War who refused to pay 
higher taxes and resisted the Maharaja's authority. 
This was the Poonch Revolt and Lamb argues that this revolt was primary in assembling 
military resistance in the region and given the region's close proximity to the Jhelum 
river made it inevitable, "that contact would be established between the Poonch rebels 
and the Pakistan authorities. "25 In the same text Lamb also suggests that military aid 
was being flown from Delhi into Srinagar airport, prior to the signing of the Accession 
agreement and that infantry and artillery units of the Patiala state army (the `Patialas') 
were being transported to Jammu City and Srinagar airport. 26 
In any event, sections of the Pakistani military moved quickly to assist the rebels 
supplying them with arms and transportation. The influx of arms and personnel proved 
too great for the Maharaja's military and within two weeks these insurgents werC 
moving in on Hari Singh's capital Srinagar. The Maharaja. still in situ at Srinagar, 
panicked at the prospect of being overwhelmed in his own capital and appealed to India 
for military assistance to prevent the wholesale military takeover of Srinagar. 
The Maharaja's appeal to Delhi has further implications because Pakistan would ar, ue 
that this appeal and the Instrument of Accession agreement that proceeded it took place 
alter the Maharaja had lost all authority because it came amidst a revolt to overthrow his 
government. Therefore an accession agreement brought about by violence and li and 
Lamb. A{ast3ir. 1994. The Birth O1 a Tragc, /v: Kashmir /Y-/7. p. O4 
rhid pp. 69-72 
108 
was invalid. Moreover the agreement was accepted by the Governor-General of India 
(Lord Mountbatten) on the condition that a plebiscite would be held after the restoration 
of law and order in which the population would decide the accession issue. The 
plebiscite did not take place. 
The Indian government also attached conditions. Firstly the Maharaja must accede to 
India and secondly that the accession must have the agreement of the chief minister 
Sheikh Abdullah. Politically and militarily Hari Singh's options and room for maneuver 
were to say the least, extremely limited. He obtained the support of the Sheikh and duly 
signed the Instrument of Accession on 26`x' October 1947 and Nehru ordered the airlift 
of Indian troops up to Kashmir to engage the Pakistani backed insurgents who 
successfully put a stop to the move on Srinagar itself. 
Indian troops however did not push Pakistan back out of Kashmir completely leaving 
Pakistan in control of about a third of the former Doora Kingdom, the third which 
Pakistan calls Azad (free) Kashmir. Thus within weeks of the formation of the two new 
states under the auspices of the Radcliffe commission, the first front opened up between 
India and Pakistan. 
The military exchanges that began with the airlift of Indian troops into Kashmir lasted 
through the winter of 1947 and the entirety of 1948. ending on 1 s` January 1949 with a 
United Nations cease-fire. Given the altitude at which the conflict was being fought, the 
weather played a major role with both sides suffering the consequences of high altitude 
and sub zero temperatures. Both sides suffered significant casualties due to the weather. 
the logistical problems of supplying troops in cold and mountainous conditions and 
through direct combat fatalities. Just as the British had discovered a hundred , -ears 
earlier during the Afghan campaigns. logistical support in winter was not viable or 
productive so after the initial engagements by Indian infantry, fighting larLiely stopped 
through the winter of 1947/48 and began again in spring of 1948. 
In his study titled. il'ar and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947 - 1948 C, Dasgupta argues that 
the role played by the former Viceroy \ Iountbattcn. who, in the «Vakc of independence 
continued in the role as Governor-General of India until his departure 
from India in Junc 
I L)48, was of seminal importance to future Indian policy. Following political tension 
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brought about by the Nawab of Junagadh's announcement on 15 . vugust 1947 that he 
intended to accede to Pakistan, %Iountbatten proposed setting up the Defence 
Committee of the cabinet, his proposal was accepted by the cabinet. furtlýcimore, 
Mountbatten chaired the committee, and thus. 'a vitally important cabinet committee 
was chaired not by the Prime Minister but by the Governor-General who therehy 
acquired -27 major role in the executive branch of the state . ''27 
Dasgupta argues that Mountbatten's role as chairman of the defence committee meant 
his inclusion in policy-making, a role from which he would have been excluded if 
deliberations had taken place in the full cabinet. Up until the end of 1947, important 
questions relating to Kashmir were decided in the defence committee, this allowed 
Mountbatten to play a role which far exceeded that of a constitutional figurehead and 
which culminated, at the end of the year in the decision to refer the Kashmir issue to the 
"28 United Nations. 
The decision to refer the Kashmir issue to the UN was essentially a British one and 
without British involvement Dasgupta argues that the Kashmir incursion would have 
been met with a fuller military response from Delhi had it been an entirely Indian 
decision. Following the eventual Indianisation of the top political, diplomatic and 
military positions in the Indian polity, Nehru said to parliament, any further aggression 
or attack or military operations in regard to Kashmir, if such takes place by the other 
side, that would mean all out war, not in Kashmir only, but elsewhere too. "29 This was 
the policy implemented in 1965. 
The political decision to cease fighting in January 1949 via the UN came out of the 
stalemate between the two sides. Although militarily and economically stroný-cr than 
Pakistan, not least because under the terms of the transfer of power. all movable military 
hardware and infrastructure had been divided along a ratio of 30: 70 in Indias favour. 
although the amount Pakistan actually received after the 1947 48 conflict was far less. 
Despite this superior military and economic ratio the new government in Delhi 
27 upta. C. 2003. IV Ill- 1Iii / Diplomacy in Kashmir 194ß-191, x. p. 
's ihp 1 
rbrcl. p. 10 
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possessed few illusions about the political and military cost that would have to be borne 
to push Pakistan back over the cease-fire line. Accordingly , 
India referred the matter to 
the UN security council under articles 34 and 35 of the U -N 30 
India argued that both Pakistani nationals and local tribesmen had attacked the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir and urged the council to condemn both the aggression of Pakistan 
and its complicity in mobilizing others to aggression. Pakistan responded by den`-irng it 
had provided assistance to tribals, furthermore, it suggested that India had carried out a 
genocidal policy toward Muslims in the valley following partition. Lastly, Pakistan 
sought to cast doubt on the terms of Kashmir's accession to India. This was the 
beginning of the UN's long and protracted involvement with India and Pakistan on the 
Kashmir issue. The arguments that were put to the Council by first India and the counter 
arguments put by Pakistan have remained largely intact throughout the remainder of the 
twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. 
From the UN's point of view the second resolution passed on 21 April 1948 formed the 
basis of the UN's approach, namely that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir would he 
settled by way of a plebiscite in which the people in the region would decide the matter 
of accession to either India or Pakistan. This has been the ambit in which the UN has 
approached the issue and settlement of the Kashmir issue since 1948. 
Pakistani Major-General Akbar Khan allows us to see how ideological rivalry 
manifested itself in relations with India and how this rivalry might impinge on the 
thinking of policy makers. 
In India, in the absence of homogeneity, a penetration in any direction can result 
in separation of differing units geographically as well as morally because there is 
no basic unity among the Shudras, Brahmins, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims who 
will follow their own different interests. At present, and for a long time to come. 
India is in the same position as she «was centuries ago, exposed to disintc-ration in 
emergencies. 3 
For an account of the military div ision, see Cloughley, Brian, 2000. A Hislor1' of the Pakistan . --army: 
(711(d insili-i- kiions, also Rizvi H. A. 1976. 
The 
. 
lfiliiari itfi(! Poliric. in Paki. w iii. In a «ood indication 
of the distrust between the League and the 
INC Rizvi cites : Malik Feroze Khan (the first Prime Minister of 
Pakistan), "ww hosoc' er gets the arme will get India. p. 28 
31 Khan, Akbar 1975. RaiC/L'rs in Kashmir p. 42 
First and foremost this sentiment fits neatly %\ith the cmerjn« power wielded by the 
military in Pakistan which following the death of Jinnah in 1948 began to grow 
exponentially throughout the 1950's. This was coupled %\ ith a burgeoning belief that the 
military must be the guardians of Pakistan at both the military and civil society levels. 
That this belief is still prevalent in Pakistan can be seen in a speech made by Pakistan's 
President General Pervez Musharraf to Pakistani diaspora in New York when this 
connection between the military and civilian good was made, "a strong military and a 
stable economy guarantees safety and stability of Pakistan. " He went on to suggest that 
Pakistan had moved forward in the last couple of years by, "developing) a deterrence for 
any adventurous enemy. "3, This sums up the domestic position of many in the Pakistani 
military. What is good for the military is necessarily good for Pakistan and by using the 
term, `adventurous enemy', Musharraf was making a thinly veiled reference to India. 
Secondly, Major-General Khan's comments reveal Pakistan's perception of India as 
vulnerable because it lacks a centralizing homogenizing philosophy or creed leaving it 
exposed to a `penetration in any direction'. In other words, Pakistan because of its 
Islamic make-up is able to sustain, Heather Rae argues that, in this we see a complex 
mixture of the new national principle that now provided the criterion for membership in 
the political community, and older, traditional religious attitudes that informed how the 
new principle was understood. "33 That is to say that Pakistan, a new sovereign state 
whose future would be informed by traditional religious attitudes would offer a 
homogenizing strength to Pakistan, a strength that, in Khan's view, was lacking in 
India. 
Secular India, lacking a homogenized core, is merely a collective of Hindu, Niuslirn. 
Sikh and Shudras that, if pushed hard enough will splinter and crack in different 
directions. There are two other parts of Khan's comments which are worth reiterating 
because they would form a recurring theme in Pakistan. Firstly. Khan suggests that for a 
'long time to come, ' India will be vulnerable until such a time that it forms a collective 
or homogenized unit and ceases to be an agoregate of disparate entities all of whom will 
put their own self interest before the collective interest of India. 
The D47ill' Jar19. ' September 2003. p. 12 
33 Rae. Heather. 200 2. SLZ! L' I(/L'rltitic'. V ana r/i'' Hc1111 OQi'ni. c. rtioll W People'.. p. 164 
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Secondly, whilst India remains in this state of limbo or flux it remains exposed to 
`penetration' from any direction, be it from Pakistan, China or some other state outside 
of South Asia. Khan puts no specific time period on precisely how long this Window of 
opportunity will remain, but the themes he addresses are recurrent in India-Pakistan 
relations and go to the heart of the ideological clash of Islamic Pakistan and secular 
India and the concomitant political constitutions that informed each state after 1947. 
A Lockean Push to War 
Perhaps the most omnipresent argument regarding Pakistan's decision to bring Kashmir 
into its sovereign territory is the shifting constitutional arrangements in the Indian 
constitution. Article 370 of the constitution makes clear Kashmir's so-called special 
status whereby central government would only be involved in defence, external affairs 
and communications. 34 If India were to unilaterally declare Indian Kashmir to be wholly 
under the rubric of the center then the chances of Pakistan wrestling Kashmir from 
Delhi would be lost. Alastair Lamb suggests that, "it would have required very clear 
signals indeed from New Delhi to cancel the effects of this impression, and these were 
not forthcoming. , 35 The Delhi agreement signed by Nehru and Abdullah in 1952 diluted 
the initial agreement in the instrument of accession whereby defence, communications 
and external affairs would be the only powers ceded to the centre and instead stipulated 
that Kashmir would be vested with subsidiary powers (powers that reside with the 
Union in the case of other states in India). The agreement also states several other 
changes in relations between the State and the Union governments such as, residents of 
the state would be citizens of India, but Kashmir could define their rights and privileges; 
the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme court was extended into Kashmir; and the 
emergency powers of the Union government could only be used with the approval of the 
Kashmir government. 36 
34 A full copy of the Indian constitution can be found at: lawmin. nic. in; legislative. doc 
35 Lamb, Alastair, 1991. Kashmir: A Disputed legacy 1846-1990. p, 247 
36 There are other articles in the agreement that set out the relationship between the Union and State 
governments with regard to the President of 
India, headship of state, financial integration and the 
national flag. For a full account of the agreement and a 
full list of the constitutional orders that came 
from it, see Report of the State Autonomy Committee. pp. 34-63 
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The agreement also saw the establishment of the state constitution in which its 
relationship with the Union were set out. in which. '-jurisdiction of union parliament 
was extended from three subjects - defence. external affairs and communications to 
almost all subjects in the union list. This constituted a first encroachment on the po« crs 
of legislation of the state by widening of those of the union. "' The net result as far as 
Pakistan is concerned was the increasing power of Delhi over the Muslim majorit\ state 
of Kashmir. 
So there is a clear sign of a Lockean rivalry that began and ended over the future status 
of the valley and its surrounding territories. This puts 1965 firmly within a culture of 
rivalry given that this conflict began and ended over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. 
What will be discussed here are the political dynamics that pushed or persuaded 
Islamabad into the 1965 conflict and the events in the Rann of Kutch that emboldened 
the government in Islamabad into this Lockean push to conflict in Kashmir. 
The issue of Kashmir and its future status resided in the battle of ideas and identity' 
between India and Pakistan. For Delhi any concession on Kashmir on the grounds of 
religion would constitute a victory for the two nation theory heralded by Jinnah. For 
India it might also provide the signal or threshold for an outbreak of violence and 
rioting throughout India. This problem might have seemed particularly acute for policy 
makers at the time given the violence over linguistic and regional boundaries that spread 
across much of northern India in the mid 1960's. 
Having been returned to office in January 1965 Ayub Khan faced two clear options as 
to the securing of Kashmir. Firstly he might have continued the long process of 
appealing to the UN for a plebiscite in which Kashmiris could vote. Second, he could 
seek out other means by which to pursue his state's ambition. however, in 1965, the do 
nothin<.; option \\as not an option given that feeling in \Vest Pakistan ran very high on 
the Kashmir issue -a point Ayub's new foreign minister Z. A Bhutto would have 
pointed out to him. 
Givcn the cold war politics of the time. the 
UNCIP (United Nations Commission ti),, 
'^ rhrj p. 47 
114 
India and Pakistan) became increasingly hamstrung (as far as Pakistan was concerned) 
given that the Soviet Union, allied to India usually wielded a veto on any diplomatic 
attempt by Pakistan to break the cycle of bilateral relations and negotiations that India 
insisted upon. Thus any attempt by Pakistan to internationalize Indo-Pakistan relations 
through the UN floundered and India had been successful in keeping the terms of the 
Kashmir debate within a remit of the legal obligations offered under the terms of the 
signing of the Accession agreement between Delhi and Singh. Conversely, India has 
had several diplomatic altercations with the UN, not least after the 1965 conflict \\! hen 
the security council, "refused to accommodate India's repeated wishes for an outright 
condemnation of Pakistan's aggression. "38 
The only real option open to the new government was to seek other political, diplomatic 
and military means to bring about a settlement to the Kashmir issue. It is this line of 
thinking that would eventually lead to the prosecution of war later the same year. Whilst 
Delhi continued to repeat their legal mantra on the terms of Accession, Pakistan 
countered that Kashmir was a moral and political question on the future of this majority 
Muslim state and that the issue would not be settled on legal technicalities. Moreover, 
Pakistan questioned the legality of the Accession arguing that given the political unrest 
in the valley and Singh's rapid retreat from his own capital Srinagar, he had lost 
political control of Jammu and Kashmir at the time of the signing of the Accession 
agreement and consequently the document was null and void. 
The competition between India and Pakistan as to the future of the state had reached 
stalemate by the early 1960's and with the IJNCIP having exhausted all avenues, 
deciding to take little more than a wait and see attitude to the Kashmir dispute, and with 
the diminishing of the aches and pains of conflict endured during the earlier campaign 
in the 1940's, it appeared attainable for Pakistan to begin a new bout of military rivalry 
and unleash the `chains' of the previous settlement. 
The events in the Rann of Kutch39 in early 1965 are often cited as a motivating factor 
that emboldened Pakistan into fresh conflict. The Rann is a territory of about 7,000 
38 Blinken berg, Lars, 1998. India-Pakistan: The Histon' of Unsolved Conflicts. Volume II. p. 104 
39 The Rann of Kutch literally means the Marshy Desert. The Rann is a territory of about 7,000 square 
miles on the north western coast of India. 
See Gupta, Hari Ram. 1969. The Kutch Affair. p. I 
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square miles that sits between the Pakistani state of Sind to the north and the Indian 
state of Gujarat to the south. It is a region prone to flooding during the monsoon 
A visiting journalist describes it thus, "Jeeping up north towards the Kutch-Sind border 
the visitor soon strikes a rocky winding track cutting through stunted bush and scraggy 




The precise borders of this territory had been disputed on and off since 1947. For 
example in 1948 Pakistan raised the matter with India stating that the, "Sind Kutch 
boundary was still in dispute and must be settled before the question of fixation of' 
boundary pillars could be considered. "" Pakistan argued that the Rann constituted a 
dead sea and thus the boundary should run through the rniddle of the region along the 
24th parallel, with Pakistan claiming the territory north of the 24`x' parallel. India refuted 
this claim and the matter disappeared from political radars, reappearing occasionally 
throughout the 1950's. 
In early 1965 there emerged a series of claims and counter claims about movement of 
personnel in the Rann region. India claimed that in January 1965 it discovered that 
Pakistani border forces were using a track of land inside the northern sector of the Rann 
territory. Pakistan countered that Indian forces began to hinder their border patrols. Lars 
Blinkenberg notes that as always in incidence of this kind there is a conflict of evidence, 
however, "outside observers have mostly believed that Pakistan wanted to exploit the 
unsettled conditions to her advantage. Here as in Kashmir, only Pakistan could have 
enough motives to press her claims through military means. , 
42 Brines takes a more 
strategic view suggesting that the Rann incident was used as a, "low cost test of India's 
will and capabilities . 
''43 D. R Manekar sums up the remainder of the conflict, 
There were further violent clashes throughout the month of April. but it never became a 
real war, both parties seeming to agree that there was no point in escalating hostilities 
beyond what had already happened' 
4 
-Io The SfrfL,. c/nL7n (Calcutta). 8 5'1965 
Gupta. Op Cit. p. 85 
Blinkcnber-1. Op C11. P. 205 
43 Brines, Russell, 1968. The Indo-Pakistan Coiitlwt. p. 288 
44 Mankckýir, D. R. Twenty-Two fateful Days. Cited from Blinkenber`l. Op cit. p. 207 
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The political fallout in Delhi from the Rann conflict was anger. the education minister 
M. C Chagla struck a chord that would be repeated by Indian politicians when he said in 
parliament, "there were people and countries who only understood the language of 
strength and toughness. Pakistan was one of those . 
-45 In a speech in Dacca on Apr-il 26"' 
Pakistani President Ayub Khan said of India, "it failed to understand the language of 
reason and continues to pursue a policy of browbeating its neighbours. "ýý The use of the 
word neighbours is a common tactic by Islamabad, rarely referring directly to itsell- by 
name, instead Pakistan prefers to cast itself in the role of another neighbour in the 
region, all of whom fall victim to the regional bullying power of India. Whatever 
lessons were, or were not learned in April 1965 what remains clear is that India and 
Pakistan continued to talk past each other and never to each other. 47 
Despite public anger being expressed by both sides, Avub Khan and Shastri met in 
London at a Commonwealth conference in June. Pakistani Foreign Minister, also in 
London, stated that the, "Rann of Kutch was not a dispute per se. It forms part of a 
much bigger issue. The heart of the Indo-Pakistan dispute lies in the Srinagar valley, " 48 
Bhutto's comments form a big part of much of the understanding about Pakistani 
intentions in the Rann of Kutch, namely that India's failure to respond decisively with 
the incident encouraged and emboldened Pakistan into Operations Gibraltar and Grand 
Slam later the same year. 
Others suggest that the political and social unrest in the valley following the theft of the 
Moe-e-Moeqqdas from the shrine at Hazratbal was understood (or interpreted) In 
Pakistan as a sign that Pakistani overtures would reach a receptive audience in the 
valley from their Muslim brethren. India's military defeat at the heads of China in 1962 
also emboldened Pakistan. Ganguly suggests that Pakistan reinforced this belief with 
racist notions of their own status as a martial race against a stereotype of the none- 
martial Hindus. This would support Susan Bayly's contention that during the colonial 
period British policies caused a rigidity between castes and religious boundaries that did 
Cited frone Gupta. H. R. Op cit. p. 183 
ibicl. E,. 215 
For an excellent discussion about India and Pakistan talking past each other, see D. D Khanna Kumar, 
1992. Diiloguc oo1 r/IL' Deaf The India-Pakistan Divide 
BlinkenhLrgg. Op cit. P. 208 
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not exist in the pre-colonial period. Moreover, this hardening of communal boundaries 
can be seen in the comments of Major-General Khan (above) and his view that India 
would remain vulnerable to attack until such a time as it developed a cohesive unifying 
state identity. 
Thus pre-1947 communalism can be extrapolated into the post 1947 era. Communal 
delineations created by the British, hardening into interstate identities after partition. 
This is hardly surprising, given that partition was justified on the basis of communal 
difference - difference that became further entrenched at partition and a herald for the 
ideological rivalry between the two states that has dominated relations. 
A further argument posits that following an eight-day trip to China in 1965 Ayub Khan 
and Bhutto convinced themselves that in the event of conflict between India and 
Pakistan, China would join the conflict to assist Pakistan. Most recently, Perkowich has 
argued that India's development of nuclear capability would soon allow India to close 
the door on any attempts by Pakistan to wrestle Kashmir away from India, thus Pakistan 
49 would have to act swiftly prior to further development of nuclear technology. 
The question can be posed at this juncture, what political and military price were these 
two states willing to pay in the 1965 conflict? We can see that both were able and 
willing to enter into a Lockean conflict of rivalry. Both willing to expend financial and 
political capital in the prosecution of a conflict that had a specific objective. 
Blinkenberg suggests that Pakistan was the most willing party and prepared to pay the 
highest price in pursuit of its goal. He writes, 
India's wish to integrate Azad Kashmir was probably never strong enough to motivate 
war, if we accept political circles without much influence. In Pakistan on the other hand, 
we have seen that there was a very general wish to integrate Kashmir and a widely felt 
frustration at this juncture because of the various failures to bring about a settlement, 
49 For a full account of this argument, See Perkovich, George, 2001. India's Nuclear Bomb. For a 
discussion on Pakistans attempt to construct a `martial race' between the self and other and Pakistans 
belief that China would assist them in the event of conflict, See Ganguly, Sunlit. 2001. Conflict 
Unending: India Pakistan Tensions since 1947. Also, Kapur, Ashok, 2001. Pokharan and Beyond: 
India's Nuclear Behaviour. Brines, Russell, 1968. The Indo-Pakistani Conflict. For a discussion on 
the role of Shastri and the effect his appointment might have had in emboldening Pakistan given that 
Shastri succeeded the dominating Nehru as Indian Prime Minister, see Blinkenberg, Op Cit. pp. 199- 
203 
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both at the UN and in bilateral contacts50 
However, Delhi was not slow to condemn military movement of the Kutch region. The 
Statesman reports on debate from the Lok Sabha, "Initiating the debate on Pakistani 
aggression in Kutch, the Prime Minister also firmly rejected as totally unacceptable tlho 
presumption behind President Ayub's threat of 'total war' that Pakistan could commit 
aggression at will while India was to be precluded from talking effective counter- 
measures. 
51 
This frustration on the part of Pakistan and the rivalry which it fuels has an important 
impact on three levels, national, regional and international. Nationally because the 
struggle to integrate Kashmir has become, certainly one of, if not the key political 
football in domestic Pakistani politics. Regionally because of the obvious antagonism 
that India Pakistan rivalry causes in the south Asian region in. for example the 
disruption caused to economic institutions such as SAARC and internationally because 
international institutions most notably, the UN has no strategy in place to break the 
ideological antagonism between India and Pakistan. The result of the blocking off of all 
outlets at all levels to a settlement in Kashmir has led to stalemate. Kamal Matinuddin 
argues that frustration on the part of Pakistan and inertia from the UN played a 
significant role in the 1965 conflict. "By 1965 Pakistan had come to the conclusion that 
India was not going to abide by the UN Resolutions on the future status of the disputed 
territory of Jammu and Kashmir... and therefore decided to use its newly acquired 
military hardware against a numerically superior India through sheer frustration. "' 
There are obvious financial restraints on states wishing to use military means to secure a 
political objective, however there is also the important and equally politically important 
point that a state might seek to use insurgency as a means not to be seen as moving., 
away from the status quo position and this was Pakistan's approach up to 1965. until it 
concluded (incorrectly) that it could 'free' Kashmir from India by more overt means 
whilst still being seen to be a status quo state. 
5`' Blinn' nberg, Op cit. P. 199 
T/ic SJciic., iitan7 (Neww Delhi). 8 5'1965 
\tatinuddin, Kamal. 2002. The, Vuc/cari: ciiion of'Sowh -ki. i. p. 3 
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What once was, in the pre-colonial period, a loose connection of cross cultural and 
religious identities has hardened in the post 1947 Westphalian environment into an 
intractable political standoff between the self and other. It can surely then be 
unsurprising that this ideationally constructed conflict has led into a Loc}: can culture of 
anarchy. But more pertinently and equally it can be of no surprise that this ideological 
clash has inexorably led to nuclear proliferation. It was only a matter of timing as toi 
when and how India and Pakistan developed the technologies to undertake the task. 
Taking into account the frustration born out of this ideological clash it can he taken 
almost as a given that this relationship has led to proliferation, but it must also be noted 
that the antagonism and frustration contained within it, stems from cultural and 
ideological difference that was created and invented during colonial rule. The structure 
of the international system played no part in military conflict or proliferation that 
followed in its wake, because the structure in which India and Pakistan now operate in, 
did not exist on the subcontinent prior to the colonial period and for the most part of the 
colonial period. Thus the meaning India and Pakistan attach to military conflict w itll 
each other and the nuclear proliferation that has followed have their antecedents in the 
colonial period. 
Operation Gibraltar 
'Operation Gibraltar' as it was dubbed by the military in Pakistan was far more of' a 
guerilla campaign of insurgency than a direct military assault by one state on another. '' 
The plan was to infiltrate by stealth and begin a process of sabotage and take advantage 
of the tense political situation in Kashmir given the changes being brought about to 
Kashmir's special federal status within the Indian constitution. This gives us the first 
example of Pakistan's misreading of the situation in Kashmir. 
Having seen political upheaval and agitation in the v a11ý2vv by Kashmiris against the 
centralizing ambitions of Delhi they interpreted this action as bein(g. not vvho11k 
connected to and a reaction against Delhi but as a sign that the people in Kashmir would 
respond in a positive light if Pakistan were to assist them in their strugulle against India. 
S' The code name Gibraltar is interesting and a reference to the rock of Gibraltar, a tc rritor\ held b\ the 
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In other words political upheaval in Indian Kashmir was misread in Pakistan as a 
willingness and ambition to be assisted by their NMuslim brethren in the valley . 
The first piece of evidence against this notion came in the shape of. "two Kashmiri 
Muslims whose timely information led to the detection of this incursion and consequent 
retaliation by the Indian army. "" SM Burke adds that Pakistan's, "expectation that the 
Kashmiris would rise with sufficient ferocity seriously to threaten the Indian occupation 
forces and that the upheaval would remain confined to Kashmir proved fallacious. '', ' 
There were of course many other reasons for the beginning of the incursion, as far as 
Pakistan was concerned, and those reasons will be discussed helo«. however the Point 
can be made here that from the outset a political environment in Kashmir that Pakistan 
believed (or had convinced itself) would see its actions received by a receptive 
population in Indian Kashmir did not materialize. 
A second phase in this campaign Pakistani regular troops would move in and in 
particular concentrate their efforts in the valley where most Muslims lived and begin a 
series of short thrusts that would foment the political empathy Pakistan had assumed 
they would find in the valley. Indeed, that the Kashmirs should be seen to be involved 
with this plan to help them throw off the yoke of Indian rule was essential for the way 
Pakistan would present this conflict as a faint accompli to the international community 
after the event. 
For Operation Gibraltar to be a success it was dependent on two key factors. Firstly a 
positive reception from the indigenous people in the valley, and inextricably linked to 
this, the operation would have to be quick and very decisive, for both military and just 
as important, political reasons. Pakistan seeks to change the status of Kashmir and for 
this reason runs the risks of being seen as a belligerent power by the international 
community who are, "prone to treat the maintenance of the status quo as peace and its 
disturbance by either side, even for good reasons. a move toward \var. ", 6 Pakistan sccks 
to change the status quo but just as importantly seeks not to be seen as breaking the 
former colonial rulers Britian and wanted back by the Spanish 'S an irresistible parallel to make 
ý' Gill, S. S. 1997. The DPmsfi '. P. 218 
Burke, S. NI 1974. mutheil and Pakixrtriii Foreign Po(icicc. p. 187 
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status quo. This explains why evidence of political unrest in the valley was seized on by 
Pakistan because it supplied a means to justify the incursion, and had the plan worked 
successfully, would have also provided a way for Pakistan to be seen as not breaking the 
status quo, it was merely assisting the Kashmiris with their quest for freedom from 
India. 
The military forces necessary for this operation assembled at Murree in May 26 1965. 
"The groups were composed of eight to ten `forces' each composing six units of five 
companies. Approximately 110 men were assigned to each company. Each company 
was composed of regular personnel of the so-called Azad Kashmir army, which was in 
fact part of the Pakistani army. "57 
The infiltration began in early August with insurgents crossing the 470 mile-long cease- 
fire line (CFL), a demarcation left over from the 1947/48 conflict which would become 
the line of control (LOC) between India and Pakistan. The insurgents, were dressed as 
local inhabitants and carrying small arms capability. Lt-Gen Harbaksh Singh, 
commanding officer of India's western front gives this account of the first few hours of 
the conflict, 
The intruders set about their task with a missionary zeal, confident of spontaneous 
cooperation from the masses whom they had come to 'liberate'... The period of the 
infiltration campaign was characterized by intense, hectic activity throughout the 
(Jammu and Kashmir) theatre with special emphasis in the valley. The raiders and our 
own forces marched and counter-marched all over the inhospitable terrain in a vast grins 
game of hide and seek. 58 
As mentioned above, the Indian authorities were alerted to the presence of intruders 
crossing the CFL by many of the local population, an awkward fact both politically and 
militarily. Politically because it undercut one of the major philosophical reasons and 
justifications of the decision by Pakistan to act. Militarily because the Pakistani forces 
quickly lost the element of surprise and with it the ability to move rapidly across the 
CFL and into the valley proper, despite this lack of tactical surprise and the fact that it 
was becoming apparent that many in the population were not behaving in a fashion 
56 Burke, Op cit. P. 188 
57 Ganguly Op Cit. p. 43 
58 Harbaksh, Singh. Cited in Ganguly. Op Cit p. 43 
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equating to that of liberatee's the Pakistan forces persisted with the plan 
Worse still Indian forces responded immediately to the breaching of the C'FL bfr 
shutting off the border and by going after the infiltrators who had already crossed into 
India. Pakistan had judged that India would respond to this incursion both late in the day 
and with a similar indifference to the way India had responded in the Rann of Kutch a 
few months earlier. Pakistan had miscalculated on subsequent Indian reaction and the 
time it would take for India to react and the determined nature of any counter attack. 
On 14 August Pakistan stuck to its plan and began an assault into Jammu, the next day 
India once again responded and crossed the CFL into 'Azad IK: ashnnir' which prompted 
a further escalation by the Pakistanis who brought up field artillery close to the CFL and 
began shelling Indian troops at Poonch, Uri and Tithwal. This escalation was met in 
kind by India who on 24 August pushed further into `Azad Kashmir' and held their 
positions. A week later, Pakistan escalated still further, launching `Operation Grand 
Slam' in southern Kashmir. An estimated seventy tanks followed by t\\ o inf i ntirv 
brigades launched an assault which, for the first time in this short and bloody campaign, 
caught India by surprise and inflicted heavy losses. 
Caught by surprise on the ground, India called in air support, again causing a significant 
escalation in a conflict that was supposed to be a quick and decisive liberation of the 
Muslims of the Kashmir valley. Just over an hour later Indian aircraft struck the 
advancing Pakistani forces compelling Pakistan to call in air support to protect its own 
ground operations. 
The conflict dragged on through the most part of September 1965, on 5 Sepcnmber 
Pakistan managed to capture and control the village of Jaurian. about fourteen miles 
inside of India-controlled Kashmir from where they planned to move on the town of' 
Akhnur and subsequently seal off Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India. A()ain 
however India responded with considerable force and resolve and attacked towards the 
Pakistani city of Lahore in western Punjab whilst simultaneously launching toward 
Sialkot, also in western Punjab and an important center of the road and railway network. 
This two-prop, cd approach stretched the capacity of the Pakistan military and made it 
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impossible for them to take and hold Akhnur. The second military column mo\ CJ 
toward Lahore, taking and holding territory and villages along the way. It was the 
Ichogil irrigation canal. part of the Punjab's elaborate irrigation system which stopped 
the Indian forces reaching Lahore, "anticipating an attack on Lahore, Pakistani 
authorities had turned the canal into a veritable moat by blowing up as many as sev enty 
bridges across it. "59 In an attempt to draw the Indian forces away from Lahore Pakistan 
countered at Khem Karan with its First Armoured Division, India brought up its Second 
Armoured Brigade and entrenched on high ground, they waited for the First Armoured 
Division's Patton tanks to enter firing range. Caught and ambushed by Indian 
Centurions lying in wait the Pakistani military suffered heavy casualties. 
The biggest armoured engagement of the increasingly brutal 1965 conflict occurred in 
the Sialkot region of Punjab. Indian forces failed to take the city o1' Sialkot itself and as 
such the post conflict argument hinged on Indian objectives with regard to the taking of 
the city. Some analysts argue that India was interested in taking the city with the 
intention of trading it for other Pakistan held regions and that this objective wwwaas 
thwarted by an untimely cease-fire. The other assertion is that India was only interested 
in putting pressure on Sialkot in order to induce Pakistan to withdraw from other 
regions, in particular, Kashmir. In any event, the military and strategic arguments gave 
way to the political costs of continued conflict and a UN Security Council resolution of 
20th September was unanimously passed that called for an immediate end to 
hostilities. 60 
The day after the resolution was passed India accepted the cease-fire and Pakistan 
followed on 22 September 1965. Although Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri 
I iced considerable opposition from his defense Minister Y. B Chavan and from sections 
of the military top brass especially the chief of staff General J. N Chaudhuri many of 
whom were delighted that Indian armed forces demonstrated that they had equipped 
themselves far better in this conflict than they had done against the Chinese in 1962' 
where Indian forces had been routed by their powerful eastern neighbour. Pakistan's 
59 Ganguly. Op Cit. p. 44 
60 There \\crc also financial costs to be borne brought about by the imposition and India \\as under 
pressure from both the UN, the USA and the UK to end the conflict. 1mmediatek 1'011o\ý ing the 
outbreak of hostilities both the UK and 
USA imposed militar\ embaruoes on India and Pakistan 
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President Ayub Khan also proved willing to accept the cease-fire, his military plan and 
the philosophy that underpinned it having badly backfired. In a radio hr»udcast 
following the ceasefire Ayub Khan demonstrates the ideological antagonisms that 
sparked the conflict. "The nation [Pakistan] discovered itself during this period. it found 
its identity and its future. Everyone of us was seized by the sudden realization of' hi, 
unlimited capacity. " The text goes on, 
The President of India and the Prime Minister of India have tried to tell the world that 
they unleashed this war on us because their system of democracy finds our way of life 
repugnant. They claim to be a secular state in spite of all the oppression which is being 
exercised by them on every minority group. They claim to be a democracy when their 
life is divided by rigid barriers of caste. They have put on a cloak of western liberalist 
munder (sic) which they conceal a dagger of fanaticism. 61 
For Khan and the planners of the 1965 campaign the failure of the military Venture and 
the manner of its failure was a bitter pill to swallow, all the more so because as events 
began to run away from them, they still had at the earliest stages of the conflict the 
opportunity to pull back, but by that time it was considered that too much political 
capital had been expended and thus the campaign continued. This, despite the fact that 
the major philosophical underpinning of the campaign, namely that Kashmiris would 
hail the liberators, had not materialized. This lack of support in the valley. "helped 
undermine `Operation Gibraltar' from the start. ""' 
The conflict came to an official end through the signing of the Tashkent Declaration on 
10th January 1966. In the first section of the treaty both sides agreed to settle their 
differences peacefully and reaffirmed their commitment and obligation under the UN 
charter not to settle further disagreement through resort to arms. They agreed further 
that, "the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the 
continuance of tension between the two countries. "63 In the second section entitled 
'Troops Withdrawal' both sides agreed to withdraw troops not later than 25'h February 
1900 and to return to the territorial positions held prior to 5 August 1965. 
The text of the agreement states that the governments of India and Pakistan ha% C a1(, reed. 
61 "\ fuuII copy of the text can 
be found in Dawn. 2/10'1965 
Ganpuly. Op Of. p. 48 




"that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of 
Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic 
missions of both countries will be restored. "" The latter section entitled 'Trade 
Relations' deals with the exchange and repatriation of prisoners of war, the restoration 
of economic and trade relations between the two states and to continue discussions on 
matters relating to refugees and eviction of illegal immigration. 
What should be on the agenda at Tashkent, and what ought not to be on the agenda was 
cause for disagreement between the two parties both prior to and during the Tashkent 
discussions. Delhi's position was to push for a no war pact between the two countries, 
Rawalpindi's position was for the future of Kashmir to be included in the talks. Ayub 
was reported to have said to the Russian Prime Minister Kosygin that, "a discussion in 
depth of the question of Jammu and Kashmir is imperative... India is said to have argued 
with equal firmness that Kashmir was not negotiable and expressed its aversion to its 
inclusion in the agenda"65 Tashkent concluded with neither side getting what it wanted, 
India did not get its no-war treaty and Pakistan did not get Kashmir onto the formal 
agenda. 
The new Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri faced particular criticism for this 
part of the treaty because many in India, particularly amongst the military argued that it 
conceded far too much to Pakistan and that having won the war, Shastri should have 
been more assertive negotiating the peace. Instead of an assertive realist approach 
Shastri was concerned with reducing tension between the two states and normalizing 
diplomatic relations. Both sides made territorial concessions at Tashkent but what riled 
many in Delhi was the handing back of important strategic positions in Azad Kashmir, 
in particular the town of Tithwal and the Haji Pir Pass. 
The press in India were not short of advice to the Indian Prime Minister, their advice 
66 
tempered only by the death of Shastri hours after the signing of the agreement. The 
Hindustan Times writes, 
64 Op cit. Tashkent Declaration 
65 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 7/01/1966 
66 Extraordinarily Ayub Khan was a pall bearer carrying Shatri's body onto a Russian aircraft for the 
flight back to New Delhi. Photograph can be seen in Dawn. 13/1/1966 
126 
Many in India are bound to feel that a country that had won decided military advantages 
in a grim if short war was entitled to more convincing compensations for the surrender 
of its gains than the agreement offers... Mr Shastri could have stuck out on the question 
of withdrawal of troops as he did over the larger question of Kashmir. 67 
In geo-political and diplomatic terms, Tashkent was a return to the status quo anti. 
However the conflict which had rapidly escalated out of the control of its Pakistani 
planners brought other unpleasant surprises, not least, India crossing into Azad Kashmir 
and taking and holding sections of strategic interest and of political interest given that a 
campaign which began based on liberation, ended with Ayub in Tashkent having to 
negotiate the return from India of sections of Pakistani sovereign territory in the Punjab. 
In the wake of the 1965 conflict Pakistan moved to strengthen its defensive capability of 
its Punjabi border that had been breached by the Indians. During the 1965 conflict both 
States breached the sovereign territory of the other but neither called into question the 
right of the other to exist. The discussion below will show how this rivalry dynamic 
impacted on other regions in India and Pakistan, the Punjab and Baluchistan. The 
following chapter will then show that in 1971 the nature of anarchy changed from one 
of rival, to one of enemy. 
A Dynamic of Rivalry 
For reasons of space this discussion will concentrate on two particular regions, Indian 
Punjab and Baluchistan in Pakistan and in doing so will make the point that the 
ideological foundations of both states have forced them both into an empirical shift, 
away from the Kashmir valley to other regions of the subcontinent. 68 
Raju Thomas argues that there is always a regional element to ethnic conflict in South 
Asia, "Communal and ethnic violence in one country tend to be aided from across 
67 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi). 12/1/1966 
68 Several regional conflicts have occurred since 1947 between ethnic regional centrifugal tendencies 
between the center and the regions, such Assam, Tamil Nadu, Sind, Bihar and the Montagnard 
'insurrections. ' 
127 
national boundaries by encouragement and material support. "69 The following 
discussion builds on this point. 
Of all the regional conflicts the Indian state has faced since independence, the Punjab 
has proved to be the most intractable, violent and politically destabilizing. It was a 
conflict that was on going throughout the 1980's and led indirectly to the assassination 
of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. She was shot by two of her Sikh 
bodyguards in retribution for `Operation Blue Star' earlier the same year - the military 
operation to remove Bhindranwale and his followers from The Golden Temple complex 
at Amritsar. 70 
The depth of concern as to the future of the Punjab and the knock on affect it might 
have on other centrifugal regional forces can be seen by Indira Gandhi's successor (and 
son) Rajiv Gandhi, "There can be no question of a second partition, absolutely not. Let 
me guarantee you that in very, very strong words. We will not allow that under any 
circumstances and whatever is necessary, however tough we have to be, however 
aggressive we have to be, we will have to prevent that"7I 
Historically the Punjab was a great deal bigger than it is today. 72 It comprised what is 
now Punjab in Pakistan, and two other provinces, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, it 
sprawled across a landmass of 3,54,736.76 sq. kms, with a population of 2,84,90,857. 
At partition the region was divided between India and Pakistan and as such shares a 
border between the two states making it not only the richest and the most agriculturally 
productive state but also places it in a vital geopolitical and geostrategic position 
between India and Pakistan. Its wealth, productivity and geographic position have 
contributed to center and regional tensions between the Punjab and Delhi, tensions that 
69 Thomas, Raju. `South Asian Security in the 1990's: The Prospects of War and Peace in South Asia 
Amidst Changes in the Global and Regional Environments. Adelphi Paper. No 278.1993. p. 20 
70 For a good collection of essays on the Punjab crisis, see Samiuddin, Abida, 1985. (eds). The Punjab 
Crisis: Challenge and Response 
Rajiv Gandhi addressing a delegation of lawyers, 4/12/1986. Cited from Salamat Ali, `Reigning in 
Punjab' Far Eastern Economic Review, 18/12/1986 
72 The term Punjab literally means the `Five Rivers' and by implication the land of five rivers but did not 
refer to any specifically defined territorial area until the British defined it s specific state after the 
Mutiny of 1857. See J. S Grewal 1980. Historical Geography of the Punjab, Journal of Regional 
History, Vol. I. pp. 1-14 
73 For a full account of population and territorial boundary changes both prior to and after 1947, see 
Singh, Amerjit, 2001. Politics of the Muslim league and partition 1935-1947. pp. 1-23 
128 
Pakistan sought to aid and abet and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi often repeated 
the charge that the tensions in Punjab were down to "foreign design against India. "74 
This section will discuss the evidence that shows Pakistan's involvement in attempting 
to assist the Khalistan movement and others into a secessionist struggle against Delhi. It 
must first be noted however that Indira Gandhi herself is often criticized not only for her 
handling of the political situation in Punjab but also for her role in instigating it in the 
first place. Amrik Singh sets out two hypotheses to this affect. "One, the Punjab issue 
need not have became a problem but for the political and electoral compulsions of 
Congress-I. Two, these compulsions were inextricably bound up with the developments 
that had characterised Indian political life since the early seventies. , 75 
This section however, examines the role Pakistan played in assisting in the agitation and 
secessionist movements in the Punjab throughout the 1980's. however it must be noted 
that Mrs Gandhi's centralizing instincts are also found to be an important factor. As 
Atul Kolhi observes, "Leaders may not be able to turn democracy on and off, but Indira 
Gandhi came close. "76 
There are also differing arguments as to the cause of the crisis in the Punjab, some 
economic, some political, linguistic and religious. Murray Leaf suggests that these 
different dynamics fall into three separate categories. He writes, "At the household level 
in Punjab, it is primarily economic; at the level of state-wide political discussions it is 
legal and constitutional. Only at the national level is it primarily religious and this 
construction is mainly the product of actions of the central government, more 
specifically the government of the late Indira Gandhi and not the people or politicians of 
the Punjab. "77 
The objectives and thinking behind the creation of a Punjabi Subah vary enormously 
from an all out secessionist movement, to a redrawing of the political map of Punjab 
along linguistic boundaries. The chief advocate of this latter view, Sant Fateh Singh 
74 Jha Kant, Nalni, 2002. Domestic Imperitives in India's Foreign Policy. p. 211 
75 Singh, Amrik, 1985. Punjab in Indian Politics: An Approach to the Problem. Amrik Singh eds. Punjab 
in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends. pp. 1-28 
76 Kolhi, Atul, 1998. Democracy and Discontent. p. 32 
77 Leaf, Murray, The Punjab Crisis, ' Asian Survey. Vol. XXVI, No. 5. May 1985. pp. 475-498 
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won an overwhelming majority in the 1965 Gurudwara committee elections. These 
different strands of Sikh identity, religion and politics can also be found in the Akali 
Dal, the major political party of the Sikhs in Punjab. 18 Furthermore. a working 
committee of the Akali Dal party are the authors of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution 
1973, a document produced in response to the inability of state politicians to resist the 
centralizing instincts of the Congress-I government. In a series of resolutions it calls on 
the Government of India to address a number of political, cultural and linguistic 
concerns ranging from the fairer distribution of the Ravi-Seas waters, the construction 
of six sugar and four textile mills to help agro-industrial policy and the installation of a 
broadcasting system in the Golden Temple to relay the Gurbani Kirtan to Sikhs living 
abroad. 79 
Gandhi herself continued to talk, "darkly of a foreign hand in the Sikh agitation - 
almost always implying Pakistani involvement, , 80 and her accusations did carry some 
weight given the large numbers of weapons of apparent Pakistani origin found at 
Amritsar after Operation Blue Star. Delhi remained consistent in attempts to seek 
international support in this regard, for example, an article in Strategic Digest highlights 
that a, "sizable number of American weapons meant for the Afghan Mujahideen were 
siphoned off to Sikh militants operating in Punjab. "8' Kanti Bajpai adds that Sikh 
"8' dissidents in Pakistan, "obtained refuge, training, arms and money from their hosts. 
Mrs Gandhi wrote to British Prime Minster Margaret Thatcher, to explain that, "some 
foreign powers including Pakistan, " were, "trying to foment the crisis in Punjab. "83 
During the same period Gandhi wrote to political leaders such as Reagan (USA), 
Mitterrand (France), Kaunda (Zambia) and Chernenko (USSR). This intense diplomatic 
movement and lobbying of international politicians was a tactic she had adopted to great 
affect before and during the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan. 84 
78 For a historical analysis of Punjabi politics see Chauhan, Ramesh K, 1995. Punjab and the Nationalirv 
Question in India 
79 For a full copy of the text see, <sikhcoaltion. org/sikhism2I . asp> ß° Hardgrave, Robert, `India in 1984: Confrontation, Assassination and Succession, ' Asian Surrey. Vol. 
XXV, No. 2. February 1985. pp. 131-145 
8, Srategic Digest (New Delhi). Vol. 23. No. 10. October 1993. p. 1667 
82 Bajpai, Kanti, `India: Modified Structuralism' in Muthiah, Alagappa. eds. Asian Security Practice. 
Material and Ideational Influences. 1998. pp. 157-197 
83 Times of India (New Delhi) 17/6/84 
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Nalini Jha argues that the Punjab crisis, "provided foreign countries especially Pakistan 
the opportunity to intervene in the domestic affairs of India. Even though the Sikhs did 
not have any cultural affinities across the border in Pakistan. -85 Indeed the willingness 
of Pakistan to assist in secessionist pressures in Punjab demonstrates a willingness on 
the part of Pakistan to put aside the older and more entrenched animosity between Sikhs 
and Muslims in order to create political difficulties for India. In an interview with Indio 
Today in 1993 the leader of the National Council of Khalistan, Jagjit Singh Chauhan, 
claimed that Z. A Bhutto had offered in 1972 to start a movement for Khalistan from 
Pakistani territory, 86 and writing in the Indian Defence Revleiv, Yashwant Deva suggests 
that the ISI launched Operation K2, "which inter alia included training to the estranged 
Sikh youth and the use of sophisticated arms and explosives, coordination with militants 
operating in the valley and directing acts of terrorism both in India and abroad. "87 
Pakistan too has faced some strong opposition to central rule from regional and 
ethnolinguistic communities, resistant to and suspicious of, a centralized and even alien 
polity at the center. The regional versus centre fault line in relations between 
Baluchistan and Islamabad resides in the call for a `Greater Afghanistan' and the uniting 
of the Pushtoons under the rubric of a so-called Pushtoonistan, a region that lies across 
the Durand line - the sovereign border between Pakistan and Afghanistan which was 
drawn by the British prior to partition and the founding of Pakistan, 
Baluchistan constitutes 42 per cent of Pakistan's land mass and yet makes up only five 
per cent of the total population. 88 Since 1947 there have been several conflicts between 
the Baluch and Pakistani forces in 1948 and 1958. These were brief conflicts lasting 
only a few months and ended in defeat for the Baluch. Longer lasting and bloodier 
conflicts occurred between 1962 and 1968 and again between 1973 and 1975, the latter 
conflict being sparked by Bhuttos's dismissal of local administrators and was the peak 
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of Baluch separatism. 89 In a speech at a joint session of the Senate and National 
Assembly in 1976 convened to discuss the political crisis in Baluchistan, Bhutto made a 
speech, peppered with implicit remarks linking the Baluch situation with India. 
Now national unity is strengthened and it has been made clear beyond all doubt that 
Pakistan will never again be dismembered. It is obvious now that the second stage 
which in their imagination, was to follow the first stage of dismemberment %\'i ll never 
arrive. It is quite clear now that after the separation of East Pakistan, no other province 
of Pakistan will be ripped asunder from the State90 
In the text of the same speech Bhutto accuses the Sardars in Baluchistan of colluding 
with their "foreign friends" who were, "trying to undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan. 
We had to act and we had to act in the interests of the state and the country. " He talks 
of, "bomb blasts and foreign intervention, " and of attempts to, "wrench Baluchistan out 
of the sacred Motherland of Pakistan. "91 
Prior to the establishment of Pakistan the Durand line had been the boundary drawn by 
the British between Afghanistan and British controlled India. After independence, 
formal diplomatic and political ties were established between India and Afghanistan in 
January 1950 with the signing of the first Friendship Treaty. 92 Basharat Hussain 
suggests that this treaty was the start of Indian endeavours to ensure that, "a friendly 
government was in place in Kabul in order to outflank rival Pakistan by exploiting the 
Pushtoonistan issue. '"93 Furthermore, an extremely antagonistic Afghan attitude toward 
Pakistan was openly demonstrated when Kabul voted against Pakistan's membership of 
the UN on 30th September 1947 in protest at Karachi's refusal to address the 
Pushtoonistan issue, a move that, "attracted India's sympathies. " 94 
The dynamic becomes clear as India and Pakistan moved into independence, a dynamic 
which saw India use all diplomatic and political means to exploit and antagonize 
89 For an account of this conflict see, Wirsing, Robert, 1979. The Baluchis and Pathans and also 
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Pakistan on the issues of Pushtoons in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) and to draw Kabul towards Delhi and away from Karachi. 
Furthermore, in the wake of the 1962 Indo-China conflict and a warming of relations 
between China and Pakistan, "awakened India to the utility of activating the issue of 
Pushtoonistan. Thereafter the issue figured regularly whenever New Delhi and Kabul 
sat to discuss their bilateral relations. "95 
What is interesting to note is that these developments occurred prior to Kashmir 
becoming the major issue in India Pakistan relations. That is not to say it was not all 
issue at all, clearly it was and the two new states had been to war in Kashmir in 1947- 
48, however, it can be seen that India was situating itself politically and diplomatically 
with Kabul in order to exploit a political weakness between Karachi and ethnic 
resistance in the regions. V. P Vaidik succinctly sums up the nature of relations between 
Delhi and Kabul, "Immediately after the partition of India, as soon as it became clear 
that Pakistan would have problems with India on the one side and with Afghanistan on 
the other, India and Afghanistan found a new basis of friendship. "96 
Hussain argues that, "the Afghan desire to annex the Pushtoon dominated areas of 
Pakistan claiming them to be the parts of the once Abdali empire and arguing that the 
Durand line was no more a legitimate boundary between the two countries proved 
conducive for nurturing Indo-Afghan relations. , 97 
Relations between Delhi and Kabul took a dramatic turn for the worse following Soviet 
support for the regimes of Babrak Karmal and Najibullah and India's tacit support of the 
Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in December 1979, a move which proved disastrous 
for both the former Soviet Union and for Afghanistan, it also left India marginalized and 
without influence in the Afghan capital. Furthermore India was not permitted to attend 
the Geneva conference, the agreement which saw the removal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan. 98 
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The emergence of the Taliban, gaining political control in Afghanistan in the earl}. 1995 
reduced India's influence still further. The Taliban, made up almost entirely of 
Pashtoons with intimate ties with Pakistan, Aly Zaman suggests, gave rise to an 
expectation amongst Pakistan's decision makers that, '-should the Taliban gain control 
over Afghanistan strategic depth against India would finally be achieved. 99 Thus 
Afghanistan, the site of the so-called Great Game between the old Imperial powers of 
the UK and Russia, would be used as a buffer state in a new great game, but this time to 
secure strategic depth for Pakistan against India. 
In the event the Taliban was removed from power in December 2001 by the United 
States following the hijacking and crashing of aircraft in the United States earlier the 
same year which forced Pakistan to disassociate itself from the Taliban. Throughout the 
Taliban's period in power, India supported and supplied the so-called Northern Alliance 
in Afghanistan -a loose knit group of anti Taliban forces including General Ahmed 
Shah Masoud. India's assistance to the Northern Alliance was substantial, in 1997-8 it 
provided $70 million of aid to the Northern Alliance, including two Mi-17 helicopters 
and another three helicopters in 2000.100 
By early 2001 it provided high altitude equipment to Masoud worth around $8 
million. 101 It provided military advisers and medical supplies and personnel to treat 
Northern Alliance troops at a hospital at Karkhor in Tajikistan. 10` Since the emergence 
of the new Afghan regime under Hamid Karzai India has moved swiftly to shore up its 
economic, diplomatic and political ties with the new regime. The Indian Embassy 
reopened in December 2001 with the then Minister for Foreign affairs Jaswant Singh 
referring to a "painful gap of more than five years" without Indian representation in 
Kabul. 103 In a further demonstration of India's keenness to reengage with Kabul India 
earmarked $100 million towards reconstruction and further help to aid health facilities, 
educational and information technology 
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facilities. "" 
India then has re-emerged as a player in Afghan politics and in the process has built a 
military base at Karkhor in Tajikistan, the first such facility beyond its Sovereign 
territory. This facility will allow India to pursue its energy interests and needs in Central 
Asia, but also to, "further erode Pakistan's concept of strategic depth by encircling it 
from the west... This move unambiguously heralded India"s entry into the new grcalt 
game. " 
IOS 
The dynamic of rivalry can be seen from the above section whereby what is good I'm- 
one state is necessarily bad for the other and that rivalry is not merely confined to the 
Kashmir valley. But as Thomas points out above, communal and ethnic Violence in one 
state is aided and abetted by the other, usually in the form of financial support or by wv'iy 
of training or refuge for those seeking succession from either India or Pakistan. 
Domestic Ideological Constructs and their Implications for the Other 
Despite the `reality' of the politically constructed environment, from day one, the future 
of Indo-Pakistan relations was replete with un-answered questions as to the validity- and 
legitimacy of these two new Sovereign states. If Muslim Indians really were ,i distinct 
nation, then what does India do with its large Muslim minority' which elected to stay in 
India? If religion really was the founding principle of nationhood in South Asia how 
should India deal with its Buddhists, Jains and Sikh populations? If howw ever. 
nationalism was a territorial and secular construction based on historical association 
how could the two-nation theory be defended`? 
Since 1 947 these questions remain pertinent to Indo-Pakistan relations. : Answers to 
these questions that currently remain outstanding. would have profound implications for 
104 Ramachandaran, Sudiha, in Afghanistan Pakistan's Loss is India's gain', Asia Online. FFchruar\ 20012. 
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the other state. This is what singles out India and Pakistan because there are many states 
in the system who have very different endogenous structures, monarchical, republican. 
autocratic, liberal etc, but these endogenous structures do not inter-subjectivel}' and 
systemically attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the other. 
Again the irony arises that these two states have moved away from a deep level of 
internalization of shared knowledge and culture of the pre-colonial period towards a 
Hobbesian culture where only the knowledge of who and where the enemy is prevails in 
relations. A previous accommodation to this problem lay in the multiple layers of 
sovereignty that used to prevail on the subcontinent, but as Jalal points out above, where 
once the use of multiple layers of sovereignty was considered part of a political 
settlement in the pre-colonial period, has become non-negotiable since partition. 
Mahmud Ali sums up this dilemma, 
The fundamental nature of the dispute meant that the two successor states were 
locked in a dialectic and philosophical duel from the day they were born. Each 
appeared to pose a challenge to the legitimacy of the other; each was driven to try 
to prove that its raison d'etre was somehow more valid than the other's. The 
contradictions inherent in the two ideologies rendered the dispute irreconcilable 106 
After partition, "neither side of the antagonists was willing to accept the status quo. "107 
India unable to reconcile itself to the emergence of Pakistan as an equal in the region. 
Pakistan, being politically, economically and militarily weaker than its new neighbour 
sought refuge in the Manila and Baghdad Pacts and fell under the superpower umbrella 
of the United States. 
Thus domestic and ideological differences very soon set them on different foreign 
policy options, India extolling the virtues of non-alignment and Pakistan doing precisely 
the reverse, aligning with a superpower. Pakistan sought refuge via superpower 
alignment and India hoped that Pakistan would not survive as an independent state. 
However by aligning itself with Washington Pakistan ensured that, at least from a 
foreign policy perspective Pakistan would survive, at least as long as the international 
106 All Mahmud, S. 1993, The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal I ar in Smith Asia. p. 6 
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system remained locked into bipolarity. 
We can clearly see how rapidly the domestic identity of each state informed interest and 
foreign policy direction and that the direction of the two new states moved in opposite 
directions. The state identities of India and Pakistan quickly manifested and polarized 
into cold war politics. This raises the question of how much interest can be defined in 
terms of power in relation to the system and how the meaning of that power is 
constituted by the nature or interest of the state. "The per se individuality of states may 
be given outside the system, but the meaning or terms of that individuality are given 
within. " 108 
In post 1947 Indo-Pakistan relations, the bipolar international system as it stood at the 
time was only a permissive force that led to such a divergent foreign policy direction. 
What constituted those divergent positions lies in the ideological conflict and mutual 
antagonism that India and Pakistan constructed between them and the ideological 
conflict that constituted state identity lies first with the British and latterly with the 
Muslim League and the INC. 
All nations need myths and legends. The problem with India and Pakistan is that they 
find their particular myths in the pre-colonial period and the myth-making of India 
contradicts Pakistan and vice versa. The day either state can name a tank, missile or 
weapons system after a non-Hindu God or diety, or ancient Muslim leader, perhaps that 
day will be the time when the two national identities of India and Pakistan begin to 
move away from one another as opposed to contradicting one another. 
This would be a move away from the pathology of ideological antagonism. However, 
Ashutosh Varshney suggests that through what has become known as the mode of 
selective retrieval whereby Hindu nationalists recall the intolerance of Mughal rulers 
like Babur and Aurangzeb and forget the tolerant ones like Akbar these. "tales of 
betrayal are threatening to push out a shared heritage of communal coexistence from 
collective memories. "109 Again we see the demands of sovereignty and ideology after 
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1947 imposing a new version of history on the subcontinent, Iftikhar Malik cautions 
that, "the super imposed administrative unity achieved either under conquering 
dynasties or under the British Raj must not be taken as synonymous with the various 
historical regional identities that have persisted in primordial form. "' 10 
Sisur Gupta suggests that from the outset there were, "powerful objective and subjective 
forces at work to lead the two countries in different policy directions. The most 
important single problem faced by Pakistan in the initial years was to give a meaningful 
form and substance to the concept of Pakistani nationalism. This necessitated the pursuit 
of a set of policies divergent from India's. " Gupta goes on to argue that in the, "making 
of the foreign policies of the two countries, needs of advancing one's national interest 
vis-a-vis the other began to play an increasingly important role. "'' An ideological 
rivalry emerged between the two and manifested itself first and foremost in Kashmir. 
But as the above section has demonstrated, ideological rivalry has also manifested in 
other regions of the subcontinent. 
Returning to Morris-Jones's three idioms of Indian politics set out in the introduction, 
the relationship between these two states has produced another idiom, a fourth idiom 
where India and Pakistan without mentioning each other by name can evoke the specter 
of Kashmir and the ideological differences between the two states. These are implicit 
suggestions and references where one state sets itself up against what the other is not. 
For example speaking at the Far East American Council of Commerce and Industry 
Ambassador Aziz Ahmed said, 
By underscoring the reliance on private initiative and sensible fiscal policies, 
Pakistan has literally become the largest show-case of private enterprise in the 
underdeveloped Afro-Asian world. This is in sharp contrast to the discouragement 
of private enterprise elsewhere in the region by government controls and 
doctrinaire philosophies 112 
Implicitly, Ahmed is contrasting the so-called, open market economy promoted by 
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western nations and used by Pakistan, with the planned socialist economy of India 
adopted by Nehru in the first decades of Indian independence. India Pakistan relations 
has produced this implicit language, adding to Morris-Jones's traditional, modern and 
saintly idioms we can add a fourth, an Indo-Pak idiom used by one state to define itself 
against the other. Within this category are two vital components of foreign policy and 
state ideology and it is within this remit that a clash of secular India and a Muslin 
Pakistan becomes apparent. More recently Indian Prime Minister Monmohan Singh 
said, 
In the defense field and the nuclear field, our strategic programmes are indigenous and 
not dependent on external sources of support. Nor can they be the subject of externally 
imposed constraints. Within these parameters, India is prepared for the broadest 
possible engagement with the international non-proliferation regime. ' 3 
Wilfred Smith suggests that given Pakistan's smaller size and its difficult geopolitical 
position in relation to India, Pakistan feels more threatened with regard to its own 
philosophical position and justification. He writes, 
Rather than coming firmly to terms with the realization that the position of India's 
Muslims depends primarily on two things, their aspiration towards Indianness and 
India's aspiration towards secularism, Pakistan has tended to deride that 
secularism and to presume and encourage a disloyalty of Indian Muslims to their 
state... Pakistani Muslims have had so heavy a psychological investment in the 
conviction that Indian Muslims are mistreated, that at times one cannot but hell) to 
detect a morbid welcoming of adverse news and a resistance to awareness of 
Indo-Muslim welfare. The emotional involvement between the two groups is still 
close and is itself a further cause of their actual estrangement. 
' 14 
The above citation captures the cultural inheritance of the two states that in turn 
provides a way for them to attempt to undermine the other. It is perhaps the greatest 
irony of all that these two states have the capacity to stress their newly defined 
differences after 1947 because of the close political and cultural proximity they both 
shared prior to 1947. Out of this similarity, comes the expression of difference. 
However, the expressions of difference are new and belong to the new system both 
states came into in 1947, their similarities predate the sovereign system by millennia. 
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Summary: 
This chapter has examined the nature of relations between India and Pakistan and the 
role of Kashmir in the nature of conflict between them. The chapter examined how the 
two Sovereign states became from 1947 ideologically opposed to each other and how 
these two divergent ideological positions have served to create and recreate conflict and 
what role the structure of the international system played in hardening these divergent 
ideological positions and foreign policy directions. 
So, coupled with interstate rivalry, both polities have found themselves having to 
grapple with internal dissidence in the hinterland regions of their respective sovereign 
territories. The most notable failure to bring all members of the new polity under one 
national collective was the continued conflict between East and West Pakistan, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
There have been other attempts to ensure the maintenance of the hinterland regions of 
both India and Pakistan within their respective secular or Muslim ideological remits 
which were discussed in this chapter. They are important because reaching settlements 
with internal `tribals' or ethnicities became essential, not only in terms of developing a 
viable functioning state, but also to justify and legitimize themselves because in 
legitimizing themselves they delegitimize the other. 
In 1965, India and Pakistan fought each other to a stalemate, and politically there was 
no winner in the sense that the `enemy' has been seen to be comprehensively defeated. 
The conflict then remained within a Lockean remit of rivalry. Both sides sought a set 
objective and were not politically prepared to contemplate, nor did they seek, the 
elimination of the other. 
It was a limited war to achieve a set objective, namely Kashmir. The trigger for this 
conflict resides firmly within the ideological clash of two states, that for their respective 
reasons argue that Kashmir should belong to them. For that reason the argument can 
be 
made that a future conflict over Kashmir will remain within a rivalry remit 
because both 
sides will know their own objective and the objective of the other. 
In that sense the 
140 
conflict is managed within a detente framework, both states know the nature of the 
conflict and the ideological reasons behind it. 
But Kashmir has not been the only conflict these two states have fought and this is 
where the dangers of a transitory ideationally driven dynamic come into play. A future 
scenario involving these two states in military conflict where there is no set objective, 
here the remit changes and moves away from theories of limited war. This is where the 
nature of anarchy might change from a preordained conflict over Kashmir to a new 
conflict over somewhere else, or something else. As this chapter has demonstrated India 
and Pakistan fight each other head to head in Kashmir, but also by proxy in other 
regions such as Baluchistan and Punjab. 
A materialist interpretation of the physical geography of the Indo-Pakistan border and 
the inequality in material military means should tell Pakistan that it can never will a 
military confrontation with India, this would amount to a realist assessment where, 
ultimately material and structural limitations dictate state behaviour. What it actually 
does however is tell Pakistan that it needs to find a new strategic plan or a new method 
of engagement which this chapter has shown is ideationally driven, thus, the structure of 
the system does not always act as the final arbiter in state behaviour - the 1965 Kashm ir 
conflict was an ideationally driven conflict. 
Confrontation will cease, not when a strategic solution to Pakistan's problem is found, 
but when a political solution is found that brings political and ideological reconciliation 
between the two states. Pakistan must stop seeking a strategic solution to a political and 
ideological problem, a real danger lies in any attempt by Pakistan to off set its 
strategically vulnerable position and to compensate for a lack of material assets through 
nuclear proliferation, these dangers are discussed in the following chapter. 
In geo-political and diplomatic terms, the signing of the Tashkent treaty was a return to 
the status quo anti but a political humiliation for Ayub Khan who was forced to 
negotiate the return from India sections of Pakistani sovereign territory in the Punjab 
that had been taken by India. Of most pertinence to this discussion however, is that in 
the wake of the 1965 conflict, Pakistan began to strengthen its defensive capabilities. 
The aftermath of conflict, changing the nature of anarchy between two states and tacitly 
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preparing the ground for the next conflict - the next conflict occurred six years later. not 
in the valley, but in East Pakistan. 
The chapter showed how the nature of anarchy between these two states moves from 
Kashmir, to the Punjab and Baluchistan. This is not a conflict fought solely within the 
territorial boundaries of Kashmir, it is a conflict of irreconcilable ideological difference 
between the two states that has manifested in Kashmir, but also manifests in other 
regions of the subcontinent. From a materialist perspective, the chapter showed that the 
1965 conflict was informed and shaped by the material limitations of Pakistan, the 
causal mechanism was ideational, but tempered by material limitations. 
The 1965 conflict highlights an important dynamic as to the nature of conflict between 
these two states. Pakistan's objective is to secure Kashmir, constituting a move aw, -Iy, 
from a status quo position. India by contrast, as far as Kashmir is concerned, remains a 
status quo state because it seeks to keep the valley within its federation. The next 
chapter will show that these roles changed with India using its political and military 
power to bring about change and Pakistan trying, and failing to maintain the status quo 
position. 
The bipolar system that India and Pakistan entered into in 1947 no longer exists and yet 
the mutual antagonism born out of negative inter-subjectivity is still dangerously 
apparent. Moreover, the change from bipolar to multi-polar system, whilst causing 
changes in foreign policy orientation in Islamabad and particularly in New Delhi which 
seeks closer ties to Washington has done nothing to curb the dangers inherent with India 
and Pakistan's mutual antagonism and continued military escalation. 
Yet, the very structural existence of these two states within the system undermines the 
justification and legitimacy of the other. The point is argued here that it is the 
philosophical underpinning of the two states as opposed to their materialist existence 
within the system that constitutes mutual antagonism and that is why the culture of 
anarchy between them is transient. 
The ideological differences between them may be entrenched and increasingly 
dangerous, they are however, new and belong firmly in the twentieth century. Gupta 
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suggests that the continued emphasis on Islam in Pakistan is a measure of its inability to 
"eliminate the rest of India from its consciousness... within the very definition of 
Pakistan's Islamic character an implied assumption is that India is anti-Islamic and this 
emphasis has essentially been a method of focusing attention on the non-Indian 
character of Pakistan. "115 Stephen Cohen supplements this analysis and suggests that 
stories of murder and persecution of Indian Muslims in Gujarat and other regions of 
India, "plus the rise of militant Hinduism seem to provide fresh justification for 
Pakistan. " 116 
Provision for a `fresh justification' is vital because it is this movement or empirical shift 
in justification which adds to transience. Kashmir provides the main empirical 
grounding, however, fresh justification such as Gujarat moves and further entrenches 
rivalry. It is the politics of, we told you so, and has been manifest in Indo-Pakistan 
relations since 1947. 
Cohen offers more evidence to the pathology of relations. The intelligence services of 
India and Pakistan are organized as much to meddle in their neighbors affairs as to 
provide intelligence and information... India and Pakistan treat ethnic separatists 
movements as instruments of foreign policy - in this region, one's own national security 
and a state's domestic insecurity go hand in hand. "'" This dynamic, sums up the rivalry 
between the two states whereby what is bad for one state is necessarily good for the 
other. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Culture of Enmity and Unlimited Conflict 
India and Pakistan, two states with limited resources, recognized in 1947 8 and in 1961 
that they had to end their respective military campaigns, not because they thought they 
would lose, but because they thought they wouldn't win. However the ideological 
conflict between the two states led them back on the path to conflict - political. 
diplomatic and military conflict. Both sides remain unreconciled to peace because both 
sides remain transfixed and gripped by systemic inter-subjectivity. 
Chapter One argued that the nature of communal and caste relations which had a high 
degree of internalization was gradually unpicked by the British and that it was the 
Morley-Minto legislation of 1909 that finally severed the link between politics and 
society because it sought to impose a religiously glided policy onto a society whose 
cultural and political unity was greater than its theological division and that these 
divisions formed the basis of partition. 
Chapter Two argued that under a Lockean anarchy India and Pakistan entered a rivalry 
stage in relations whereby the justification for the foundation of each state became a 
focal point of antagonism and rivalry between them under a new belief system that was 
alien to the South Asian experience vis-a-vis the liberal Westphalian system. The 
chapter argued that this new international system hardened and entrenched the two 
disparate ideological positions adopted by the two new sovereign states with Kashmir 
caught in the middle, but that these antagonisms were apparent prior to Kashmir 
becoming the flash point of India Pakistan relations. The latter section of the chapter 
examined how this mutual antagonism had implications for internal politics in both 
states and how one state seeks to exploit these political difficulties. The chapter looked 
at Pakistan involvement in Indian Punjab in the 1980's and Indian 
involvement in 
Baluchistan and the N\1'FP. 
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In 1947/8 and 1965 the states fought each other to a stalemate, this chapter armes that 
the 1971 conflict constitutes a departure from this scenario because 1971 nativ a clear 
winner and a clear loser in military and political terms that moved Indo-Pakistan 
relations away from a conflict of Lockean rivalry and status quo to a Hobbesian position 
of kill or be killed. Later, in 1998 the two states displayed the capabilittiv to talc this 
antagonism to a new level with the nuclear testing and counter testing at Pokharan in 
India and Baluchistan in Pakistan. 
The second part of this chapter will make the argument that in the event of a 1971 
conflict occurring again, India Pakistan relations will rapidly escalate into a nuclear 
standoff given the acute nature of the mutual ideological antagonism between them and 
that this standoff could have catastrophic consequences given the added material 
element of nuclear power. The conclusion of this thesis \\-ill suggest what opportune 
moments or catalysts might arise in the future to facilitate a deterioration in relations. 
If, at the present time India and Pakistan do share a Lockean anarchy, then we need to 
be able to theorize relations within a coherent framework in order to understand the 
direction relations are heading and how future events such as another Indian military 
exercise like Brasstacks, or a military escalation such as occurred at Kargil in 1999 can 
be theorized and understood. The transitory dynamic of Indo-Pakistan relations is such 
that, having exhausted all peaceful political and diplomatic means to settle disputes at 
both national, regional and international levels, the risk of a resort to violence remains 
apparent, indeed, it was the exhaustion of these political and diplomatic avenues that led 
indirectly to conflict in 1965. 
Ideological friction between India and Pakistan is still apparent. and the diplomatic and 
political avenues open for a peaceful settlement are still, at best limited. Whilst such an 
impasse remains, and India Pakistan relations remain at a high level of ideolo`iical 
friction, then a further resort to military conflict and a continued nuclear escalation 
remain a certainty. This problem forms the basis of transience in the construction of 
anarchic cultures, just as the geographic location of conflicts between India Pakistan 
have varied, so too might the nature of anarchy «ith the potential for si,., nificant and 
possibly catastrophic implications for South Asia and indeed, for international politics. 
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India and Pakistan occupy a theoretical middle ground between the two cultures - 
between a limited conflict in Kashmir and an unknown conflict somewhere else where 
the two cultures become blurred and interchangeable. In this sense. KL! shmir has almost 
become materialist and structural. albeit replete with ideation. But in the sense that 
Kashmir is seen as the pressure point between these two states it has taken on a 
structural macro dynamic. In other words. Kashmir is Indo-Pakistan relations and 
1947/8.1965 and 1999 demonstrate clearly that it does play a macro role in relations. 
but this macro level of analysis does not help us grapple with transience and 
interchangeable anarchic cultures. 
A further problem with this level arises if it is not Kashmir that transforms the nature of 
anarchy between India and Pakistan, but the ideological friction between them, which 
pushes relations towards a Hobbesian culture. In other words, transience comes from 
the latent ideological friction between India and Pakistan, not from its current structural 
manifestation, Kashmir. The danger being that too much emphasis on the structural 
manifestation diverts theoretical analysis away from ideational friction that drives a 
transient nature of Indo-Pakistan relations and has, as 1971 will demonstrate, 
manifested itself in another regional conflict far removed from the Kashmir valley. 
This point raises the spectre that these two states might begin a conflict from tvvo 
different anarchic positions. For example in 1965 Pakistan %\ as not a status quo state. 
but was a status quo state in 1971. India by contrast was a status quo state in 1965 but 
by 1971 was operating from a Hobbesian anarchic culture given that it succeeded in 
removing East Pakistan from the political map of South Asia. In this respect, Indo- 
Pakistan relations is driven structurally by the manifestation of the Kashmir issue, but 
the transience in anarchy is driven by the latent ideological friction between the two 
states. Thus systemic inter-subjectivity whereby Kashmir manifests als structure. but 
negative inter-subjectivity is also apparent given that these two states have not failed to 
transport their mutual enmity to other regions. This is the transient nature of Indo- 
Pakistan relations and it is this transience of ideological friction that has led to mutual 
antagonism emerging outside of the Kashmir dispute. for example in the Punjab and 
Baluchistan as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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A positive intersubjectivity as characterized by a Kantian anarchy equates to he1p-'in 
friendly states within a security community wherever it might be necessary, whel-Cls tile 
manifestation of a negative intersubjectivtity equates to thwarting an enemy anvwOere 
and this is what has happened in the case of India and Pakistan. There is a Further 
problem that stands in stark contrast to the experience of Western Europe, born out of Li 
liberal Westphalian system and having passed through a Hobbesian culture \\ cstern 
Europe has moved into a Kantian culture of friendship. 
By contrast, India and Pakistan, who prior to the colonial period shared \ hat could be 
characterized as a Kantian culture (see, chapter one on relations between the Niuýghal 
court and the Rajputs) now, post-independence share a culture of anarchy that fluctuates 
between Lockean and Hobbesian cultures that remain faraway from the Kantian culture 
that once existed on the subcontinent. The emergence of Lockean culture stems frone the 
strict delineation between Hindu and Muslim introduced by the British, a system that 
was perpetuated by Indian political elites during the last decades of the Raj and into the 
post 1947 period. This rivalry was pre-destined to manifest somewhere alter 1947, it 
happened to manifest first and foremost in Kashmir, but the ideological friction that 
underpins it has ensured that political and military rivalry would come to characterize 
India Pakistan relations beyond Kashmir. 
Given the nature and violence of partition and the ideological antagonism that went with 
it, a Lockean culture of rivalry was inevitable after 1947 but as has been argued above 
the 1965 conflict stretched the boundaries of a rivalry culture in the sense that Pakistan 
went (or were politically forced) to go beyond the status quo remit of rivalry. As has 
also been argued above in the case of the 1965 conflict. India did not swish or need to go 
beyond the stated objectives of a limited conflict to thwart Pakistani ambitions in 
Kashmir. 
Thus whilst one state, in the case of Pakistan in 1965, went beyond a status quo and 
rivalry position, India remained within it. The danger being that if both statcs 
simultaneously regard themselves as being in a culture of Hobbesian enmity. then the 
outcome in a future conflict will be very different and the consequences far more 
serious for the region. Wendt writes, "enemies that survive the initial clash of arms will 
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be the tougher for it, and start forming a shared understanding of their condition, the 
Hobbesian culture. "' 
The major empirical case study of this chapter is the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan and 
the emergence of Bangladesh that looks in particular at India's political and military 
involvement in the conflict, a conflict that transformed East Pakistan into Bangladesh 
and it is argued here changed the nature of anarchy between India and the nascent state 
of Bangladesh. 
Implicit within the literature on Indo-Pakistan relations is an acceptance that the 1971 
conflict was different from the previous conflicts in Kashmir, different not only due to 
the relocation of violence, but more importantly, in the nature of that violence. Suba 
Chandran writes, "Ever since their independence in 1947, relations between India and 
Pakistan have been in a state of flux. They have had overt military conflicts on differing 
scales and close military confrontations in 1948,1965,1971,1986-7,1999 and 2002. 
This chapter will theorise this conflict from the perspective of unlimited violence and 
the termination of East Pakistan to tease out the theoretical differences between the 
1965 conflict in Kashmir and the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan. 
In doing so the chapter will demonstrate that there are `differing scales' of conflict and 
show that currently India and Pakistan are unable to agree on what the cause of conflict 
is about - Pakistan arguing that the basis of an agreement must include a settlement on 
the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, India arguing that Kashmir is its 
sovereign territory and has been since 1947. The chapter will show that conflict resides 
in the intersubjective clash of ideas, not structure. 
War in East Pakistan 1971 
The 1971 conflict was very violent and very bloody, and began as a civil conflict 
between the Punjabi dominated West Pakistan and the Bengali East Pakistan. Relations 
between the two wings had deteriorated rapidly as a reported comment by Yahya Khan 
to his officers demonstrates, "There can be no political settlement with the Bingos till 
1 Wendt, Op cit. p. 268 
2 Chandran, Suba, 2005. India Pakistan Conflicts: Ripe for Resolve? p. 21 
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they are sorted out good and proper. "3 This section begins with a brief outline of the 
political, linguistic, economic and ideological antagonisms between the two wing's of 
Pakistan as they emerged in March-April 1971 and will then discuss the conflict itself 
and India's involvement in it and the political and ideological reasons behind it. 
The political and governmental arrangements set up between the two wings of Pakistan 
were complex and in the view of the Bengali dominated East wing were wholltiy 
dominated by West Pakistan. Ganguly sums up relations between the two wings as one 
of, "fundamental social, economic and political inequity. "4 The following is an extract 
from Pakistani leader Mohammed Ayub Khan and gives a good insight into West 
Pakistan's perception of Bengalis. 
East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population, probably belong to the very 
original Indian races. It would be no exaggeration to say that up to the creation of 
Pakistan, they had not known any real freedom or sovereignty. They have been in turn 
ruled by the caste Hindus, Moghuls, Pathans, or the British. In addition they have been 
and are still under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence. As such they 
have all the inhibitions of downtrodden races and have not yet found it possible to 
adjust psychologically to the requirements of new-born freedom' 
This text which could have come from the pen of Thomas MacCaulay and has a distinct 
Orientalist tone to it, ironically comes from Ayub Khan's work entitled, Friends not 
Masters. It offers a blatant view as to the way Bengalis were perceived in West Pakistan 
and what is even more astonishing is that the book was published prior to the creation of 
Bangladesh. It is also noteworthy that Khan attributes what he regards as the political 
and cultural weakness of Bengalis to their long and continued association with a Hindu 
dominated culture. Brigadier Abdul Qadir head of the Inter Services Security 
Committee (ISSC) expressed similar views to Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, 
`Have you ever looked a Bengali in the eye? Have you noticed the hate in his eyes? ' he 
asked me and then went on to answer himself. `Perhaps they can't help it. Perhaps they 
are made that way. Centuries under the Hindu domination has made them bitter and 
suspicious, even of their own compatriots. '6 
Dhar, P. N. 2000. Indira Gandhi, the 'Emergency' and Indian Democracy. p. 152 
Ganguly, Sumit. 1994. The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947. p. 52 
Ayub Khan, Mohammed. 1967. Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography. p. 63 
6 Siddiqi, Abdul Rahman . 2004. The 
Endgame: An Onlookers Journal. p. 165 
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Soon after independence in 1947 the Bengalis made claim for greater involvement in 
the national polity, one of the most important points being that Bengali was accepted 
along with Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. Jinnah's Dhaka declaration in 
1948 scotched this important political aim for the East. This was compounded in 1952 
by Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin, himself a Bengali, reaffirming that Urdu would 
remain the national language of Pakistan, a reaffirmation which sparked the language 
riots as Bengalis became increasingly concerned that their much prized cultural and 
linguistic distinctiveness was to become submerged under Punjabi/Muhadjir. Urdu 
dominance. 7 
Coupled with important linguistic and cultural problems was the shape and 
methodology of governance. Here too there were serious misgivings in the East that 
once again political and cultural differences between the two wings of Pakistan were far 
greater than the theological unity of Islam. The basis of representation within the 
national parliament was to be established in the Constitution of Pakistan which was 
being drafted by the constituent assembly - an interim body made up of representatives 
elected to a predecessor assembly prior to partition, and drawn from the geographic 
areas that became Pakistan after partition. 
Sisson and Rose suggest that at this juncture the different political, cultural and 
representative differences between the two wings come into sharpest relief. 
West Pakistan feared constitutional domination by the Bengalis in a federal system that 
provided majority representation to a single province, 20 per cent of whose population 
was Hindu. To relieve this concern, groups in the west advanced the concepts of `parity' 
in representation between the two wings and of `separate electorates' for different 
religious populations, which the Bengalis perceived as sinister arrangements to reduce 
their representation and legislative influence 
8 
Lastly, the disbursement of financial and material benefits was skewed heavily in favour 
of West Pakistan and East Pakistan had a, "sense of having its wealth 
drained away by 
the central government, it also felt that the latter's disbursements 
for development 
For an account of the language riots, see Talukder Maniruzzaman, 1980. 
The Bangladesh Revolution 
and its Aftermath 
8 Sisson, Richard & Rose, Leo. 1990. War and Secession: Pakistan India and the Creation of 
Bangladesh. p. 10 
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purposes were going almost exclusively to West Pakistan. "9 The figures for economic 
benefits extended by the central government to the provinces between years 1947-55 
bear this out. For example, West Pakistan received Rs 2,100 millions for capital 
expenditure compared to Rs 620 millions in the East. The West received Rs 4.650 
millions for defence compared with Rs 100 millions in the East. 10 
Siddiq Salik recalls a meeting he had with several Bengali businessmen who 
complained bitterly to him about the political and economic disparities between the two 
wings. 
Look at the camouflage jute nets used by the army. Jute and Jute factories are here. But 
the goods must travel to West Pakistan for dyeing before they are issued to army units 
in East Pakistan. Nothing seems to be fit for East Pakistan unless it enjoys the sacred 
touch of West Pakistan. It is true of politicians and administrators as well as commercial 
goods. 11 
There were then serious political, economic and cultural problems between the t\vvo 
wings, problems which needed a political solution, but as Sisson and Rose point out the 
Pakistani military tended to, "ally itself politically with the western wing and also had 
unquestioned confidence in its already proven ability to control any form of political 
resistance by the temperamental Bengalis. " 12 It is not surprising therefore that when 
East Pakistan began to organise itself politically and in doing so pose a risk to the unity 
and integrity of Pakistan, the military would seek a military solution as opposed to a 
political one. This situation was compounded by the removal of Ayub Khan in March 
1969 and his replacement by the chief of army staff, Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. 
The catalyst for Ayub's removal was the failure of the roundtable conference to discuss 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's's six-point plan for greater autonomy for East Pakistan. The 
six-point programme essentially called for parliamentary democracy and adult 
franchise, a limiting of the powers of the federal government to areas of defence and 
foreign policy, provision for mutually convertible but separate currencies and the 
9 Lambert, Richard, `Factors in Bengali regionalism in Pakistan. ' in Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 28. No 4 
1959. pp. 49-58 
10 Dawn (Karachi), January 9,1956. This is despite the fact that throughout the same period the annual 
revenue of Punjab and East Bengal were about the same. Rs 246.2 million and Rs 234.5 million 
respectively. Keith Callard. Pakistan: A Political Study, p. 156 
Salk, Siddiq. 1977. Witness to Surrender. p. 7 
º` ibid. p. 9 
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ensuring of provincial control over fiscal and foreign exchange earnings. "Sheikh 
Mujib's political party the Awarni League had been pushing for the political changes 
above. 
After taking office Yahya committed the government to free and fair elections across 
the two wings of Pakistan to be held in October 1970. In January the same year, Yahva 
passed Martial Law Regulation permitting the resumption of political activity and other 
ordinances soon followed allowing public gatherings for electoral purposes. '4 After 
much discussion with his inner circle Yahya issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO) 
in March 1970. This document held five key principles that would guide and inform the 
political arrangements which emerged from the elections. These included a ruling that 
the constitution would be based on the ideology of Islam, federal and provincial 
elections would be based on universal adult franchise, a democratic constitution would 
be introduced, statutory provision would be made to seek to end differences between 
East and West Pakistan and that the various provinces of the state would have 
maximum autonomy without compromising territorial security. 
Finally and crucially the LFO gave Yahya as President the right to overrule the National 
Assembly if it drafted a constitutional arrangement that was not to his liking. This 
notwithstanding, Fazal Muqueem Khan suggests that the regime had misjudged the 
amount of popular support the Awami League enjoyed in the East. Its intelligence 
reports estimated that at best the League could win sixty to seventy seats, in the event. 
and running on a firm commitment to implement the six-point plan, the League won 
every seat it contested in East Pakistan winning 160 seats out of 162.15 
There then followed discussions between the Awami League, Bhutto's PPP and Yahya 
(the PPP had also done well winning 88 seats from a possible 138), however talks 
reached stalemate with Bhutto refusing to share power and Mujib unable to get his six- 
point plan taken into account by the National Assembly. J. M Dixit suggests that. 
"Bhutto could not conceive of a Bengali becoming Prime Minister. Even more 
important he could not conceive of anyone but himself becoming the Prime Minister of 
13 Rehman, Sheikh Mujibur, 1972. Bangladesh, My Bangladesh. p. 130-145 
1A For a thorough examination of the political parties and their respective positions, see G. W Choudhur), 
1974. The last Days of United Pakistan 
15 Khan, Fazal Muqueem, 1973. Pakistan's Crisis of Leadership 
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Pakistan. " 16 Yahya thus cancelled the National Assembly meeting and speaking on 
radio said, 
The position briefly is that the major party of West Pakistan, namely the Pakistan's 
Peoples Party, as well as certain other political parties, have declared their intention not 
to attend the National Assembly session on the third of March 1971. In addition. the 
ge 1 neral situation of tension created by India has further complicated the whole position 7 
But Bhutto was not alone in struggling to come to terms with the electoral success of 
the Awami League, throughout the campaign Yahya had clung to the belief that there 
would be no overall winner leaving the President with the role of political broker. This 
however is contested by Choudhury who argues that Yahya believed the Awwwami League 
would win in East Pakistan but was assured by Mujib that he would modify his six- 
point plan after the election. '8 Ian Talbot suggests that a miscalculation in electoral 
support might be down to Yahya's expectation of greater support amongst the parties 
sympathetic to his regime, chief among these being the Muslim League that had been 
formed by the former Chief Minister of the Frontier Abdul Qayyum Khan. 19 
Miscalculation may have simply come down to the fact that the Pakistan military and 
intelligence services had little knowledge, interest or experience of electoral politics and 
analysis of polling evidence. However, with the chances of a political settlement 
disappearing the military launched `Operation Searchlight' on March 25`h 1971 and a 
bloody civil conflict ensued which would end the uneasy relationship between the two 
wings of Pakistan and bring about the emergence of Bangladesh. In response to 
Operation Searchlight, Syed Nazrul Islam, acting President of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh (in Calcutta) said, "We are now in the middle of a war of liberation. We 
cannot rest until we eliminate every alien soldier from our soil. "20 
16 Dixit, J. N. 1995. Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance. p. 21 
17 The Pakistan Observer. 2/3/1971 
18 Choudhury. Op Cit. p. 128 
19 Talbot, Ian. 1998. Pakistan: A Modern History. pp. 195-196 
, The Hindustan Times. (New Delhi) 217/1971 
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Indian Involvement in East Pakistan 
The flight of an estimated 9.2 million refugees from East Pakistan into Indian Ben,., ýi1 
and Assam posed a serious threat to political stability in India. The refiuý, ce crisis also 
presented India with an opportunity to act against East Pakistan and undermine the 
philosophical justification for Pakistan by demonstrating that the bond of Islam was not 
sufficient justification for the existence of Pakistan. 
Such an undermining of two-nation theory in the East would also dama(, c Pakis<<lni 
claims to Kashmir because the Pakistani claim to Kashmir is also based on this 
ideology. Ganguly sums up the material and ideational calculation being weighed up by 
New Delhi. "Indian decision makers saw an excellent moment to not only materially 
weaken Pakistan in a war but also to attack its very ideological foundation. ' 21 The 
former Indian foreign secretary and Ambassador to Pakistan J. N Dixit alludes to similar 
aspirations. 
If the people of East Pakistan because of their socio-ethnic and linguistic considerations 
and in the face of the obstinate negation of their aspirations. wished secession from 
Pakistan and independence, India had no objection. If Indian endorsement and support 
resulted in this new entity being friendly to India, it was all to the good. A non-hostile 
Bangladesh instead of a hostile East Pakistan was considered desirable. Giv eil the 
encouragement being offered off and on to the centrifugal forces in India's north-easter» 
states from East Pakistani bases it was natural for India to support the liberation 
movement. 22 
India was not in a kill or be killed scenario and the refugee crisis. although a se'. ere 
strain on the resources of the state. could not be described as a threat to the survival of 
the state. However, not being in danger of being killed did not prevent India from trvino 
to kill the concept of two-nation theory and this chapter argues that this is precisely 
what India did. 
Op Cit. P. 52 
22 Digit, J. N. Op Cit. pp. 2 
3-2 4 
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Enemies are constituted by representations of the other who does not recognise the right 
of the self to exist as an autonomous entity and therefore will not willingly limit its 
violence toward the self. Herein lies the important distinction between a limited conflict 
where the self is merely trying to reach a specific objective (Kashmir). and an enemy 
culture which does not recognise the right of the self to exist and thus seeks to revise the 
latter's life and liberty. Rival and enemy both, "impute to the Other aggressive intent. 
but the enemy's intentions are unlimited in nature, the rivals are limited. '-23 
The theoretical distinction is an important one because it distinguishes between two 
different levels of violence, limited and unlimited and this chapter argues that whereas 
the numerous conflicts in Kashmir have been limited to Kashmir and indeed the sole 
objective has been about Kashmir, the 1971 conflict is different because India sought a 
deep revisionism in East Pakistan and used violence, not to achieve a specific territorial 
objective, but to remove East Pakistan from the political map of South Asia and in 
doing so, undermine two-nation theory and the philosophical justification for Pakistan 
to exist. 
In 1971 India was an existential threat to the justification and raison d'etre of Pakistan, 
however, it is important to emphasis that the other does not have to be a real existential 
threat to the self. Enemies are real in the sense that the self believes them to be real. The 
difference between them might affect the dynamics of enmity and whether it can be 
overcome, but it does not affect the reality of Hobbesian cultures. Will Hutton 
demonstrates the difference between reality and perception within the context of an 
emerging China, 
There is a Panglossian tendency to overstate oil reserves by oil producing countries and 
oil companies alike, as we have learned from Shell. Oil production is set to peak much 
earlier in any case what matters is less reality than perceptions of reality; the European 
powers didn't need colonies in Africa to ensure their prosperity, they just believed they 
did as China believes it needs oil reserves in Asia today. And there are the third, fifth 
and seventh US fleets as a constant reinforcer of its instincts. 
24 
23 Wendt. Op Cit. pp. 260-261. Wendt suggests that enemy images have a long pedigree suggesting that 
medieval Europeans feared defeat at Liegnitz at the hands of the Mongals 
heralded Armageddon and 
in the twentieth century, the holocaust, Northern Ireland and Pol Pot are examples of the Other being 
intent on destroying or enslaving the self. 
24 The Observer. (London) 3/7/05 
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There are several important implications of the Hobbesian culture if states enter into this 
culture. The theoretical point here is that states learn this process or cultural norm and 
that it comes from inter-subjectivity, not from the international system and derivative 
self help system. First, states will tend to respond by acting like revisionist states 
themselves, thus a status quo state has an interest in becoming a revisionist state. 
Once a state has entered into this culture or mind set, possibilities as opposed to 
probabilities dominate the policy making process. Relative military strength is seen as 
crucial because enmity gives capability a particular meaning and this meaning comes, 
not from the system or from the intrinsic materialism of weaponry, but from the 
Hobbesian structure of the relationship constructed between states. Lastly, states will be 
prepared to act pre-emptively, observing no limits on their own violence, especially if 
offensive weapons and technology is available. The added element is the materialism of 
nuclear technology and the interpretation or meaning each state attaches to the others 
possession of powerful offensive weapons. 
Within a culture of enemy the possibility of pre-emptive action becomes a real 
possibility if one state (in particular Pakistan) believes its right to exist is being 
challenged. In 1971 Pakistan's right to exist, at least in its pre-1971 formation, was 
challenged and was revised, the net result being the separation of the two wings of 
Pakistan and the undermining of two-nation theory; 1971 was both a territorial and 
philosophical defeat for West Pakistan. 
From an Indian perspective one must ask, what was the meaning India attached to the 
1971 conflict and the reasons for prosecuting this conflict? Was it, as has been 
discussed in the past, a response to a refugee crisis? Or did India act because it saw an 
opportunity for a deep revisionist strike on Pakistan? As Maya Chadda observes, the 
Indian role, "went well beyond humanitarian concerns, " but to get to grips with this 
question we have to look at the process that led to Indian involvement. 
25 
By late spring of 1971 a set of decisions had been made by the Gandhi government that, 
"set a framework for Indian policy thereafter. " The 
first was the return of all refugees to 
25 Chadda, Maya. 2005. `international Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict, ' in Devin Hagerty eds. South Asia 
in World Politics. pp. 187-212 
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East Pakistan and the Delhi government made it clear that any peaceful solution that did 
not provide for this would be unacceptable, furthermore the government would seek 
`credible guarantees' for their future safety and well being. The second objective was 
the transfer of power to the Awami League, either within the confines of a Pakistani 
federation or in a newly independent state. Third, military force would be used, initially 
indirectly through the Mukti Bahini, but if that proved unsuccessful, through direct 
involvement of Indian forces. 26 Lastly, political and diplomatic efforts would be made to 
internationalise the civil conflict and the refugee crisis. This then formed the basis from 
which India would seek a settlement in East Pakistan and, New Delhi was intent on 
trying all of them to find a solution that met Indian requirements. " 27 
Just as Pakistan attempted to internationalise the Kashmir question, so India attempted 
to do the same on the East Pakistan question and Indira Gandhi dispatched a succession 
of diplomatic and political representatives around the world to Europe, North America 
and Asia. The message was the need to pressurise the Pakistan government into 
accepting a political solution acceptable to the Awami League. In a speech in parliament 
on 24tß' May 1971 Gandhi said, "if the world does not take heed, we shall be constrained 
to take all measures as may be necessary to insure our own security and the preservation 
and developments of the structure of our social and economic life. "28 Gandhi was 
careful not to use the official UN code for military conflict, `all necessary means', 
opting instead for the strikingly similar, `all measures as may be necessary. ' 
The general reaction in foreign capitals was to remonstrate with Rawalpindi about its 
excessive use of force in the East, but then to back off regarding it as an internal matter. 
Delhi responded to this lack of international commitment by, "substantially expanding 
its support of the Bangladeshi resistance forces and by raising the prospect of direct 
Indian military intervention. "29 Moreover in a series of public statements senior 
members of the cabinet began to talk of war if Pakistani policy towards the east did not 
change. For example in June defence minister Jagjivan Ram suggested that, "war may 
be thrust upon us, " if Rawalpindi did not change course. 
30 In the same month Foreign 
26 The Mukti Bahini (liberation force) was initially called the Mukti Fauj (liberation army) 
27 Sission & Rose, 1990. War & Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh. p. 187 
28 Gandhi, Indira. 1972. India and Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements. p. 18 
29 Sission and Rose. Op Cit. pp. 186-187 
30 National Herald. (New Delhi) 21/6/1971 
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Minister Swaran Singh bluntly stated, "India may be forced to take action on its own, if 
no political solution could be found. "31 In July the Prime Minister stated that. "unless 
conditions were created in East Bengal offering security to life and property for the 
refugees they could not go back. Pakistan assurances were ridiculous and meaningless 
because they were not even now prepared to end the massacre. '''' 
By October Jagjivan Ram explicitly talked of "independence to Bangladesh. " Pakistan. 
he said had "squeezed out" eight million people and, "this kind of aggression is more 
serious and more detrimental to India than armed aggression. "33 The tactic was to invite 
the international community to assist and if it was not able or willing to assist, then 
India would act alone. The tactic forced other states to show their hand, and it worked. 
While supporting the guerrilla activities of the Mukti Bahini and preparing to use its 
own conventional forces Indian diplomacy sought to internationalise the issue and 
encourage the intervention of the UN to assist in coping with the refugee crisis. Robert 
Jackson writes, "the Indian government knew that, as the exodus of refugees continued, 
it was acquiring a powerful hold over Pakistan by becoming a necessary party to any 
settlement: for the definition of `credible guarantees' lay very largely in Indian 
hands. "34 In other words, the refugee crisis allowed India to successfully argue that the 
numbers of refugees entering India negated Pakistan's contention that the crisis was an 
internal matter and, more worrying for Rawalpindi was the increasing influence Delhi 
was able to assert, given that those fleeing East Pakistan sought refuge in India. 
However, India soon became a victim of its own diplomatic success. It had used the 
refugee crisis primarily as a way of getting international pressure put on Pakistan 
arguing that the influx of refugees had become an internal Indian problem and this 
moreover had been the basis of Indian demands for a UN presence in East Pakistan. But 
by the end of May Pakistan's position began to change with an acceptance of a UN 
presence in East Pakistan. This according to Jackson signalled India's departure from 
the UN process because the, "Indians saw that the kind of settlement they thought 
" The Hindu. (Calcutta) 26/611971 
32 The Hindustan Times. (New Delhi) 4/7/1971 
33 Times of India, 5 October 1971. Cited in Mishra, Guiab. 1987. Indo-Pakistan 
Relations: From 
Tashkent Agreement to the Simla Agreement. pp. 326-327 
34 Jackson, Robert 1975. South Asian Crisis: India Pakistan Bangladesh. p. 60 
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appropriate could not be obtained through the United Nations. "" Choudhury shares this 
view, pointing out that India, "repeatedly refused to allow UN observers to facilitate the 
return of refugees to their homes. India insisted that only after a political settlement. 
which must be the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of a new country, could 
the refugees return. 36 
There was considerable worry in Delhi as to the validity of the Mukti Bahini and the 
political viability and credibility of the Awami League, or at least concern over its 
viability without its figurehead Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. However by the end of May 
Delhi was well aware of and impressed by the, "intensity and the breadth of the 
opposition to the Pakistan government in East Pakistan and concluded that with some 
encouragement and assistance, the resistance could be sustained to the point where the 
price Islamabad had to pay would become too high. "37 
This is important given the difficulties encountered by Pakistan in 1965, when having 
launched Operation Grand Slam they discovered they had greatly miscalculated the 
reaction of Kashmiris in the valley, who did not assist the Pakistani forces in ejecting 
India from Kashmir. Delhi was clearly not prepared to make the same mistake. Sitting 
and waiting throughout May, June and July was important for India and allowed them to 
both assess the reaction and success the Mutki Bahini forces were having in East 
Pakistan, but also it allowed Delhi the diplomatic breathing space to assess the likely 
reaction/intervention of foreign powers, not least the United States who enjoyed good 
relations with Pakistan. It was the relationship between Pakistan and America Indira 
Gandhi had in mind when she stated, "They are offering us a little money for the 
refugees, but at the same time they are supplying arms to Pakistan. "38 
A treaty of peace and friendship between the USSR and India had been in the offing for 
some considerable time and the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was 
signed in Delhi on 9`" August 1971. The treaty itself is a wide-ranging document in 
which India and the Soviet Union agree to continue to fight against colonialism and 
strive for its eventual elimination (article III). To continue all economic, scientific and 
3s ibid. p. 61 
36 Choudhury, G. W 1974. The Last Days of United Pakistan. p. 213 
37 Sission and Rose. Op Cit. p. 152 
38 The Hindustan Times. 4/7/1971 
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technological cooperation between them (article VII). Of most interest here is article 
XII which states, 
Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this treaty that may arise 
between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a 
spirit of mutual respect and understanding. 39 
There were differences of interpretation of the treaty, India (and Pakistan) regarding it 
as vitally important prior to any military conflict in East Pakistan offering India 
diplomatic and military cover against any Chinese or American involvement. The 
timing was also important, coming just four months before India began overt military 
action in East Pakistan. This was not just a happy coincidence for New Delhi and as 
Zubeida Mustafa correctly observes, "Without tacit support of the Kremlin, it is 
unlikely that Mrs. Gandhi's government would have sustained since its inception the 
guerrilla movement in East Bengal and pursued its policy vis-a-vis `Bangla Desh' -40 
There is still debate about just how far the Soviets were prepared to go in accordance 
with the treaty and article XII cited above appears to give them room for manoeuvre. 
Mustafa maintains that India committed military force with, both Moscow's knowledge 
and with its, "specific approval . "41 Ashok Kapur argues that although India was clearly 
able to use the treaty to its advantage during the conflict, "it is by no means clear that 
the Soviet sponsors of the treaty wanted it to be used in this manner. , 42 The debate 
revolves around cold war politics and how the Treaty impacted on the balance of power 
in the region. Robert Donaldson points out that negotiations for the treaty had begun 
two years prior to its eventual signing in an atmosphere of "sharp Sino-Soviet conflict 
and splits in Mrs Gandhi's ruling party... undoubtedly, it is in the context of `collective 
security' against the Chinese that the main thrust of the Soviet-Indian treaty must be 
viewed. 543 Without question, the treaty removed a concern of the Delhi government that 
39 For a copy of the treaty see Ganguly. Op Cit. pp. 164-167 
40 Mustafa, Zubeida, The USSR and the Indo-Pakistan War, 1971, in Pakistan Horizon Vol. 25. No's I- 
4. pp. 45-52.1972 
41 ibid. pp. 45-52 
''` Kapur, Ashok, Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance, in Asian Survev. Vol. 12. No. 6 
pp. 463-474.1972 
43 Donaldson, Robert, India: The Soviet Stake in Stability in Asian Survey. Vol. 12. No. 6. pp. 475-492. 
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the Chinese would become involved in the conflict and the treat, greatly diminished 
this prospect. 
The Indo-Soviet treaty shored up India's eastern flank and the influx of refugees 
allowed Delhi to test international opinion and the likelihood, or not, of foreign 
intervention should India carry out a conventional military strike. Furthermore the 
particularly severe monsoon season of 1971, wrought considerable damage to the 
vulnerable alluvial plains of East Pakistan and government incompetence in alleviating 
its consequences served to further alienate the East from the West. 
The issue of what to do with the influx of refugees became enmeshed in the ideological 
antagonism between India and Pakistan, for Delhi any settlement that did not 
specifically include the return of all refugees - Muslim and Hindu alike - would not be 
accepted. Conversely Pakistan was uninterested in any settlement that meant the return 
of the `traitorous' Hindu Bengalis and Yahya declared at a press conference that, `'the so 
called refugees in the Indian camps were Indian destitutes masquerading as Pakistani 
refugees. While he would be most willing to take back `my refugees' he would not 
accept the impoverished Indians. "44 
The refugee question then became a major and ultimately unassailable barrier to a 
settlement, thus, "making a military solution appear to be the only realistic option to 
both sides. "45 Furthermore, in India there was a growing fear that the Pakistani army 
under General Tikka Khan was deliberately seeking to expel the Hindu community in 
the hope of redressing the balance of population and ideology between the two wings of 
Pakistan. Concern might have been heightened by the fact that Lieutenant-General 
Tikka Khan had earned himself the nick-name, the `butcher of Baluchistan' for his 
handling of the Baluchistan crisis mentioned in the previous chapter. 
46 By the end of 
June, the exodus of refugees fleeing East Pakistan into India had reached an estimated 
seven million people. 47 
41 Siddiqi, Abdul Rahman. 2004. The Endgame: An Onlookers Journal. p. 159 
as Sission and Rose. Op Cit. p. 148 
46 Dhar, P. N. 2000. Indira Gandhi: The Emergency and Indian DemocracY. p. 151 
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Under a Hobbesian culture states see only worst-case scenarios, possibility becomes 
probability and relative military strength is used to calculate the risk of attack. The 
other's military ability to destroy the self becomes the intention of the enemy. military 
capability to attack, becomes the probability that the self will be attacked. This 
heightened sense of threat perception can be seen by the reaction in Pakistan to an 
article written by Subrahmanyam, the director of the Institute of Defence Studies and 
Analysis (IDSA). Published in the National Herald the article argues, "What India must 
realize is the fact that the break up of Pakistan is in our interest, an opportunity the like 
of which will never come again. "48 The latter phrase became infamous amongst 
Pakistani intellectuals, press and government as clear evidence of Indian intervention 
and proof of a Hindu plot to destroy, first East Pakistan and then West Pakistan. 
It fed into the perception in Pakistan that India had never accepted the foundation or 
justification for Pakistan and this perception has fed into what this thesis refers to as the 
fourth idiom. Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz provides a further example. 
"Pakistan is not in any arms race, nor does it want to launch a military offensive against 
any country. However, a tit for tat response will be given if any external power casts an 
evil eye on our country .,, 
49 The hyperbolic reaction Subrahmaniyam's comment caused 
in Pakistan is however matched by Ganguly's assessment of the 71 conflict that it 
represented both, "a threat and an opportunity, " for New Delhi. '° 
It is worth noting that Subrahmanyam's comments made it into the Hamoodur Rehmau 
report, an inquiry set up by Pakistan to examine the conflict. Also cited in the report 
was an article by Subramaniam Swamy, originally published in June 1971 in the Indian 
daily Motherland it reads "the break up of Pakistan is not only in our external security 
interest but also in our internal security interest... for this the dismemberment of 
Pakistan is an essential precondition. , 51 
There are some striking parallels to be drawn out of the way Pakistan behaved prior to 
the 1965 conflict and the way India behaved prior to the 1971 conflict. When these two 
states break the status quo they follow similar patterns, both tried to 
internationalise the 
48 Subrahrnaniyam, K. Cited in G. W Choudury. 1974. The Last Days of United Pakistan. p. 211 
49 Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, cited in the Hindustan Times. 20 7/05 
so Ganguly. Op Cit. p. 72 
S' The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 
War. 1972. p. 135 
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conflict, both allowed their own states to be used as training grounds for insurgency 
forces and ultimately both states are prepared to use their own conventional znilitar`, 
force against the other, but to what ends? 
In 1971 India was prepared to use military force to remove East Pakistan from the 
political map of South Asia, albeit, after some nimble diplomatic and political 
manoeuvres. Aside from the question as to the nature of violence there is a further 
implication to be drawn from the two different approaches to military conflict. In 1965 
Pakistan relied heavily - and in the event too heavily - on wishful thinking as to how 
their Muslim brethren in the valley would react to their overtures of liberation and on a 
false supposition of their martial superiority and on what one former Pakistani diplomat 
described as memories of " Moghal glory. ))52 
India did not regard itself as being in a kill or be killed mode, India was not in mortal 
danger as a sovereign entity, although its eastern borders were being fractured by the 
influx of refugees. Militarily, 1971 was a Hobbesian kill in the sense that East Pakistan 
as a political entity ceased to exist, but politically and diplomatically it was a calculated 
risk. The hypothesis that there might be foreign intervention had to be thoroughly tested 
by Delhi, prior to a conventional military commitment and India needed to assure itself 
that it was materially capable of achieving its objective. 
An interventionist approach early in 1971 would certainly have been condemned by the 
international community, therefore Delhi placed great emphasis on, "the dirty of the 
international community to bring pressure to bear on Pakistan for a political solution 
that met East Pakistani (and Indian) demands. " From the beginning there were few in 
Delhi who believed other countries would respond, "nevertheless the Government of 
India considered it necessary to provide the international community with the 
opportunity to act particularly since India could not do much itself at this stage of 
developments .,, 
53 In other words Delhi calculated (correctly) that the risk of foreign 
intervention could be negated by first allowing other states to forego their 'duty' prior to 
full Indian military involvement. 
52 Interview. London. July 2005 
53 Sission and Rose. Op Cit. pp. 151-152 
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There were limitations constraining, not the nature of violence, but the timing of the use 
of violence. The first is Indian concerns of intervention by other powers, namely China 
and America. These concerns were offset by Indian diplomatic efforts to internationalise 
the refugee crisis and allow UN or foreign intervention prior to committing itself 
militarily. 
Indian concerns and constraints revolved around what China and America would do in 
the event of an Indian military move into East Pakistan and whether the Indian state had 
sufficient material means to achieve its objective, namely, the elimination of East 
Pakistan as a political entity. These were the two existential variables constraining Delhi 
prior to military conflict. 
This has important implications for the politics of South Asia and brings us back to 
Cohen's realist idealist conundrum. Comparative military weakness constrained India 
but if India continues to develop economically, this will change. Wendt writes, 
"Violence between enemies has no internal limits; whatever internal limits exist will be 
due solely to inadequate capabilities (a balance of power or exhaustion) or the presence 
of an external constraint (Leviathan). "54 In the case of India in 1971 these constraints 
were entirely external residing in concerns of material means and the balance of power. 
For so long as Kashmir and its concomitant historical debate remain top of the India 
Pakistan analysis agenda the relationship between ideational antagonism and material 
constraints will continue to go under theorised. This is an unhealthy state of affairs 
given that material constraints on the subcontinent (particularly in India) will continue 
to wane. If material capability catches up with ideational antagonism the results could 
be dire for South Asia. 
Constructivism pre-supposes that materialism is informed and changed by ideas and 
inter subjective cultures, both good cultures and bad ones. In Indo-Pakistan relations the 
materialism side of the equation continues to grow in the shape of military and nuclear 
escalation. On the ideational side, a mutually antagonistic culture remains. fluctuating 
between rival and enemy. 
sa Wendt. Op Cit. p. 261 
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Prior to the conflict itself Indian political and diplomatic energies were expended to 
offset these external constraints and to clear the way for a military attack on East 
Pakistan. Thus, on 3rd December, Indira Gandhi broadcast on radio, "Today the \v-ar on 
Bangladesh has become a war on India. This has imposed upon me, my government and 
the people of India a great responsibility. We have no other option but to put our 
country on a war footing. "55 The resort to military means lasted fourteen days until the 
two wings of Pakistan had been inexorably separated. 
In 1965 Pakistan was far more interested in ideological antagonism than material 
limitations. It was a limited conflict justified in ideological terms and fought on the 
basis of the majority Muslim state of Kashmir should belong to the Muslim state of 
Pakistan - the home for the Muslims of South Asia. It was ideological first and material 
second. In 1971 India fought a conflict that was limited by externally imposed 
materialism, however once those material constraints were removed Delhi used 
whatever amount of violence it required to secure its objective. Pakistan is more 
inclined to be driven by ideological means than material means, its behaviour in 1965 
demonstrates a greater need to display or be driven by the ideological basis on which it 
was founded. In 1971, India was limited by its relative military power and its material 
capabilities. 
The remainder of this section will look at how this military objective was secured. The 
chapter will then move on to discuss the May 1998 period when India tested a nuclear 
device at Pokharan and was followed a few days later by Pakistan. This is an important 
aspect of relations, not only due to the obvious dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also 
because of the meaning of nuclear power in South Asia. It will be argued here that this 
increase in material capability of the two states is dangerous for the region given the 
ideational meaning India and Pakistan will attach to the other's nuclear capability and 
that the meaning of nuclear weapons and power in South Asia is very different to the 
meaning it had in the West during the cold war. 
The events of 1971 and 1998 are 
connected it will be argued because, if a 1971 conflict were to occur again. 
India 
5' The 14-Dav War. 1972. p. 7 
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Pakistan relations would very quickly escalate into a nuclear stand off which could end 
in a nuclear exchange. 
Conclusion of 1971 Conflict 
On 10tß' December Indira Gandhi announced to the Indian parliament that West 
Pakistani troops had surrendered. 
The West Pakistan forces have unconditionally surrendered in Bangla Desh. The 
instrument of surrender was signed in Dacca at 16.31 hours IST today by Lt. Gen. 
A. A. K Niazi on behalf of the Pakistan Eastern command. Lt. Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora. 
GOC-in-C of the Indian and Bangla Desh forces in Eastern Theatre accepted the 
surrender. Dacca is now the free capital of a free country. 56 
The Prime Minister's statement was short, unusually short in the circumstances, 
however Gandhi still managed to press home the Indian government's justification for 
conflict - the refugee crisis. "Our objectives were limited - to assist the gallant people 
of Bangla Desh and their Mukti Bahini to liberate their country from a reign of terror 
and to resist aggression on our own land. "57 Assisting the Mukti Bahini to 'liberate' 
their country had also led to the inexorable division of Pakistan, the termination of East 
Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh and as G. W Choudhury points out, Her 
intervention in the Bangladesh crisis within forty-eight hours of its inception on March 
25 1971, when not a single refugee had gone to India, could hardly be described merely 
as furthering a desire to restore the `democratic rights' of the Bengalis. "58 
In the last paragraph of her statement, the Prime Minister expressed her hope that the 
"Father of this new nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will take his rightful place among 
his own people and lead Bangladesh to peace, progress and prosperity. "59 Mentioning 
Rahman was important because there was a concern in New Delhi that having 
terminated East Pakistan a Bengali nationalism might emerge that would spread from 
Bangladesh into West Bengal. The Indians were concerned that if the vacuum created 
by the demise of East Pakistan was not filled by the Sheikh Mujib and the Awami 
56 Gandhi, Indira. 1971. Statement by the Prime Minister in parliament. The /-l-Day War. Publications 
Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. p. 60 
57 ibid. p. 60-61 
58 Choudhury, G. W. 1974. The Last Days of United Pakistan. p. 203 
59 The 14-Day War. Op Cit. p. 61 
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League, it would be filled by others. The Indian government knew that many, in the 
provincial government residing in Calcutta did not enjoy the complete confidence of 
Sheikh Mujib, who having been arrested in March was still in jail in West Pakistan 
running the risk that the Awami League might lose the political leadership of the 
resistance movement leaving it to the splintered factions of the Mukti Bahini. 6o 
There is no smoking gun or smoking document about Indian intentions in East Pakistan, 
or at least none has yet emerged from the bowels of South block, or Indira Gandhi's 
personal papers. What we do know however is that East Pakistan ceased to exist after 
the surrender of West Pakistan and that the two-nation theory was dealt a severe, if not 
terminal blow. Despite Mrs Gandhi's insistence on the question of refugees, we do 
know the outcome of the 1971 conflict. It was the use of military force to bring about 
political change in another sovereign state. Whilst the millions of refugees that did 
come to India provided both legal cover and an extremely strong diplomatic hand which 
the Indians played with great skill, it also provided a political opportunity that could 
only be obtained through the use of violence. Violence that was not limited to achieve a 
specific territorial objective, but unlimited to bring about the demise of East Pakistan. 
As Choudhury points out, "at no time in recent history have the internal affairs of one 
country been used to justify the invasion and dismemberment of another. , 61 
Under a Hobbesian culture a state fights because it believes rightly or wrongly that it 
must kill or be killed, the 1971 conflict is culturally more dangerous than this. India 
fought an unlimited conflict, not because it thought it would be killed, but because the 
opportunity was there for the taking - the use of unlimited violence coming out of 
opportunity must be regarded as being more dangerous than when violence comes out 
of a perceived necessity. This begs the question, when will one state or the other, see an 
opportunity? Acting on a perceived opportunity as Pakistan did in 1965 and as India did 
in 1971 would without question damage the current attempts to introduce confidence- 
building measures and possibly bring about a return to military conflict. This lends a 
dangerous unpredictability to security in South Asia. 
60 For an excellent discussion on relations between the Awami League and the Mukti 
Bahini and the role 
played by Mujib's so-called `khalifas' see P. N Dhar. 2000. 
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The dangers of this unpredictability come into sharp relief if we examine Pakistan'` 
assessment of Indian objectives prior to the 1971 conflict. Siddiq Salik argues that 
Pakistani strategists assessed that, "India aimed at nothing higher than capturing a 
sizable chunk of territory to establish Bangla Desh so that she could shift the 
headquarters of the Bangla Desh government from Calcutta to East Pakistan and 
transfer the bulk of her refugee burden to the liberated area. It would be a constant 
irritant for Pakistan - much to the relief of India. That is all we had by way of strategic 
anticipation. "62 
Salik suggests that Pakistani troops were deployed in order to prevent India achieving 
this objective, however, "India did not unleash her mighty war machine to slice off any 
sizeable territory. She knew this would mean total war. And this she did not want unless 
she had tied up all loose ends. She therefore worked on limited objective of aiding the 
rebels wearing down our troops and establishing bridgeheads. 13 
According to an authoritative source who defected from the Pakistan High Commission, 
"the loss of Bangla Desh in the event of an all out war with India was an accepted fact. 
Whenever the security of East Pakistan was raised at conferences discussing a war with 
India, the immediate answer from the military junta was to the effect that the future of 
East Pakistan would be decided on the plains of Delhi. The implication being that East 
Pakistan would fall, but so would Delhi. "64 In this context Pakistan was half right, East 
Pakistan fell, but Delhi clearly did not. This assessment was made presumably on the 
basis of Pakistan's over estimation of their own ability and under estimation of India's 
ability. 
By the time of the Simla negotiations East Pakistan did not exist and is not mentioned in 
the Simla agreement signed between India and Pakistan on 2"d July 1972. Cohen likens 
the Simla agreement to a famous Buddhist tale of a Prince who, tired of his advisers 
arguing amongst themselves blindfolds them and introduces them to an elephant. One. 
having touched the animal's leg likened it to a tree, another holds a tusk and likens it to 
a spear and another grabbed its trunk and likened it to a snake. 
62 Salik, Siddiq. 1977. Witness to Surrender. P. 123 
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The Simla agreement argues Cohen, is a "perfect elephant - with mane theories 
purporting to explain what it really was about. "6" The 'spirit of Simla' as it has been 
called many times, has taken on many different meanings to mane different individuals 
with two politicised versions, one belonging to India, the other to Pakistan, it is a term 
that owes its longevity to alliteration more than to a careful reading of the document. "''" 
However, the new state of Bangladesh had a new political leadership under Rahman and 
the Awami League, plans for a new constitution for Bangladesh were underway- and 
perhaps most importantly the new leader of Bangladesh was pressing Delhi to link the 
release of (west) Pakistani troops to Pakistan formally recognising Bangladesh as a 
sovereign state. 
In his memoir on the Simla negotiations P. N Dhar writes, '`Mujib was unwilling to let 
the POW's go without Bangladesh being recognised as an independent state by Pakistan 
- he quite rightly refused to negotiate except on the basis of sovereign equality. 
Moreover, Mujib announced that some of the Pakistani POW's were to be tried for tivvar 
crimes, this demand was dropped under the auspices of the Tripartite Agreement signed 
in 1974, but the most important point here is Mujib's insistence to couple the release of 
POW's to Pakistan recognising Bangladeshi sovereignty because it demonstrates that 
East Pakistan had been terminated and that its new leadership was attempting to use 
POW's in exchange for sovereign recognition. 
68 
A reading of Simla reveals an anodyne document replete with diplomatic niceties as to 
the future of India Pakistan relations and a perfunctory list of undertakings as to the 
exchange of POW's and withdrawal of troops to their sides of the 
international border - 
this particular part of the text refers only to the northern Indo-Pakistan 
border. The 
agreement ends with an undertaking for the "establishment of a 
durable peace and 
normalisation of relations, " between the two states. 
69 
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The spirit of Simla grew up out of meetings between Gandhi and Bhutto during the 
Simla negotiations in which the two politicians agreed to work gradually to transform 
the LOC into a legal sovereign border, but a careful reading of the document 
demonstrates that no such agreement was actually documented. Dhar gives a succinct 
account of how the good intentions of Simla came to naught. 
In his desire to neutralize India's superiority in conventional warfare. Bhutto had 
embarked on a nuclear arms programme in 1972. The explosion of an atomic device by 
India on 18th May 1974 gave him an excuse to postpone the resumption of 
communications, travel and trade arrangements. 70 
The thesis argued in chapter two that Pakistan was heavily reliant on its ideological 
justification that led it to ignore or disregard its own material capabilities to secure its 
objective in 1965. In 1971 India demonstrated a greater material awareness of whether 
or not it had the tools to do the job. In other words it was prepared to use violence to 
fracture the two wings of Pakistan, but took a more cautious political and diplomatic 
approach. But with increased material capability and in particular nuclear proliferation, 
India's ideological justification, or ideational foundation may well supersede its 
material capability. As Simla demonstrates, ideas and intersubjectivity soon proved 
greater than diplomatic niceties and good intentions. 
The important question can now be posed, why didn't India move into Pakistan in 
1965? Or, how would India and Pakistan respond today if an East Pakistan conflict 
arose? The short answer to the first question is that India did move into Pakistan in 
1965, much to the horror of the military planners in Islamabad. Clearly though India did 
not launch a military campaign beyond that of a limited conflict and territory it gained 
in 1965 was returned under the Tashkent treaty. 
A more substantial answer lies in the transience of anarchy and a change between the 
self and the other. This transient dynamic can be seen in the different levels of violence 
used in the 1965 and 1971 conflicts as India began to come to terms with the fact that 
Pakistan had not, as widely predicted, ceased to exist. During the early days of partition 
the expectation had been that partition had to be accepted in order to speed up the 
departure of the British, and as Alistair Lamb argues as outlined in the previous chapter. 
70 ibid. pp. 211-212 
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prior to independence Nehru only went along with such `absurdity-' in order to speed up 
Britain's departure from South Asia. 
In a letter to the Chief Ministers in November 1947 Nehru compares the tactics of the 
Muslim League to Hitler and writes, "the whole policy of the Muslim League during the 
past few years has been singularly reminiscent of the Nazi tactics. " In the same letter lie 
writes, "From a military point of view there is little doubt that if there was war between 
India and Pakistan, Pakistan as a state would perish. But India would suffer great injury 
and all our schemes of progress would have to be pushed aside for many, many vears"^ 
Thus, in 1947 the cost for India to assist in the dismantling of Pakistan was too high, but 
as it became clearer that Pakistan was not going to implode, this changed. For example 
in January 1957 at Madras Nehru said, "We have never accepted it [Pakistan] and we do 
not propose to accept the two nation theory on which Pakistan was founded. '72 
There was a change from leaving Pakistan to implode of its own accord to a more 
proactive policy pursued in 1971 where violence was used to secure this end. Whereas 
initially after partition the cost of war to India was deemed too high a price to pay this 
changed as it became apparent that Pakistan had not imploded of its own accord. It \vi1I 
be shown below that with the advent of nuclear technology both states have 
demonstrated a willingness to accept the risk of nuclear conflict in pursuit of their 
mutual ideological antagonism. 
This chapter now turns to this interplay between materialism and the ideational meaning 
India and Pakistan might attach to the others nuclear weapons and how this might push 
the nature of anarchy towards a Hobbesian mode of kill or be killed. It will show that 
whilst initially after independence the domestic cost of conflict was regarded as 
unacceptable, this now has become relative and that this change from unacceptable 
levels of damage to relative levels of damage will negate the establishment of a robust 
deterrence between them. 
71 Gopal, S (eds). 2003. The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru. Volume II. p. 322 
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In an article on the social construction of norms and deterrence. Price and Tannenwald 
ask this pertinent question, "What goes into the definition of unacceptable cost? " 7' They 
argue that the patterns of non-use of weapons cannot be fully understood without taking 
into account the development of prohibitionary norms that shaped these weapons as 
unacceptable. The section below will show that the social construction of norms of 
unacceptability is in flux in South Asia and that a non-use norm has not developed. 
May 1998: The Meaning of Nuclear Power & Deterrence 
The nature of anarchy between India and Pakistan again showed signs of falling into a 
Hobbesian culture given the events of May 1998 and the meaning that each state might 
attach to the development of the others weapons. Do they attach the meaning of 
deterrence to nuclear weapons, or does the ideological clash between these two states 
have deeper meaning than a deterrence view of nuclear weapons? Whereas the cold war 
ideological clash has its roots in a liberalist versus Marxist theories of politics. 
economics and the state, the ideological clash between India and Pakistan has its roots 
in the colonial period of the mid 19`x' century, it is a much younger conflict. Therefore a 
structuralist approach and cold war comparisons are not relevant to India Pakistan 
relations because they have their roots in a different time and place. 
The success or failure of any future rapprochement will depend on the meaning both 
states attach to Kashmir and nuclear weapons. The danger is that the ideological friction 
between them and a lack of political and diplomatic outlets to resolve or lessen 
ideological friction will increase the likelihood of conflict and possible military 
escalation. The Kargil conflict in 1999 showed that India and Pakistan are liable to think 
too much about teaching each other a lesson and not enough on the consequences of war 
between them. The job of the international community is to remind both states of those 
dire consequences and work to resolve the friction that underpins it because it is this 
friction that adds meaning to Kashmir and to nuclear weapons. Thus. Kashmir and 
nuclear weapons become the material basis of relations, 
but ideation between them 
73 Price, Richard and Tannenwald, Nina, 1996. `Norms and Deterrence: The 
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provides transience and also informs the meaning both states will attach to each other's 
weapons. 
This problem has been exacerbated by the post May 1998 environment because the 
meaning each state attaches to the others weapons and delivery systems will be very 
different than to other states in South Asia who share different anarchic cultures with 
India and Pakistan. As Wendt writes, "the probability that any given possibility will be 
realized depends on ideas and the interests they constitute. , 74 In this regard nuclear 
hardware on the subcontinent has added a further materialist element to a region already 
replete with ideation and inter-subjectivity. In other words, the materialist or structural 
role that Kashmir plays in Indo-Pakistan relations now has nuclear weapons or the 
threat of nuclear weapons adding to the high level of intersubjectivty. The presence of 
this materialism becomes another target onto which India and Pakistan can project their 
mutual antagonism. 
This combination of material power and ideological antagonism represents a dangerous 
threat to the region. A threat that can only reduce with the reduction of the ideological 
friction that drives it because it is the transient nature of anarchic cultures that weighs 
heavily on the meaning both states attach to the material elements of Kashmir and 
nuclear weapons. The greater the amount of materialism these two states produce, the 
greater the meaning that will be attached to it by each side and consequently, the greater 
the risk will be that both states push each other towards a culture of enmity. 
This danger is brought into sharp relief by Rodney Jones who writes, 
By May 1999, India and Pakistan were embroiled in the Kargil mini-war under a 
nuclear shadow. Indian nuclear weapons did not deter that Pakistani venture across the 
LOC in Kashmir. Many concluded that nuclear weapons actually emboldened Pakistan 
to take unusual risks. Likewise, Pakistan's nuclear weapons did not deter India from 
responding to Kargil with the threat of horizontal escalation and expanded war until the 
crisis was defused by President Clinton's involvement'' 
The above quote allows us to see how the inclusion of nuclear power has changed the 
dynamics of India Pakistan relations, how this new materialism might change the nature 
74 Wendt. Op Cit. p. 255 
75 Jones, Rodney, "Strategic Stability and Conventional Force Asymmetry in South Asia, " Conference 
paper presented to the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit (SASSU). 
22 23 July '1004 
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of anarchy between them and how a South Asian understanding of nuclear power differs 
from western cold war understanding. During the cold war the argument about nuclear 
weapons rested on the strength or weakness of nuclear deterrence and mutually assured 
destruction (MAD). 
The cold war debate was not structural in the sense that no one argued that nuclear 
weapons per se were intrinsically or materially advantageous. the debate was set within 
a normative theoretical framework of whether one thought nuclear deterrence was a 
good or bad method of statecraft. Broadly speaking the debate was split between those 
who argued nuclear weapons were a necessary evil and those who argued that they were 
an unnecessary evil. The latter section of this chapter will examine the different 
meaning India and Pakistan attach to nuclear power and nuclear weapons and argue that 
on the subcontinent the debate is premised on a different cultural understanding of the 
intrinsic value of nuclear power and as such is different from the more militaristic 
understanding of nuclear power as was the case during the cold war. 
May 1998 is a seminal and important date in Indo-Pakistan relations, a period that 
changed the nature of relations between the South Asian neighbours, a period after 
which both states officially and very publicly announced themselves as nuclear power 
states. P. R Chari writes, "Their urgent claim to nuclear status made clear that prestige 
weighed as heavily as security in motivating these nuclear tests. It could be observed 
that domestic and internal political issues have outweighed external security 
concerns. "76 
India who had already tested for nuclear yields in 1974 announced on 11 
`h May 1998 
that New Delhi had conducted three nuclear tests, "one of which involved the 
detonation of a thermonuclear device.. . 
India announced two days later that it had 
conducted two more detonations that purportedly `completed the planned series of 
underground tests. " 77 In Washington there followed feverish diplomatic activity to try 
and prevent Pakistan from responding. This diplomatic activity came to naught when 
Pakistan, "seeking to validate its nuclear weapons designs, buttress the credibility of its 
76 Chari. P R. 2004. `Nuclear Restraint, Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South 
Asia, ' pp. 19-41 in Krepon, Micheal eds. Nuclear Risk 
Reduction in South Asia 
Tellis, Ashley, 2001. India's Emerging Nuclear Posture. p. 1 
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deterrent vis-a-vis India, and appease its restive domestic polity, responded on N1av 28. 
1998 with an announcement that it had conducted five nuclear tests of its own. .. 78 
The heightened tension in the region was matched by the shrillness of the rhetoric 
produced. Home Minister L. K Advani warned that this "decisive step to become a 
nuclear weapon state has brought a qualitatively new stage in India-Pakistan relations, 
particularly in finding a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem ... 
79 Following 
Islamabad's testing, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said in a television address 
that, "today we have made history-we have settled the score with India. "80 
In the wake of India and Pakistan officially announcing that they are nuclear power 
states there followed assurances from both that, "they knew the dangers nuclear 
weapons posed, having watched the superpower rivalry during the cold war. They 
argued that nuclear weapons are only good for deterrence and not for waging war. "8 
The remainder of this chapter will argue that cold war inter theoretical debate is not 
relevant to India Pakistan relations because it carries with it an entirely different 
historical basis and an entirely different set of ontological baggage as to the motivation 
and justification for the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons and related 
technology. 
The point that needs to be addressed is what meaning these two states attach to both 
their own weapons and the weapons of the other and on both counts to consider their 
very different meanings from western perceptions of nuclear power during the cold «gar 
where there was no debate about an intrinsic `goodness' to nuclear weapons. The debate 
centred on whether, or not, deterrence theory was a desirable or undesirable method of 
statecraft between the two superpowers. In other words the debate was inter-theoretical 
and based on the merits or demerits of deterrence theory. 
In India and Pakistan there is a culturally embedded notion of a qualitative goodness of 
nuclear power. For example both states have their ordained God Fathers of the bomb, in 
India Homi Bhabha, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is 
78 ibid. p. 2 
79 The Hindu. (New Delhi) 19/5/1998 
80 New York Times. 29/5/1998. Cited in Tellis. Op Cit. p. 3 
81 Jones. Op Cit. P. 1 
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sometimes refereed to as the Father of the Bomb and in Pakistan Dr A. Q Khan is feted 
as the Father of the Bomb. 82 The west has no such figure. indeed many involved at Los 
Alamos and the Manhatten project expressed regret at their involvement and in what 
can only be described now as a brutal irony, Robert Oppenheimer thought of the 
Bhagavad Gita, "I am become death the destroyer of worlds . -93 on witnessing the 
destructive capability of nuclear power, not to mention thermo nuclear power. In South 
Asia there have been no public announcements from the scientific community 
expressing similar humility. 
There is a further irony that India, a constituted secular state names its ballistic missiles 
after Hindu Gods and deities, Prithvi, for example is India's short range, liquid fuelled 
ballistic missile and Pakistan's intermediate range missile, the Ghauri is named after a 
Muslim conqueror of northern India. Pictures and models of the nuclear testing site, the 
mountain range at Chagai in Baluchistan have reached iconoclastic status in Pakistan 
and a measure of its nuclear power and modernity. It is interesting to note that the tests 
in India on 8th May 1974 and 11th May 1998 both fell on Buddha Jayanti, a date which, 
in accordance to the Hindu mythological calendar, is the Buddha's birthday. 84 
These cultural icons and ideas are unique to the South Asian region and suggest a very 
strong cultural affinity and support for a culturally embedded meaning that is attached 
to nuclear power and weapons. George Perkovich argues that modernity plays a 
powerful role in the desire for nuclear power, indeed many of the points mentioned 
above could certainly find a home under the broad heading of modernity. Perkovich 
suggests that this push for modernity comes out of a, "determination to repudiate any 
vestiges of colonialism including within the Indian national psyche. "85 
These are domestic icons, but what role has the political and military antagonism 
between India and Pakistan played in informing understanding of nuclear weapons and 
deterrence theory on the subcontinent? New Delhi goes to great lengths to dissociate 
itself from the hyphenization of Indo-Pakistan relations stressing instead India's 
82 A. Q Khan established Pakistan's first uranium enrichment facility 
83 Oppenheimer: A Life. Berkeley. edu/oppenheimer; 'exhibit: chapter3'html 
Ra 1 am grateful to Arnab Ray Chaudhuri - fellow South Asian 
Ph. D student at Bristol. for pointing this 
out to me. It goes a long way to explaining the two codenames 
for the tests. In 1974 -*The Buddha 
has smiled', and in 1998, `The Buddha has smiled again'. 
85 Perkovich, George, 1999. India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Prolrjeraiion. p. 286 
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emerging power in the international system, the most infamous example being the 
comment by George Fernandes that "China is potential threat No. 1 . "86 In 2001 however 
Fernandes contradicted this statement when he suggested, We [India] could take a 
strike and survive, Pakistan won't. "87 
There are numerous other examples such as Jaswant Singh venting his spleen in the 
direction of Strobe Talbott for demonstrating the western proclivity for using the 
hyphen between India and Pakistan. 88 
Despite these Indian protestations the May 1998 period is replete with a rhetorical 
squaring up between Delhi and Islamabad, or as Tellis puts it, "a cacophony of rhetoric 
and unsubstantiated claims emerged from both India and Pakistan in the month of 
May. , 89 If India remains frustrated at the hyphen word it falls strangely silent when it 
comes to the question of why this should be? As Perkovich correctly notes, from a 
security-centric logic, India's tests did not really threaten any other country besides 
Pakistan, "90 Having terminated East Pakistan in 1971 to great acclaim, Delhi should 
find it easy to answer the vexed question of hyphenization. 
Rodney Jones offers a clearly defined set of objectives that states must reach in order 
for there to be robust nuclear deterrent stability between them. The first two are 
avowedly strategic; one, each state must have a credible capability for the delivery of 
weapons to high value targets and deliver them in sufficient numbers that persuade the 
opponent that no meaningful advantage could be gained. Second, a secure second strike 
capability which is to say, the survival of sufficient nuclear assets in the event of a 
preemptive strike to be able to launch a retaliatory strike that inflicts unacceptable 
damage. 
The third requirement and the most worrying in the context of South Asia is, "neither 
(state) must have consuming ambitions or unresolved grievances with the other that 
86 India Today International. 18/5/1998 
87 Fernandes interview. Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 30/122001 
88 For this comment and for an excellent account of Indo-US 
diplomatic relations in the wake of the May° 
1998 tests, see Talbott, Strobe, 2004. Engaging India: Diplomacy, 
Democracy and the Bomb 
89 Tellis. Op Cit. p. 3 
90 Perkovich. Op Cit. p. 418 
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make its leaders or the public at large passionately eager to go to war. "91 Relations 
between India and Pakistan since 1947 rule out qualification for this category. 
Furthermore, given the cultural affinity that both states attach to nuclear power. 
qualification for the first two categories can also be called into question. For example 
Advani's comment cited above vowing to deal firmly with Pakistan in the light of the 
`changed geo-strategic position, ' in the region and George Fernandes suggesting that 
India could absorb a strike and then retaliate. Both these comments suggest an 
understanding and ontological mind set that falls outside the remit of deterrence theory 
that states that a nation state must think in terms of unacceptable damage, not relative 
damage, if it is to fit within the criteria of deterrence theory. 
States create the culture of anarchy between them and the nature of this anarchy 
impinges on the meaning states attach to nuclear weapons and deterrence theory. 
Moreover, the ideological clash between India and Pakistan predates by several decades 
their relatively newly acquired nuclear power status. If ideological friction creates 
transience in anarchy causing a fluctuation between anarchies of rivalry and enemy, 
then India Pakistan relations will never satisfy the criteria of deterrence theory. 
Nuclear rivals must be firmly rooted in a culture of rivalry, a move towards a Hobbesian 
culture would be a disaster, and existing in a theoretical no mans land between the two 
will also have dangerous implications for a nuclearised region. The culture of anarchy 
will inform the structure of the system and likewise this culture will inform the meaning 
a state attaches to nuclear weapons which in turn supersedes a state's understanding of 
deterrence theory. 
The superseding of deterrence theory was again apparent during the Kargil crisis when 
Pakistan's foreign minister warned that Islamabad could use any weapon" in its arsenal 
to defend the country. 92 Again, such shrill rhetoric is a long way from an objective 
realist argument that the international system is anarchic and as such generates a self 
help system which forces states to maximise power. This rhetoric is generated, not by 
the objectivity of a rationalist approach, but by agency, it is an intersubjective 
construction of anarchy, anarchy that in 1999 erred dangerously close to a culture of 
enemy. 
91 Jones. Op Cit. p. 7 
92 The Hindu. (Calcutta) 1/6/1998 
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It is worth reiterating the point that the other becomes the enemy when the other really 
is an existential threat, or by way of misperception, the self has reason to believe the 
other is the enemy. "Real or imagined if actors think enemies are real then they are real 
in their consequences. "93 An existential threat occurs when the self believes rightly or 
wrongly that it is under threat. Given the rhetorical exchanges that take place between 
Delhi and Islamabad in times of already high tension such as 1998 or Kargil 1999. it is 
not difficult to see a scenario where the threat of a Hobbesian culture triggers the real 
thing. 
Posturing and rhetorical exuberance are clearly not part of the deterrence remit and 
suggest that India and Pakistan fall foul of the third point in establishing a robust 
deterrence between states. Namely that a robust deterrent cannot be established between 
two states where there are outstanding political grievances between them. The danger is 
of a conflation of these grievances and nuclear weapons. Chari suggests that such a 
conflation has produced posturing on both sides that has persuaded the 
international community that Indian and Pakistani leaders seem unable to comprehend 
that nuclear weapons establish an entirely new context for the security relationships in 
which the need for reassurance and accommodation of the adversary y is as significant for 
the stability of their relationship as the establishment of deterrence. 
There is still a clear danger that South Asian security is threatened by the political 
leadership's inability to de-couple their long standing political and ideological 
antagonisms to meet the modalities required to establish deterrence. Under this set of 
circumstances India and Pakistan can only ever be a nuclear threat to one another and 
will be incapable of establishing deterrence. Furthermore, with transience in anarchic 
structure fluctuating between rival and enemy, that in turn informs the meaning both 
states attach to the others nuclear weapons and dangerous uncertainty will pervade 
relations. 
93 Wendt. Op Cit. p. 262 
94 Chari. Op Cit. p. 24 
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Summary: 
This chapter has argued that the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan was fought within a 
Hobbesian remit of enmity because the Indian objective was to remove East Pakistan 
from the political map of South Asia and it succeeded in its objective. This does beg the 
question, if East Pakistan occurred now, would Pakistan retaliate with nuclear weapons? 
Or would the presence of nuclear weapons restrain India? Theoretically speaking the 
question is a contradiction in terms, because a Hobbesian conflict fought in a 
nuclearised region could only have one catastrophic outcome. It does however highlight 
the need to develop a much deeper theoretical understanding of how cultures of anarchy 
inform the materialism of military hardware, both in South Asia and beyond. 
In South Asia, there is not a single omnipresent anarchy forcing states to act the way 
they do within the self help system, if that were the case then security in South Asia 
would not be so acutely dangerous. It is the socially constructed role of anarchy that 
dictates the way these states behave, it is not the maximization of power but more the 
maximization of threat whose causal link lies firmly in the construction of anarchy 
between states. Moreover, it is this socially constructed culture of anarchy that equates 
to India and Pakistan representing a nuclear threat to one another and not a deterrent to 
one another, the probability of attack overriding the possibility of attack. 
To overcome these dangers to security in the region two steps must be taken to try and 
ensure stability. First, historical reiteration must be replaced by a theorised 
understanding of the nature of relations and the nature of violence these two states have 
been prepared to use against each other in the past. Are India and Pakistan rivals who 
given their mutual ideological antagonism do not like each other very much, a dislike 
that occasionally manifests into limited conflict? Or. are they. enemies who have in the 
past attempted to break the status quo of rivalry for the far more dangerous unlimited 
violence of deep revisionism? Are they rivals or are they enemies? This is the 
theoretically informed debate that must take place. a debate that transcends history and 
reaches a clearer understanding of the nature of relations and the nature of violence. 
This thesis has set out a theoretical remit for this debate to take place. 
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ý. 
Second, the establishment of a system of law or criteria between the two states 
establishing deterrence. Just as we have a system of law of the land, perhaps we should 
have a law of deterrence. This would lend much needed objectivity to what is currently 
a milieu of political and ideological antagonism. A law of deterrence would establish 
that nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons and nothing more. this is the vital 
component that is missing currently and this void is being filled by the political 
ambitions of both states. A law of deterrence set in treaty would establish what can and 
what cannot be achieved by being a nuclear weapon state. The persistent attempts by 
both states to conflate nuclear capability with political ambitions is to sa}y the least, 
foolhardy and must be stopped. 
Both states have shown signs of a willingness to perceive nuclear capability as a way of 
transcending material limitations. The intersubjective antagonism between these states 
draws them inexorably into conflict, it is this antagonism that must be worked on and 
changed because it is this ideationally driven antagonism that informs materialism. 
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CONCLUSION 
India Pakistan relations is a unique relationship in international politics that poses 
many challenges to the discipline and challenges the old dichotomous debate of 
agency versus structure. The issue of agency arises given the high level of political 
and cultural similarity prior to colonial rule, juxtaposed with the structure of 
sovereignty imposed in 1947. Indo-Pakistan relations is a rich empirical vein to tap 
into for anyone wanting to develop theories that join structure with agency because of 
the interests and identities that made up the justification for partition and the different 
philosophical foundations on which the two states were founded in 1947. 
This thesis is grounded in constructivism because this theoretical approach accepts the 
structure of the system but challenges the immutability of anarchy and the self help 
system and instead looks to agency and intersubjectivity between states as the causal 
mechanism for relations between states - both peaceful relations and violent relations 
between states. Its theoretical contention is that states use ideas and intersubjectivity 
to take each other into account and that structure does not exist apart from process. 
To return to Wendt's empty vessel analogy the interests and identities that these two 
states put into the vessel have their origins prior to 1947, in other words, interests and 
identities came prior to the imposition of structure. There was no blank page that 
these two states started from in 1947, the vessel was already replete with a clash of 
identity with the self being undermined by the other to the extent that the new 
government in Delhi fully expected the ideas and interests that went to make up 
Pakistan to crumble and fall. This is not the structure of the international system 
acting as a causal mechanism for conflict, it is conflict derived from the pre-1947 
period that was dropped into the international system in August 1947. This is conflict 
at the micro intersubjective level, not at the macro structural level. Structure gives 
these two states the means and ability for conflict (materialism) but agency tells us the 
meaning attached to that materialism. 
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International relations in South Asia does not lend itself easily to categories or modes 
of analysis as the British discovered during their period of hegemony in the region. 
This thesis suggests that given both the economic rise in the significance of the region 
and the inherent dangers of nuclear proliferation a constructivist account is necessary 
to overcome these theoretical and methodological difficulties. 
Much of the literature on Indo-Pakistan relations is bound up in theories of post- 
colonial states and strategic studies and the difficulties of government and 
development in new states that are, as Rudolph and Rudolph suggest a political and 
economic paradox, "a rich poor nation with a weak strong state. "' India and Pakistan 
born out of the same struggle for independence share these contradictions between the 
very old and the very new. Very old given the ancient civilization from whence they 
came and very new given that they both entered the international system as sovereign 
states, a system that was alien to the experience of both. This chapter will begin by 
reviewing some of the literature on South Asian history and politics and then show 
where this contribution fits in and what new knowledge and insight it lends to India 
Pakistan relations and international relations generally. 
Literature Review 
Concentrating on the development of the Indian nuclear programme since the 1940's 
George Perkovich's `India's Nuclear Bomb, ' argues that the driving force for an 
Indian bomb is the need for India to become a modern powerful state which by 
definition equates to being a nuclear power and "unless or until substitute symbols of 
scientific prowess are created and promoted by Indian leaders, unproliferation will 
represent antimoderism. "2 For Perkovich the issue of modernity is a powerful force 
driving India' s nuclear program which comes from India's perception of itself and 
India's desire for technological modernity and hegemonic ambition, not from any 
external force such as international anarchy and the self help system. or indeed, from 
ideationally and culturally constructed anarchies that this thesis is positing. 
Rudolph, Lloyd & Rudolph, S. 1987. In Pursuit of Lakshmi. p. 
2 Perkovich, George, 1999. India's Nuclear Bomb. p. 457 
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Stephen Cohen's book `India: Emerging Power, ' concentrates primarily on American 
perceptions of India. Nonetheless this work comes closest to the argument of this 
thesis because it suggests the need for a greater level of agency that this work will 
contribute, in particular what Cohen describes as the `realist-idealist conundrum. ' 
Cohen argues that, "experts working on Indian foreign policy have ignored domestic 
social and economic factors, while the scholars who work in Indian domestic politics 
tend to be unconcerned with strategic issues. "3 The task of this thesis has been to pull 
together some of these strands to allow for an analysis of the anarchic structure(s) of 
India Pakistan relations that are lacking in the literature on international politics in 
South Asia. Cohen's analysis amounts to an implicit recognition of the gap in our 
theoretical understanding. 
The extremely valid point is made that as far as most of its neighbours are concerned 
India already is a superpower that constrains and dominates the South Asian region 
both economically and politically. The one exception to this however is Pakistan, the 
one regional state that does not regard India as being a legitimate candidate for 
regional superpower, let alone a global one. Like numerous superpowers or empires 
and would-be great powers down the ages, India sees itself as a force for good in the 
region. Pakistan however is not prepared to share this view of India and India has thus 
far been unable to force Pakistan into submission, leaving Delhi with the choice of the 
use of force, or rapprochement. This thesis adds greater clarity to the way in which 
relations have changed through the different cultures of anarchy and how peaceful 
change might be brought about between India and Pakistan. 
Crossing the Rubicon - The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy, examines the 
radical, even seismic shift in India's foreign policy orientation that has taken place 
under the BJP coalition since 1998. Raja Mohan cites India's support for 
Washington's war on terror after September 11 `h and its backing for George Bush's 
National Missile Defence (NMD) programme as evidence of a radical rethink in 
Delhi. However, Mohan suggests that foreign policy re-orientation is the product of 
incremental changes that occurred since the end of the cold war during which time all 
aspects of the Indian political elite, left, right and centrist all had spells in government 
3 Cohen, Stephen, 2001. India Emerging Power. p. 4 
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and by the turn of the millennium the, "quantitative adjustments in Indian diplomacy 
after the cold war ended up in a qualitative transformation. 9A 
Mohan argues that these quantitative adjustments and rethinking of many of the core 
issues and ideas that constituted India's foreign policy range from: the ending of the 
cold war and the demise of its erstwhile ally the Soviet Union, one party rule yielding 
to coalition governments at the centre, state socialist planned economics yielding to 
`unplanned' liberal market capitalism and attempts to redefine secularism. 
These domestic and international changes and shifts are important variables en route 
to the nuclear tests in May 1998. As for the tests themselves Mohan's explanation is 
strikingly similar to Cohen's idealist-realist conundrum that the tests were about 
redefining India's approach to the question of power and "part of the effort to temper 
"'' the idealism in its (Indian) foreign policy with a strong dose of realism. 
Thematically Mohan's argument suggests that Indian foreign policy is, work in 
progress. He characterises the Nehruvian foreign policy approach as that of a 
porcupine, a reactionary state that put up sharp quills when it felt its 'excessively 
normative' principles were under attack from a hostile international system. The 
future of Indian foreign policy equates to a tiger emerging from Nehruvian non- 
alignment and anti-western liberalism that embraces globalisation rather than 
opposing it. This `qualitative transformation' is a positive development for Mohan 
which will see India emerge as an, "economic giant and a great power of substance in 
Asia and the Indian ocean region. "6 
Mohan's work is a good account of the pro-Indian argument and as such is replete 
with pejorative terms and adjectives to describe Pakistan.? The key point for this 
thesis however is, if Indian foreign policy is on the move then in which direction is it 
heading? Looking at the changing character of Indian foreign policy through the three 
cultures allows us to see how these changes impact on Indo-Pakistan relations. 
4 Mohan, Raja, 2003. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's new 
Foreign Polici". p. xiii 
ibid, p. xv 
6 Mohan, R. 2003. Crossing the Rubicon: the Shaping of India's New Foreign 
Policy. p. 262 
For example, there is a description of the vivisection of 
Pakistan in 197 1. p. 262 
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Ashley Tellis's, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, describes the process whereby 
policy makers in New Delhi decided to launch nuclear tests in May 1998 and sets out 
the regional and global implications of this decision and its affect on the future of 
India's nuclear posture. Tellis outlines a long list of strategic options that were 
available to Delhi prior to 1998 such as retaining a nuclear option, a recessed 
deterrent and developing a ready arsenal. He then discusses the variables that would 
influence a decision such as the demands imposed by regional securit}y, in particular. 
regional nuclear threats and the character of India's bilateral relations with other key 
players in the international system. 
In conclusion Tellis argues that of the many variables that could account for the 
decision, it was the looming prospect of the Comprehensive test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
due to come into force in 1999 finally convinced Delhi to test in 1998. However he 
enters an important caveat with regard to relations with Pakistan and notes that for 
Delhi to admit that Pakistan might prove to be a irresolvable security problem or 
threat to Indian security, "is tantamount to admitting a political equivalence that could 
negate all of New Delhi's claims to pre-eminence in the region. "8 Despite an 
extensive strategic account of India's options, Tellis is unable to evade Buzan's 
suggestion that India and Pakistan cannot avoid or ignore each other given their long 
political and cultural history. 
There is a wealth of historical literature, some taking 1947 as its starting point, others 
going back to the 1857 Mutiny and others further back to the rise of the Mughal 
period. For example, Percival Spear argues that the political structure of both the 
Mughal Empire and the later British Raj have similarities and that the British would 
not or could not have ruled India the way they did without the political structures put 
in place by their Mughal predecessors. Much of the twentieth century historical 
literature takes a partisan point of view and can be summarised as being in either the 
pro-Indian or pro-Pakistani camp. Some take a theological line suggesting that the 
antithetical nature of Islam and Hinduism is responsible for partition and has 
continued to foment antagonism between the two given these two different modes of 
state building. This argument has major problems however. given that neither India 
8 Tellis, Ashley, 2001. India's Emerging Nuclear Posture. p. 50 
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nor Pakistan were founded on a clear theological basis. India is a secular state and 
Pakistan although now an Islamic state, was founded on the basis of a Muslim state. a 
home for the Muslims of south Asia. 
Ian Talbot argues that with a greater degree of historical overview the rapid changes 
on the subcontinent since 1947 are not new but merely history repeating itself. Talbot 
argues that the 1999 military coup in Pakistan that removed Nawaz Sharif and the 
seemingly relentless rise of Hindu nationalism in India reflect patterns that can be 
understood thematically and historically. Thus the quiescent response to the coup in 
Pakistan can be understood in terms of the, "army's long-established image in 
Pakistan and its importance as an employer, educator and development agency. "9 
In response to the Indian election of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the 
same year, Talbot argues the election was not a battle of Hindu nationalism 
triumphing over Congress secularism, but more a sign of growing antagonism to 
sitting governments and the rise of many other regional and lower-caste political 
parties. For Talbot, the growth of regional parties in India and the military coup in 
Pakistan that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power are not isolated or 
extraordinary events, but merely historical reflections of Indian and Pakistani politics 
since partition and independence and can be understood in historical terms. 
In Democracy and Authoritarianism Ayesha Jalal argues that much of the literature 
looking at the roles played by the INC and the Muslim League, both before and after 
independence is chimerical because it is based on historical disjunctions which tend to 
over emphasise differences at the expense of similarities. This she argues has been the 
basis of analysis of relations between the Muslim League and the INC, a methodology 
that is continued today in analysis of the political structure and policy formation of 
India and Pakistan with Indian political 'success' put down to the righteousness of 
Nehru and Pakistani political `failure' put down to the duplicity of Jinnah. Pakistan 
she argues is, "cast in the role of a seceding state and with 
Muslim provincial 
particularisms providing a major driving force. "10 For Jalal the `congenital rivalry' 
between the two states has come about due to the exaggeration of 
difference. A 
9 Talbot, Ian, 2000. India and Pakistan. p. 1 
10 Jalal, Ayesha, 1998. Democracy and Authoritarianism in South 
Asia. p. 49 
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difference that suited the Nehru-led Congress government. equipping it with the 
structural and ideological powers of coercion to punish anyone wavering from 
complete allegiance to the state and nation. 
Pakistan in contrast descended into a military-bureaucratic state that decided whom to 
include and exclude from the political process. For Jalal, there is too much emphasis 
on structure and difference because difference suited the political needs of the elite. 
She comments, "It is a supreme irony of the times that a region with a long history of 
working out creative political arrangements based on layers of sovereignty appears 
today to have declared sovereignty a non-negotiable issue. "" 
This thesis addresses some of these unattended to issues and addresses the problem by 
way of a socially constructed structure, not the a priori structure of state and 
sovereignty that Jalal so vehemently criticises. The analysis here takes into account 
the similarities of ideas and culture because, as Jalal notes. this is an as yet 
uncompleted task and as such the issue of similarity has been largely ignored within 
the confines of international relations theory. Furthermore the thesis has looked at the 
'supreme irony' highlighted by Jalal between the pre-1947 period when multiple 
layers of sovereignty constituted a political settlement whereas in the post 1947 period 
issues regarding sovereignty are considered non-negotiable. 
More recently communalism has re-emerged as an area of interest and analysis. 
particularly with the rising influence of the BJP in mainstream politics in India. The 
destruction of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya usually supplies the empirical bedrock of 
these studies. Richard Davies12 however, concentrates more on the road to Ayodhya 
to inform his work, tracking the process of the procession (Rath Yatra) as it made its 
slow and often bloody way from Somnath up through northern India via Delhi, 
through Bihar to Uttar Pradesh, visiting as many religious sites as its organisers could 
Jalal, 1998. DemocracY and Authoritarianism in South Asia. p. 158. The role of the Pakistani state 
is a contentious issue among scholars of Pakistan. For example 
Mohammad Waseem argues that the 
ascendancy of bureaucracy was not a post independence phenomemon 
but inherited from the British, 
"Muslim majority provinces of British India under the regularly 
functioning governments were 
penetrated by an extragovernmental institution, the All 
India Muslim League. " Waseem, Mohammad, 
Politics and the State in Pakistan. p. 92. For a similar 
discussion, see Wirsing. Robert, Pakistan's 
Security Under Zia, 1977-1988: The Policy Imperitives of a Peripheral Asian State. p. 20 
1` Davies, Richard. 1996. `The Iconography of Rama's Chariot. ' 27-54 in David 
Lud den, eds. pp. 
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fit in en route to Ayodhya. Ayodhya and the Rath Yatra that preceded it have become 
synonymous with the perceived rise of Hindu nationalism that the BJP, RSS and the 
VHP are inextricably linked to and the political arguments surrounding communalism 
and the acrimonious debate between pro and anti secularists in India. 
Whilst much of the literature takes a particular view from either the Indian or 
Pakistani side, this thesis will concentrate on the socially constructed nature of 
anarchy between them. The thesis uses a normative, constitutive theoretical 
framework because much of the IR literature and Indo-Pakistan relations literature 
which has been employed to try and explain relations between the two states has been 
unable to give a satisfactory account of what drives Indo-Pakistan relations. 13 
A systemic account with its emphasis based wholly on structure as a causal 
mechanism is too broad a theoretical tool to employ in this instance because a macro 
ahistorical approach cannot account for the historical inter-subjectivity of Indo- 
Pakistan relations prior to 1947 and it is essential to demonstrate this for the thesis to 
show that the relationship has fluctuated between cultural anarchies. Therefore a 
greater emphasis needs to be placed on agency and interpretation that looks at Indo- 
Pakistan relations at the level of systemic-intersubjectivity. 
The intellectual justification for this thesis resides in the argument that the politics. 
diplomacy and intellectual examinations of India Pakistan relations are bogged down 
in historical reiteration - the endless reiteration of highly politicized versions of 
history on the subcontinent. Historical reiteration has impacted on the pre-colonial 
and colonial periods, but the debate is most ferocious on the events of partition and 
the post 1947 period. Historical debates in a region replete with historical fascination 
and precedent need not surprise or concern us, however the political 
debates as to who 
did what to who during and after partition have served merely to 
further entrench 
positions on both sides. It is this politicization of history that urgently needs 
addressing. 
13 For some examples of the most polemic accounts, see 
Nanda, K. K 1994. Conquering Kashmir: .4 
Pakistan Obsession. Gutzar, Ahmed 1967. Pakistan 1tieets 
Indian Challenge or Mankekar D. R 
1972. Pakistan Cut to Size 
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Given this unhelpful and potentially dangerous milieu it is very important that this 
complex relationship should be subject to a method of theorization that seeks a greater 
understanding of the nature or culture of violence between them. Such an approach 
has been lacking in accounts of relations in South Asia and this thesis has set out a 
theoretical framework that moves away from unhelpful historical debates and instead 
contributes a theoretically informed assessment of the nature of violence between 
these two states that accepts structure, but argues that structure does not exist apart 
from process. In the post-colonial environment of South Asia this is important 
because it allows in inter-subjectivity between states, a vital point given that these two 
states are cut from the same cultural and political cloth. 
Theoretical Implications of this Study 
Since 1947 and the imposition of sovereignty in the region, South Asia has been 
unsuccessful at bringing about peaceful political change without recourse to military 
conflict. For this reason we must begin to connect domestic politics in South Asia 
with regional and international implications. This thesis has brought these domestic 
and international variables within the theoretical remit of constructivism and natures 
of anarchies. 
There is an important link to be made between E. H Carr's criticism of a normative 
approach and Wendt's constructivist approach. Carr was concerned with the 
introduction of normative ideas and institutions and Wendt argues that ideas and 
cultures are constructed between states. Can is arguing against imposed normative 
ideas, Wendt suggests that anarchies are created via a process of inter-subjectivity 
between states without the external hand of, for example, the UN. 
In the case of India Pakistan relations Carr is right to suggest that these ideas are 
dangerous and the history of South Asia shows just how dangerous and violent the 
region can be. But in the case of India and Pakistan, sovereignty itself is an imposed 
normative construct that has served since 1947 to produce conflict. Carr's 
maximization of power argument is not sufficient to explain Indo-Pakistan relations 
because there is no clear de-linkage between domestic and foreign policy. Both states 
make it their business to interfere in the others 
domestic difficulties and a 
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maximisation of power argument has little credibility in a region where sovereign 
borders do not so much meet, as merge. 
Carr argues against the use of pure aspiration when trying to theorise international 
politics, one must look at the world the way it is, not the way one would like it to be. 
This is a methodological argument as to the type of theory to use to examine 
international politics, but Can is wrong to suggest that aspiration can be de-coupled 
from `objectivity. ' Pakistan for example aspires to incorporate Jammu and Kashmir as 
part of its sovereign territory. This aspiration is born out of normative ideas and 
interests and has since 1947 had a very real impact on foreign policy decision-making. 
thus Carr's argument for a realist assessment is superseded by Pakistan's normative 
ideas and interests. 
Structural realist such as Kenneth Waltz contend that ultimately it is the structure of 
the system and relative material means that dictate state behaviour. This thesis argues 
that it is the ideological clash between the two states that constructs the nature of 
anarchy and informs policy-making and that these ideas are far more internalised than 
realism can account for. 
There has been a long-standing criticism of Martin Wight's three traditions that there 
is no distinguishing feature or dynamic that forces change from one culture to another. 
Chapter one has shown that change did occur in the pre 1947 period by a process of 
the politicization of culture, a process whereby a Kantian logic of friendship was 
disrupted by a European power and compounded by the need of the INC and the 
League to create their own distinctive political identities and constituencies. This 
brought about a politicization of culture which required religion and culture to 
become static and categorized. A Kantian culture of friendship was usurped by the 
need of the Muslim League and the INC to establish loyalty with their respective 
electorates and polities. 
Empirically the thesis is on strong ground because it demonstrates two states fighting 
two types of conflict - limited and unlimited violence. 
There is sufficient empirical 
data here to allow the rival or enemy question to 
be asked and this is the fundamental 
question to consider about the nature of violence 
between these two states. It is 
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important in terms of regional security because it moves away from historical 
reiteration and it is important theoretically because it shows ideas as opposed to 
structure as the causal mechanism in India Pakistan relations. 
Materialism is insufficient to offer a systemic account, using a constructivist approach 
allows room for ideation and the subjective and epistemological use of knowledge in 
the formation of identity and interests, thus it is at the micro, intersubjective level 
where we will find the most useful theoretical insights into Indo-Pakistan relations 
and other cyclical conflicts. Cyclical violence occurs when ideational beliefs 
outweigh materialist limitations, when the memory of past conflict is forgotten and 
ideation comes to the fore once again. These ideas and knowledge can only exist at 
the micro level. Constructivism contends that states construct their own anarchies 
through a process of inter-subjectivity, this thesis has shown that in the case of India 
and Pakistan we can theorise these different cultures of friendship, rivalry and enmity. 
At the micro level Pakistan's desire to maintain parity with India can be cited as the 
most important ideational variable in its relationship with India and moreover it was 
Jinnah's desire for parity prior to partition that became the key bone of contention 
between the Muslim League and the INC. 
From an Indian perspective, Delhi's desire for great nation status has changed from 
the early Nehruvian policy of non-alignment to a more material based power, but 
India's desire for great power status continues to threaten Islamabad precisely because 
it challenges Pakistan's desire for parity. A desire for parity on the part of Pakistan 
and a desire for great nation status on the part of India are both ideationally led and 
are mutually incompatible. 
India Pakistan relations are ideas led, the material pursuit of weapons cannot be 
changed but the ideas behind them can. The challenge for India and Pakistan is to 
formulate ideas, myths that may be true or false, but which do not undermine the 
other. 
Structural and systemic approaches have difficult, accounting 
for the high level of 
inter-subjective rivalry and ideological antagonism between 
India and Pakistan. 
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Conversely, post structural based theory and methodology has problems with the high 
level of systemic rivalry, or structural inter-subjectivity, what Stephen Cohen refers to 
as the realist-idealist conundrum. At the heart of these difficulties is the issue of 
sovereignty, which became of paramount importance to both states after 1947 and vet 
was of little or no consequence in the pre -colonial period. 
The thesis began by arguing that there was a culture of friendship between Hindu and 
Muslim in the pre-colonial period and then went on in chapters two and three to use 
the 1965 conflict in Kashmir and the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) to 
assess the culture of violence and the limited and/or unlimited nature of this violence. 
The argument set out here is that there is transience in the nature of anarchy between 
India and Pakistan and the argument has been made that transience began when a 
culture of friendship became politicized and unpicked by the British and since 1947 
has fluctuated between a culture of Lockean rivalry and Hobbesian enmity. This 
argument required a starting point in the pre-colonial period to establish an 
internalization of culture between Hindu and Muslim, before moving on to the post 
1947 cultures of rival and enemy. 
Chapter One demonstrated that an internalized culture of friendship became 
politicized during the period of British rule whereby theological differences between 
Muslim and Hindu were used to establish the basis of political representation on the 
subcontinent and that this basis did not reflect or take heed of the internalized political 
and cultural unity that existed. Legislation such as the Morley Minto reforms 
enshrined this difference at the expense of similarity and moreover, these differences 
became solidified in the name of sovereignty after partition. Thus, the need for 
sovereignty created structure, but the ideological clash between India and Pakistan has 
been the causal dynamic for violence. 
The establishment and maintenance of these loyalties 
forged a new culture of rivalry 
between them, the construction of which manufactured a self and other that became a 
material and structural difference when India and 
Pakistan become sovereign states 
within the international system in 1947 and that the 
ideological justification for both 
states lie in a twentieth century debate between secularism and 
two nation theory. not 
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in the immemorial past of the pre-colonial period. 
For the important contemporary task of theorizing the nature of violence, the seminal 
question that comes out of this study is, are India and Pakistan rivals or enemies? The 
transient argument put here has been of a theoretical no-mans land between the two 
cultures with both states capable of breaking the status quo. Whilst the causal 
mechanism resides in the ideological clash manifested in Kashmir, a military 
escalation, still driven by ideation, could occur in any of the disputed regions between 
these two states and in 1971 that is precisely what happened. 
The thesis found two states stuck in ideological hostility to one another, each 
challenging the justification for the other. It considered that whilst ideational 
challenge remained constant, the empirical manifestation of this conflict changed, 
from the Kashmir valley to former East Pakistan and that the case of unlimited 
violence occurred not in Kashmir, but in East Pakistan. Thus, whilst the majority of 
the ideological manifestation may reside in Kashmir the most serious unlimited 
violence has thus far occurred outside the valley in East Pakistan. 
In 1965 Pakistan was persuaded that it could take Kashmir with a covert approach that 
required the involvement of their Muslim brethren in the valley. This it was argued is 
a clear case of ideation winning out against structure because the causal link resides in 
an inter-subjective construct based in ideas, not structure. In 1971 India showed that it 
was cognisant of material limitations, but these limitations merely affected its political 
and diplomatic strategy, it did not affect or ultimately restrain its ideological desire to 
invade East Pakistan. Thus rump materialism merely informs diplomatic strategy, it 
played no causal role in the use of violence, or the nature of violence. 
Chapter three used the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan to argue that 1971 was a conflict 
fought within a culture of unlimited violence because it concluded with the 
elimination of East Pakistan from the political map of South Asia, the removal of the 
East Pakistan leadership by the Awami League, the emergence of a brand new 
constitution for Bangladesh and discussed how the new political leadership in 
Bangladesh attempted, through the Simla negotiations, to couple the return of 
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Pakistani prisoners of war with a demand that Pakistan recognise Bangladesh as a 
sovereign state. 
The second section of the chapter looked at the nuclear tests carried out by both states 
in May 1998 and at the meaning both states attach to the others nuclear capability. 
The chapter argued that the meaning attached to nuclear weapons by India and 
Pakistan would cause considerable difficulty in establishing a robust deterrence 
between the two states. The political problem is how to prevent any further conflation 
of nuclear technology and the political and ideological ambitions of both states. The 
chapter suggested there is an urgent need to set in treaty a strict delineation between 
nuclear power and political ambition to prevent any further conflation of the two. 
By setting out the requirements needed for states to meet the demands of deterrence 
theory, the chapter brought these political difficulties into sharp relief. In order for 
deterrence to be effective states must meet certain criteria. First. a credible ability to 
deliver weapons to high value targets in sufficient numbers that any would-be 
opponent is persuaded that no meaningful advantage would be gained. Second, a 
secure second-strike capability that persuades an opponent that retaliation would 
inflict unacceptable damage. Third, neither state must have consuming ambitions or 
unresolved grievances with the other that could lead to political pressure to resort to 
military conflict. 
The chapter argued that talk of relative as opposed to unacceptable damage falls short 
of deterrence requirements and furthermore it is very unlikely that either state at the 
present time has a second strike capability. Failure to meet the first two strategic 
requirements is compounded still further by the third, that neither state should have 
consuming ambitions and/or unresolved grievances. The chapter argued that not only 
do they have unresolved grievances but they also conflate these unresolved grievances 
with nuclear power, thus negative inter-subjectivity and the nature of anarchic culture 
informs the meaning both states attach to nuclear power 
There is a further difference highlighted in the text, that 
in South Asia there is a 
culturally embedded idea of the qualitative goodness of nuclear power. 
Both states 
have a so-called 'Father of the Bomb, ' in India, 
Homi Bhabha. the former chairman of' 
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the AEC and in Pakistan, Dr A. Q Khan. The west has no such figure and no 
personalisation process occurred before, during or after the manufacture and testing of 
nuclear power, or weapons. 
India and Pakistan have different stated political objectives for becoming nuclear 
power states, but the domestic cultural meaning attached to nuclear power is the same 
in both states. Mutual ideological antagonism coupled with a belief in both states of 
the qualitative goodness of nuclear power, equates to a serious political problem for 
future security in South Asia. 
Leaving aside historical arguments and instead framing a new debate within the 
confines of the nature of violence - limited or unlimited violence - lends clarity to the 
theorization of India Pakistan relations. Such a framework will enhance our 
understanding of future relations and the likelihood (or not) of the confidence building 
measures (CBM) currently being undertaken in South Asia being a success. If India 
and Pakistan can construct an anarchy of rivalry, then the prospects for CBM's are 
good. If on the other hand, an anarchic culture of enemy again begins to emerge, then 
CBM's must give ground to the establishment of a law of deterrence. This does not 
mean to say that CBM's and a law of deterrence are mutually exclusive, but it does 
mean that greater attempts to separate deterrence from political ambitions and 
antagonisms must be undertaken. 
Tests of India Pakistan Relations 
The two major territorial disputes since 1947 have been discussed 
in chapters two and 
three. These are important to demonstrate that the ideological friction 
between the two 
states has moved far beyond the usual confines of the usual topic 
for Indo-Pakistan 
relations, the Kashmir valley. These territorial disputes 
demonstrate an empirical and 
territorial shift emanating from ideological friction that creates transience 
in the 
nature and culture of anarchy between India and 
Pakistan. 
As for the future direction of anarchy between India Pakistan relations, wie can 
look to 
important political changes that will occur 
in the subcontinent. Changes in 
government in Delhi and Islamabad are 
important, as 1965 demonstrated, a change of 
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government in Delhi following the death of Nehru, was followed by military conflict 
in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir. In 1971, political upheaval and civil conflict in 
East Pakistan was followed by the most violent military clash between the two states. 
concluding with the termination of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh. 
In 2004 however a change in government in Delhi with the ending of the BJP 
coalition and the return of the Congress party to government did not trigger an}, major 
political or military escalation. We can only ask the question at this stage, will the end 
of General Musharraf's period in office have an equally neutral impact on relations? 
Or perhaps more importantly, how will any new government in Islamabad approach 
India Pakistan relations? 
Further testing for nuclear yields remains a near certainty in South Asia as both states 
continue with the process of weaponization. How Pakistan reacts to likely further tests 
at Pokharan remains an unanswerable question, it will however yield important 
information and knowledge as to where Pakistan regards itself as being within the 
theoretical remit of this thesis - rival or enemy? Another important indicator of the 
direction relations is heading will be if India gives Pakistan prior notice of any future 
nuclear testing. If, as India claims, Pakistan is not part of its nuclearisation policy and 
strategy, there is no reason why prior warning cannot be issued. 
South Asia and International Politics 
As a discipline, IR was not aware or sensitive to the seismic shift in international 
relations that occurred in the late 1980's that ultimately led to the end of the cold Nvar 
and IR seems similarly unprepared for any future shift in global power. 
Failure to 
predict the implosion of the USSR can be put down to too much 
inter theoretical 
debate within the discipline and too little analysis on the relationship 
between 
domestic and international politics. Future events in and around 
South Asia will have 
an increasing impact on international politics and IR 
is still ill equipped for this shift 
in global power. 
Relations between the USA and China and indeed relations between India and China 
will be one of the most important manifestations 
in international politics and \\111 play 
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a major role in shaping the nature of international politics in the 21 S` century and 
probably beyond and yet IR has little to say on the region - this must change. 
This thesis has attempted to offer a new theoretical framework from which to draw 
inference from, this is important because at the present time Indo-Pakistan relations 
suffers from a lack of theorisation. Since 1947, South Asia has lived with the political 
consequences and implications of an agenda set in Europe or Washington. but this 
will change when South Asia and China begin to set the agenda for international 
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